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Energy impacts our lives in a multitude of ways. Some of these impacts can drastically improve our 
lives, others can be detrimental to the things we value in life. In this thesis, I develop a space through 
which to connect energy to the things we value to better understand and articulate the impacts of energy 
systems.  
To develop this space, I explored the ways through which we have commonly connected energy systems 
to the things we value and investigated the efficacy of more recent attempts to understand these 
connections through ideas of energy justice. To assess the efficacy of these approaches, I outlined the 
role moral and political philosophy can plausibly play in describing the things we value and their 
relations to energy systems. I found a substantial divergence between my own account of the role of 
moral and political theory in describing the impacts of energy systems and the uses of moral and 
political theory in existing approaches to energy justice. I argued this divergence limits the capacity of 
energy justice approaches to draw on moral and political philosophy to articulate and analyse the 
impacts of energy system in a meaningful way. 
I produced a series of outputs which form a foundation for a viable account of energy justice. I 
developed a capabilities-based framework to articulate the impacts of energy consumption and 
production and the tensions between them. I outlined a pluralistic approach of testing the ability of 
different moral theories to reflect the dynamics underpinning energy dilemmas. I presented arguments 
detailing how trivalent conceptions of justice, which pre-date energy justice discourse, can form a viable 
basis for an account of energy justice. In concluding, I point towards future avenues of research, 
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1 Chapter 1 Energy and the things we value 
 
This thesis focuses on the relationships between energy systems and justice; how we should discuss 
these and how we can best capture them. Early on, this thesis points to a collection of literature which 
illustrates how both the production and consumption of energy can significantly impact on attaining or 
being deprived of the things we hold valuable in life. Describing the aspects of energy systems that 
impact the things we value is only one side of understanding these relationships. Understanding and 
articulating what it is in life which we hold valuable and how we might meaningfully connect these 
values to energy systems is another substantial pursuit. It is this latter pursuit on which this thesis 
primarily focuses.  
A central facet of this thesis is that to understand the relationships between energy systems and the 
things we value requires an effective means of articulating the things we hold valuable, connecting 
them, and understanding how energy systems impact these valuable things. Disciplines which study the 
production and consumption of energy are not always best situated to conceptualise or capture these 
complex relationships. The introduction of this thesis outlines why this is and sets out a framework 
which reaches the necessary level of abstraction for both the things we value and different aspects of 
energy systems to allow us to discuss them in relation to one another, enabling the illustration of the 
important relationships between them. 
The first section of this chapter moves briefly through ways in which energy systems have been 
connected to our lives through the dichotomy of production and consumption. Developments in this 
thinking are drawn on to illustrate how the production and consumption of energy stem from 
interconnected systems which impact the things we hold valuable in both positive and negative ways.  
The following sections focus on understanding how the production and consumption of energy in 
relation to things we value can help to explicate the role of energy in our lives and the importance of 
such values in shaping the systems that produce the energy we use. Section 1.1 elaborates on the need 
to discuss energy at a level of abstraction which connects to our lives. Section 1.2.1 – 1.2.3 outlines the 
ways in which this level of abstractions has been achieved and the developments which have produced 
more nuanced understandings of energy systems. Section 1.2.4 introduces the concept of the “energy 
dilemma” and outlines how we might understand the connections between energy systems and our lives 
as pertaining to moral issues. Section 1.3 covers existing work, namely approaches to energy justice, 
which attempts to explicate and respond to energy dilemmas using ideas of justice from moral and 
political philosophy. Section 1.4 outlines several moral and political distinctions and concepts which 
offer a preliminary understanding of justice and which help to justify the selection and use of moral 
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concepts used throughout the rest of the thesis. Section 1.5 illustrates how these distinctions and 
concepts can be used to question the efficacy of existing approaches to energy justice, and how these 
concepts might be used to further develop our understanding of the relationship between energy systems 
and the things we value and the importance of understanding this. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 outline the 
methods employed in this thesis and breakdown where these methods are employed throughout this 
thesis.  
1.1 Understanding energy 
‘Why does energy exist? One does not see or feel energy. You can detect directly and sensorially certain 
parameters that are related to the quantity called energy: mass, temperature, velocity, shape, phase, 
position, chemical composition, electric charge, separation, etc.  But none of these is energy’ (Lehrman, 
1973 p.15) 
Despite ambiguity over its definition, energy is a measurable property and its transformations and 
subsequent effects can be observed and accounted for with relative confidence. Lancor (2014) describes 
energy as ‘rich in lexical and conceptual complexity that makes it fertile ground for misunderstandings’. 
It is a broad idea that arises in and embodies numerous disciplines, discourses and abstractions 
(Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014). Different fields provide their own working definition that is useful in 
their own context, but these definitions are not always uniform (Lancor, 2014). The first law of 
thermodynamics states that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. The quantity of energy in the 
universe is fixed, only transforming from one form to another, never decreasing nor increasing. All 
events require the transfer of energy from one system to another – if an object is to be moved or heated 
it must have some force transferred to it to do so – natural scientists refer to this as performing ‘work’ 
on an object. However, this concept of work is seemingly detached from the lives we live and does not 
readily help us articulate the relationship between energy and the things we value.1   
Instead of energy transformations, the relationship between energy and the things we value might be 
better articulated through discussing energy in terms of trophic levels – the different stages through 
which energy is transferred in ecosystems. Biological sciences describe life as a continuous input of 
energy. Light produced as a product of fusion occurring in the centre of our sun, is converted into 
chemical energy via photosynthesising cells, which is in turn used to produce biomass. Biomass is 
consumed by animals (including us humans), the chemical energy locked in this biomass enables us to 
move, work, think, and reproduce – things we might reasonably value. However, these transfers of 
energy focus exclusively on the energy we ingest and absorb. We are surrounded by and embedded in 
a range of systems which enable us to attain different ends by harnessing energy in varying forms to 
 




achieve valuable outcomes. Trophic levels do not incorporate the energy in these systems or provide 
means to connecting these systems to things we value.  
Neither the language of transformations, nor trophic levels can adequately describe the relationships 
between our use and production of energy and the things we value. When thought of in these ways, 
energy seems almost entirely removed from the areas of our lives which we might have reason to value. 
This thesis is not so much concerned with explaining energy transformations or trophic level energy 
transfers, but rather in how energy, our capture and use of it, overlaps with what we value about our 
own lives and the lives of others, and how we might better come to understand and articulate this. 
Releasing the chemical energy stored in biomass to heat food or between hydrocarbons to push the 
pistons which power a motor car, or converting the potential energy of water stored in a dam into electric 
charge to power a street light, are all examples that we can begin to relate to the lives of humans. 
However, to meaningfully discuss these issues requires terminology and concepts that can capture both 
the complexity of energy systems and the quality of human lives. This requires discussing energy at an 
abstraction beyond that of a property that is transferred between objects or through trophic levels. The 
following sections explore two ways in which literature has articulated the relationship between energy 
and our lives: through consumption and through production.  
 
Figure 1-1 Arriving at conceptions of energy which enable the articulation and relation to human lives. Source: Own 
illustration produced using draw.io 
4 
 
1.2 Contextualising energy: from production to consumption 
1.2.1 Consumption and Access 
The ability of a society to capture and consume energy has been and remains seen as fundamental to 
development (White and Carneiro, 1949, United Nations, 2018). Development is often viewed 
normatively as progress, although ideas of development and the means to achieve these are being 
increasingly contested (Steinberger et al., 2012, Raworth, 2017, Raworth, 2012, O’Neill et al., 2018, 
Steffen et al., 2015). For example, Steinberger and Roberts (2010) found that increasing energy use 
beyond a certain level did not necessarily result increases in a range of human development indicators.  
Aside from arguments contesting the extent to which energy use contributes to development, the 
indicators on which development is measured may not be the most effective means of articulating why 
energy access is important in our daily pursuits. For example, the human development index is a 
composite of life expectancy, gross national income per capita, and level of education, but these 
concepts alone do not provide the explanatory link between energy access and the other areas of our 
lives which we value, such as participating in society. Therefore, although development and associated 
ideas of progress are linked to energy access, it does not necessarily help us to understand the 
importance of energy access in our lives. Rather, it might be more appropriate to see development and 
energy access as aiming towards the same ends - as opposed to framing energy access as a means to 
development.  To better understand these ends it helps to visit literature on energy access.  
Discussion of energy relating to human lives has often been framed in terms of access (Bickerstaff et 
al., 2013, Walker and Day, 2012, Gillard et al., 2017). Access has often been articulated in terms of the 
ability to use a range of energy services (lighting, heating, refrigeration etc.), which are frequently 
embedded within a domestic setting (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015). These services all depend on the 
delivery of energy in various forms to certain locations. This energy will likely have been embodied in 
natural resources such as coal, oil, gas, moving water, wind, and sunlight – energy in this form is often 
described as ‘primary energy’ or ‘energy carriers’ (Pachauri et al., 2004). The primary energy which is 
delivered to humans in the form of services is referred to as ‘end-use energy’ (Sovacool, 2011). ‘Energy 
services’ subsequently acts as a term which enables the relation of energy, held and carried in various 
forms, to services which improve a human life (Sovacool, 2011, Fell, 2017).  
Discussing our relationships with energy in these terms creates a space for the articulation of the benefits 
of energy access for humans. For example, the delivery of primary energy in the form of gas, enables 
us to heat our homes and prepare food, whilst being connected to electrical grids enables us to illuminate 
these spaces. These services in turn yield numerous benefits to our mental and physical health (Liddell 
and Morris, 2010, Marmot et al., 2011). Living in a warm, well-lit home for example, helps people to 
avoid and recover from illness, but can also produce a suitable environment for a child to study and 
complete their homework (Liddell, 2009). Of course, the converse is true of these relationships. Living 
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in a cold, poorly lit home, may exacerbate an illness and make it difficult for a child to study at home. 
As such discourses which focus on energy access are primarily motivated by the problems stemming 
from its absence (Boardman, 1991, Boardman, 2013).  
Discourses focusing on the deprivation of adequate energy services have sought to conceptualise these 
issues under terms such ‘fuel-poverty’, ‘energy-poverty’ and ‘domestic energy deprivation’ 
(Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015). Li et al. (2014) note that there has been significant confusion as to 
what each term aims to captures, with certain authors taking them to be synonyms, whilst other pointing 
out key differences and functions in the individual concepts. Bouzarovski and Petrova (2015) outline 
‘energy poverty’ as a term used to describe low levels of networked energy provision due to economic 
under-development, and ‘fuel poverty’ as a term to describe rising energy costs and issues of access 
within developed countries. Regardless, each term embodies or relates to a concern regarding the 
impacts of inadequate access to a set of energy services (although this concern might not always be 
articulated in relation to “services”). 
Both energy and fuel poverty have traditionally focused on energy within the home, and subsequently 
often end up focusing on thermal energy and lighting (Buzar, 2016, Li et al., 2014, Sovacool et al., 
2012). Energy services, however, improve our lives in other ways external to the domestic setting. In 
order to capture these interactions some scholars have proposed expanding the scope of these concepts. 
Sovacool et al. (2012) put forward arguments to broaden the scope of energy poverty, arguing that 
mechanical power and mobility are essential energy services in reducing poverty (also see Lucas et al. 
(2016) and Mattioli et al. (2017)). Such additions to these concepts help us recognise the breadth of 
impacts energy access (or lack of) has on human lives.   
As we introduce more variables, discussing energy in terms of access becomes ever more complex. 
Inequalities between demographics and different personal situations mean that a set of energy services 
or level of access to end-use energy for one person will not result in the same outcomes for another. 
Walker and Day (2012) for example, outline how fuel poverty strongly reflects several social 
inequalities, illustrating that factors such as income, age, health, and disabilities all affect how 
vulnerable a person is to fuel poverty. 
Further questions then arise as to what level of deprivation of these services requires action to be taken 
(Walker and Day, 2012). Judging which services, and to what levels, we should prioritise ultimately 
entails judging which activities and states we value and which spatial, social, economic, and political 
features impede or facilitate the attainment of these (Bouzarovski and Simcock, 2017). The goal of 
these discourses is not the provision of specific services, but to deliver certain outcomes for people and 
societies. These judgements often ultimately rely on normative beliefs, intuition, and reasoning. An 
outcome like good health seems to be an intuitive and objective goal that the provision of energy 
services can aim to contribute to. However, once we again ask why good health is important, our 
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answers lead us back to normative reasoning; good health is pertinent to maintaining healthy social 
relations, being able to participate in society, being able to reason. But there is no way to objectively 
prove that to do, be, and have certain things is right or good. Ways of exploring, articulating, and 
reasoning which outcomes we should aim for and which things in life we should value are explored 
shortly. However, first it is important to explore the other ways in which energy and the systems that 
extract, transport, and produce it relate to human lives.  
1.2.2 Extraction and production  
The extraction and production of energy impacts the lives of humans across a range of scales. Primary 
energy sources, such as coal can help illustrate this point. The extraction of coal is associated with a 
range of issues that relate to the quality of people’s lives. For example, figure 1-2 taken from Healy et 
al. (2019) illustrates a range of issues stemming from coal supply-chains which impact on the quality 
of people’s lives, including forcible displacement, hazardous waste and environmental contamination. 
Later the combustion of this coal, to produce heat and electricity, will emit greenhouse gases, 
contributing to on-going climate change (IPCC, 2018).  
 
Figure 1-2 Healy et al.'s, (2019) illustration of energy issues associated with the coal supply chains from extraction through 
to waste disposal. 
Climate change itself underpins and contributes to a multitude of issues such as famine, dislocation and 
separation, droughts, and heat-waves, and these events and situations contribute to many forms of 
human suffering (Adger, 2006, Shue, 2014, Kinney et al., 2008, Greenough et al., 2001, Rosenzweig et 
al., 2001). Evidently a single energy source can produce a range of issues and hazards throughout its 
extraction, production, and use. Many such examples exist. Air pollution, a cause of respiratory 
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diseases, is linked both to industrial energy use and the combustion of fossil fuels for freight, public 
and private transport (Gallagher, 2005, Derwent et al., 2005, Gulliver and Briggs, 2004, Harrison et al., 
2015). Wind turbines can spoil the visual and audio landscape for those who live in proximity to them 
(Petrova, 2016, Wolsink, 2000). Nuclear energy and its accompanying waste poses security risks and 
disposal problems for present and future generations (Berkovitz, 1992). The use of hydroelectric 
technology is a source of displacement and can disrupt ecological and agricultural systems and thus 
local food security (Xie, 2003, Zhouri and Oliveira, 2006).  
Evidently the production of energy can negatively impact a range of things we value. In noting this, we 
can therefore see that both energy production and consumption are connected to the attainment and 
deprivation of many things we might have reason to value. The following sections outline how we might 
connect and discuss these issues in tandem.  
1.2.3 “Whole systems” 
So far, I have established that issues surrounding energy systems have been conventionally viewed as 
either pertaining to consumption or production. However, within recent energy scholarship there has 
been a push to recognise the interconnectedness of issues of consumption and production (Winskel, 
2018, Sovacool et al., 2015, Bouzarovski and Simcock, 2017). I specify recent energy scholarship 
because work exists external to this sphere has articulated similar dynamic in relation to issues of 
environmental justice, which often begin with, or relate to, the production or consumption of energy 
(see Holifield et al., 2009, Walker, 2009). Within energy justice, a discourse and set of approaches 
explored in later sections, this push has manifested as a “whole systems” approach (Jenkins et al., 2016, 
Jenkins et al., 2014).  
Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017) offer an apt description of this as a call to “transcend the production-
consumption binary”. Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017) describe how energy poverty, an issue typically 
described as occurring at the end-use stage of energy systems can be influenced by factors such as local 
climates, the quality of housing stock, and the quality of energy transmission infrastructure. The logic 
underpinning “whole systems” therefore is that focusing on specific points at which energy related 
problems manifest may not reveal the underlying causes of the issue.  
1.2.4 Introducing the energy dilemma 
The range of energy related issues discussed so far can be described using the term ‘energy dilemma’ 
(Sovacool, 2008, Bradshaw, 2010, Qing and Sullivan, 1999). This term is often used loosely, and I have 
been unable to find a definition for it. Authors tend to draw on the term when describing a specific issue 
or set of issues which result from an energy system. For example, a country’s need to transition to 
renewable energy whilst meeting growing energy demand might be termed an energy dilemma, but so 
might the public opposition to a small scale wind development, or any of the issues revolving around 
energy access discussed above. Fuel or energy poverty and their underpinning social and material 
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deprivations might also be summarised using the term. In this way ‘energy dilemma’ can act as a useful 
catch all for any issue pertaining to energy systems, not just describing a problem that exists in a singular 
instance or space, but one that is connected to and exists in tension with other phenomena and dynamics 
in broader society.  
Authors tend to discuss energy dilemmas from a normative standpoint. They are described as normative 
because they deviate from how a person believes the world ought to be. This view of the world is often 
informed by implicit assumptions about the types of lives, goods, and states people or societies are 
entitled to live, have, and be. We can objectively measure how many households have poor insulation 
or how many populations are displaced by large scale energy projects, but we have to draw on reason 
and intuition to justify why the consequences of these situations are worthy of discussion or concern.  
Often, we assume which situations and events are problematic because they conflict with something we 
hold valuable, whether that is freedom, fairness, equality, democracy, autonomy, or some other value. 
Moral values like these are inherent in fully realising and understanding the range of issues energy 
systems present us with today (Hall, 2013, Sovacool et al., 2013, Jones et al., 2015). The following 
section outlines a simple exercise to illustrate how we might arrive at connecting certain values to the 
benefits and burdens which arise from and in relation to energy systems.  
1.2.5 Energy Dilemmas and Moral Dilemmas 
Because of its broad range of uses, describing an energy related situation or event as ‘energy dilemma’ 
has a limited capacity to convey seriousness or severity; little information is expressed regarding the 
urgency and extent to which an energy dilemma impacts the things we value. This disconnect between 
energy dilemmas and their apparent ethical implications has prompted a number authors to reassess 
how we discuss and view energy systems (Sovacool et al., 2016, Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014, Jones 
et al., 2015). Within the past decade many energy scholars have attempted to broaden their focus to 
incorporate these issues into energy scholarship and policy (Bickerstaff et al., 2013, Walker and Day, 
2012, Healy et al., 2019, McCauley et al., 2013, Jenkins et al., 2016, Sovacool et al., 2013, Sovacool 
and Dworkin, 2014, Hall, 2013). These approaches will be explored in greater detail shortly. However, 
I find it useful to outline a simple exercise concerning the use of moral theory to outline and frame an 
energy dilemma.  
This particular exercise draws on the work of Aristotle to arrive at a goal or value to which our actions 
should aim, once we discover this value, we can then use it to assess how access to energy and the issues 
which spawn from energy systems aid or hinder our pursuit of this goal. This method is just one example 
as to how we might reason what is important in our lives and the lives of others. The literature on 
morality and justice is vast and contains a multitude of approaches to reasoning and justifying what is 
morally important. I chose to draw on Aristotle’s approach here because of its simplicity and 
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approachability - it seems a good place to start the ball rolling when introducing more complex and 
detailed understandings of morality and justice later. 
1.2.6 An exercise in framing energy dilemmas through ‘the ultimate end’ 
In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle asks ‘what is the ultimate purpose of human existence?’ In asking this 
Aristotle is pursuing the ultimate end of all our actions (Ross et al., 2009). Aristotle reasons ‘to be an 
ultimate end, an act must be self-sufficient and final, that which is always desirable in itself and never 
for the sake of something else’. To answer his question Aristotle assesses whether the ends of certain 
actions are actually in the pursuit of something else. Essentially asking why we want a particular good 
or outcome from a pursuit. Aristotle concludes ‘it is easy enough to see that we desire money, pleasure, 
and honour only because we believe that these goods will make us happy. It seems that all other goods 
are a means towards obtaining happiness, while happiness is always an end in itself.’  
By happiness Aristotle is referring to the concept of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia differs from traditional 
conceptions of happiness as an emotion or state that can be brought on in a pleasant situation. Instead 
edaimonia is a richer concept which embodies ideas of flourishing and well-being, which might consist 
of numerous components e.g. health, education, friendships, participation, autonomy etc. Importantly 
this conception of ‘happiness’ or Eudaimonia is not a means to anything else. And Aristotle argues it is 
this good to which all other activities ultimately aim.  
Combined, the exercises illustrated in figures 1-3 and 1-4 below, illustrate how pursuing the “ultimate 
end” of energy use offers a means, albeit a simple one, of providing a level of abstraction to 
meaningfully articulate how energy systems relate to human lives – their impact on the attainment of 
“the good”.  Here we don’t have to subscribe to the idea of Eudaimonia, many contemporary theories 
of morality and justice make space for pluralistic conceptions of the good – the idea that different groups 
and people will have overlapping but differing ideas about what is valuable in life. These ideas are 
explored further in later sections (chapters three and four) on capabilities and justice, but I raise this 
here because we can follow a similar line of enquiry when trying to capture why particular aspects of 
energy dilemmas are important.  
Using an example of accessing energy services (see figure 1-3), we can ask ‘why is it important we 
have access to adequate lighting?’ This question has multiple answers, for example we might answer, 
so we can study at home, prepare food when it is dark outside, have guests in our home, and move 
around safely in the night. Each of these answers seems reasonable. But we can follow our line of 
questioning and ask why each of the outcomes is important; having guests enables the fostering and 
maintenance of relationships, preparing food in a safe environment contributes to our health, studying 
at home can improve our employment prospects. The further we follow this line of reasoning the more 
abstract our answer will become.  
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An answer which seems to meet the criteria of ‘self-sufficient and final’, the ultimate reason for 
measuring, conceptualising, and responding to these issues might be to improve the lives of people are 
able to lead. Accurately capturing and conceptualising how inadequate access to energy can result in 
the deprivation of things we value is a vital step towards recognising how we can improve our lives. 
Similarly, we can view a range of energy dilemmas in reference to how they interfere with the things 
we conclude are important in our lives.  
 
Figure 1-3 a visualisation exploring the ultimate ends of energy services. Source: own illustration produced on draw.io 
It might have become apparent that reasons we believe energy access to be important are also the 
reasons why we find many other things important. The list of goods we need to flourish that energy 
access can help sustain might also be degraded through the outputs of energy systems. For example, we 
know that energy access can help us maintain good health but certain products of energy use and 
production - air pollution for example - can result in the deprivation of good health. Good health is key 
to many conceptions of a good life (Nussbaum, 2001, Doyal and Gough, 1984, Max-Neef, 1991). As 
such we can use a similar line of reasoning to frame why certain aspects and impacts of energy systems 
impede the ability of humans to live out their conception of the good life. Figure 1-4 illustrates this 
method, using ideas of the ultimate end to explain why an energy dilemma is a moral problem.  
 





This exercise has illustrated one way in which we might begin to view and understand the moral 
implications of energy dilemmas. Later, this chapter uses the idea of the ultimate end to set out concepts 
and approaches which can help explore and connect different conceptions of this “ultimate end” to the 
impacts of energy dilemmas on the things we value. I use the idea of an ultimate end to illustrate how 
concepts from moral and political philosophy can be used to frame and articulate complex energy 
dilemmas that span entire energy systems; and how we might understand the necessary spaces for 
people who endure energy dilemmas to articulate their own values in relation to these energy dilemmas. 
Before doing so, I discuss a growing range of literature which has begun to relate moral concepts, 
primarily ideas of justice, to energy systems in different ways. Many contributions of this thesis arise 
from building on or responding to this literature.  
1.3 Energy and justice: emerging research  
So far, I have outlined the different ways in which different types of energy dilemmas have been 
discussed and I have illustrated a simple way in which we might connect these dilemmas to the things 
we hold valuable about our lives. Understanding how we might arrive at considering something 
normatively or morally problematic does not just depend on how an energy dilemma relates directly to 
an abstract value but also depends on understanding how societal, material, and political dynamics 
interact with the attainment or deprivation of this value.  
This thesis attempts to establish and understand the efficacy of several recent attempts to use ideas of 
the things we value, as a means of connecting energy systems to their ethical implications (such 
approaches do so through drawing on ideas of justice which are explored in the following sections). 
Based on this enquiry, the outputs of this thesis set the foundations for a broad account of how energy 
dilemmas relate to the valuable aspects of our lives.  
In the following sections I outline two key areas of research which are either critiqued or drawn on 
throughout this thesis. First is the discourse of “energy justice”. Energy justice as a discourse consists 
of a number of disparate uses of moral and normative concepts to frame and explore a range of energy 
dilemmas, but also contains a number of broader over-arching approaches to energy justice. It is 
primarily these over-arching approaches on which this thesis focuses. Second, are ideas from moral and 
political philosophy which I see as essential tools in assessing gaps in current approaches to energy 
justice and then in developing an alternative means of connecting our values to impacts of energy 
dilemmas. The capability approach is featured in each chapter of this thesis and offers what I argue is a 
viable space in which to link the impacts of energy dilemmas to people’s lives in a meaningful way.  
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1.3.1 Energy justice: decoupling discourses and approaches 
Over the past decade a burgeoning range of literature has drawn on different moral concepts to explore, 
analyse, and advise on a range of energy dilemmas (Cowell et al., 2011, Walker and Day, 2012, 
Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012, Sovacool et al., 2013, McCauley et al., 2013, Bickerstaff et al., 2013, 
Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014, Snell et al., 2015, Jones et al., 2015, Mattioli, 2016, LaBelle, 2017, 
Galvin, 2019, Pellegrini-Masini et al., 2020, Middlemiss et al., 2019, Day et al., 2016). A key motivation 
for the import of moral concepts into energy scholarship, is that often energy decisions are decoupled 
from the range of ethical issues they create or compound (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). Moral 
concepts and ideas of justice in particular, are argued to provide important structures through which to 
connect energy systems and their ethical consequences (Sovacool et al., 2016).  
This general approach of applying ideas of justice to energy dilemmas has spawned a discourse often 
referred to as “energy justice”. However, before proceeding, it is important to note that relating justice 
to problems stemming from or relating to energy systems is not a novel idea. A number of literatures 
and discourses, on which certain energy justice approaches draw on, already focus on energy dilemmas 
(Walker, 2012, Schlosberg, 2012, Schlosberg, 2009, Schlosberg, 2004, Müller, 2001, Paavola and 
Adger, 2002, Adger et al., 2006, Shue, 2014).  
Energy justice discourse consists of a diversity of contributions. For example, a collection edited by 
Bickerstaff et al. (2013) contains pieces of work on issues surrounding energy vulnerability, energy 
production, low carbon transition and nuclear energy. These contributions range in their appeal and use 
of philosophical concepts, with certain authors drawing substantially on particular concepts and ideas 
of justice to discuss an issue (Fuller and Bulkeley, 2013), whilst others draw more generally on broadly 
interpretable concepts such as equity and fairness (Adams et al., 2013). In such collections of work 
energy justice is used as a broad umbrella term, within which a range of energy dilemmas, discrete 
approaches, and framings sit simultaneously. 
Within energy justice discourse however, individual approaches exist, which seek to offer over-arching 
approaches or visions of energy justice. These approaches do not solely draw on moral concepts as 
exploratory or analytical tools to address individual energy dilemmas but attempt to offer a conception 
of “energy justice” that can be applied to and encompass a broad range of energy dilemmas (Sovacool 
et al., 2017, Jenkins et al., 2016, Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014). For simplicity, I refer to these works 
as “approaches” but, amongst other things, they have been referred to as normative approaches, 
frameworks for analysis, movements, and a ‘cross-cutting social science research agenda’ (Jenkins et 
al., 2016, Sovacool et al., 2016, Fuller and McCauley, 2016). It can therefore be confusing deciphering 
the exact functions and purpose of each approach to energy justice – and establishing this, forms a key 
part of this thesis.  
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Confusion over the purpose of these approaches can be compounded as proponents of these approaches 
often conflate energy justice discourse with their own individual approach (See Jenkins et al., 2016, 
Jenkins, 2018). A number of special editions and collections for example, begin by outlining energy 
justice in terms of particular individual approaches, despite contributions to these editions not 
subscribing to or applying these approaches (See Jenkins et al., 2017, McCauley et al., 2019).  
For now, however, we can describe energy justice discourse as a collection of disparate and diverse 
uses of moral and broadly normative concepts to frame and explore a variety of energy dilemmas in 
discrete instances; and we can describe individual approaches as seeking to construct an over-arching 
framework which is designed to be applied to a range of energy dilemmas as to provide insights and 
normative guidance relevant to responding to these dilemmas. This is a slight over-simplification, as 
many discrete contributions to energy justice discourse can make valuable contributions to broader 
understandings of energy and ideas of justice, but for now this distinction suffices for separating these 
approaches from broader energy justice discourse.  
1.3.2 Approaches to Energy Justice: 
Within energy justice discourse two approaches have become particularly prominent, named here as the 
the principled approach and the triumvirate conception of energy justice (See respectively Sovacool 
and Dworkin, 2014, McCauley et al., 2013). Here I briefly describe the approaches based on the claims 
and descriptions given by their respective authors. However, many of these claims are critically assessed 
and challenged in chapter three and four of this thesis. 
“A triumvirate conception” 
Originally laid out in McCauley et al. (2013) underpinned by a trivalent account of justice which 
presents energy justice as consisting of three core components: procedural, recognition-based and 
distributive justice. These broad interpretations of justice are often used to categorise and, to an extent, 
describe certain aspects of energy dilemmas. The triumvirate conception of energy justice has the goal 
of providing ‘all individuals, across all areas, with safe, affordable and sustainable energy’ (McCauley 
et al., 2013, Jenkins et al., 2016). This approach has also had significant uptake within broader energy 
justice discourse. Throughout this thesis this approach is referred to as the triumvirate conception of 
energy justice or the “TCEJ”. Scholarship focusing on this approach makes frequent claims regarding 
the approaches’ ability to guide “ethically sound” decision making and to identify and respond to energy 
related injustice (Jenkins and Martiskainen, 2018, Heffron et al., 2015, Heffron and McCauley, 2017). 
The TCEJ loosely resembles earlier trivalent accounts of environmental justice, which also described 
justice as consisting of distributive, procedural and recognition-based dimensions (Schlosberg, 2009, 
Schlosberg, 2004, Schlosberg, 2013). However, the TCEJ differs substantially in its interpretation and 
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use of these dimensions of justice - this is discussed substantially in chapter four.2 However, to 
summarise here, the TCEJ’s own interpretation of a trivalent conception of justice overlooks key details 
that enable a trivalent conception of justice to reflect and help to understand how particular grievances 
arise and are perpetuated. These issues stem primarily from the TCEJ’s tendency to isolate each 
dimension of a trivalent account of justice (distribution, recognition and procedure). In earlier accounts 
of trivalent justice, the connections between distributive, recognition-based, and procedural issues are 
key to understanding how a single grievance can stem from and be perpetuated by each of these three 
dimensions. The separation of these dimension within the TCEJ literature acts to conceal the 
relationships between them and therefore limits our understanding of energy dilemmas and the way in 
which we might respond to them. This thesis uses the term TCEJ to refer to the frameworks set out in 
a specific group of literature (Jenkins, 2018, Jenkins and Martiskainen, 2018, Jenkins et al., 2017, 
Jenkins et al., 2016, Jenkins et al., 2014, McCauley et al., 2013, Heffron and McCauley, 2014, Heffron 
et al., 2015, McCauley et al., 2016, Heffron and McCauley, 2017).  
“A principled approach” 
A framework initially outlined in Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) offering normative principles to guide 
and frame the formulation of responses to current energy dilemmas and future energy policy based on 
a survey of philosophical concepts and accounts of justice.3 This approach draws on a range of moral 
theory and concepts initially: virtue, utility, human rights, procedural justice, welfare and happiness, 
freedom, posterity, and fairness (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014). Responding to criticism that the 
approach only contained western concepts a number of “non-western” theories and concepts were 
added: ubuntu, Taoism and Confucianism, Hinduism and Dharma, Buddhism and indigenous 
perspectives of the Americas (Sovacool et al., 2017). A key output from this approach is, as LaBelle 
(2017) refers to it,  a “normative checklist” of values that energy decisions should promote: availability, 
affordability, due process, good governance, sustainability, intergenerational equity, intragenerational 
equity, and responsibility (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014). This approach to energy justice envisions ‘a 
 
2 Trivalent conceptions of environmental justice feature prominently in chapter four of this thesis, offering an 
understanding of the dynamics which modulate the attainment or deprivation of capability in a broader 
foundation of an account of a viable energy justice. 
3 Another work proposed by Sovacool et al., (2013) synthesises two principles from reviewing a range of justice 
literature: a prohibitive principles which states: ‘Energy systems must be designed and constructed in such a 
way that they do not unduly interfere with the ability of people to acquire those basic goods to which they are 
justly entitled.’ And an affirmative principle that follows: ‘If any of the basic goods to which people are justly 
entitled can only be secured by means of energy services, then in that case there is also a derivative entitlement 
to the energy services’. This work is apt in describing why energy systems are linked to varying conceptions 
justice and is sometimes cited in literature on the principled approach initially outlined in Sovacool and 
Dworkin (2014) but is markedly different in structure and function to principled approach. This work is drawn 





global energy system that fairly disseminates both the benefits and costs of energy services, and one 
that contributes to more representative and impartial energy decision-making’ (Sovacool et al., 2016).  
A key theme in both these approaches is that appealing to certain moral values and ideas of justice can 
result in “fairer” or “just” energy systems and energy decision-making (Jenkins et al., 2016, McCauley, 
2017, Sovacool et al., 2016). Authors of the TCEJ in particular make a number of claims regarding their 
approach. Heffron et al. (2015), for example claim ‘energy justice can achieve a just and equitable 
balance between the three dimensions of the energy trilemma [which Heffron et al. (2015) describe as 
policy, economics, and environment]’; whilst Jenkins et al. (2018), in reference to energy transitions, 
suggest the approach must be engaged with to uncover what is “just, equitable and right”. The validity 
of these claims and others are examined in chapter three and four.  
Both approaches adopt, and to a certain extent develop, the aforementioned “whole systems” approach 
(Sovacool et al., 2019, Jenkins et al., 2014). In doing so, both can be seen to contain “calls” to transcend 
the production-consumption binary – to view energy dilemmas as embedded and connected to the 
broader energy systems and societies (Jenkins et al., 2016, Sovacool et al., 2016). Both approaches also 
view energy systems and their associated dilemmas as amalgamations of social and technical factors 
(Jenkins et al., 2014, Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). 
These approaches are not the sole focus of this thesis but require substantial examination because they 
initially appear to be exploring a key component of this thesis: articulating the intersection between 
energy systems, the things we value, and the role of moral theory in exploring and articulating this. In 
this thesis the TCEJ ultimately draws more focus for two reasons. One is because of its extensive claims 
to be able to produce certain normative outputs and guidance. The other is that out of the two 
approaches, the TCEJ has been positioned as improving upon existing “grounded” work on justice, 
namely accounts of environmental justice (Jenkins, 2018, Heffron et al., 2015). However, both 
approaches feature significantly throughout this thesis.  
For the past decade, the literature on energy justice approaches has remained largely uncritical of itself. 
Two outputs in particular which critically seek to develop existing approaches to energy justice 
approaches are the ones of Galvin (2019) and Pellegrini-Masini et al. (2020)4. However, authors and 
proponents of the TCEJ and principled approach have scarcely revisited their approaches with a critical 
lens and the rare instances where they claim to do so have, in some instances, transformed into advocacy 
for their approach.  
One of few examples can be found in Heffron and McCauley (2017), who despite claiming to provide 
the first critical account of the emergence of the energy justice concept in research and practice (they 
 
4 I emphasise “critically” here because there are numerous other articles which add and remove concepts from 
energy justice approaches without providing a critique of the approaches. I detail both Galvin (2019) and 
Pellegrini-Masini et al. (2020) in chapter 5.  
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claim multiple times to provide a “critical theoretical exploration of energy justice frameworks” and a 
“critical account of the emergence of the energy justice concept”), soon after state “it is not the aim of 
this paper to critically assess these frameworks but in terms of assessing their value to different 
disciplines and exploring their merit”. Instead, they critique “how scholarship has engaged with them 
[energy justice] and how these concepts have engaged with policy”. After this “critique”, Heffron and 
McCauley (2017) conclude that their “critical account of the energy justice concept builds evidence for 
policy-makers to justify its use. It is the first article to account for its beginning in both practice and 
research.” 
Some self-critiques have resulted in more fruitful additions to energy justice approaches. Sovacool et 
al. (2017) for example, respond to criticism that their “principled approach” is dominated by western 
perspectives and so move to include a more diverse range of non-western philosophies. However, by 
and large the underlying structures and methods of these approaches have remained unchanged since 
their initial inceptions. For instance, the triumvirate approach to energy justice set out in McCauley et 
al. (2013) is repeated in McCauley et al. (2019). It is only very recently that some authors have noted 
the tendency and limited impact yielded by literature which repeats an over-arching approach to energy 
justice without developing it further (Jenkins et al., 2020).  
A constant trait of work on these approaches is that although they might occasionally include a new 
moral concept the actual underlying working of these approaches remains the same. As such, there has 
been little reflection or update on the role moral theory plays in these approaches.  
1.4 Understanding moral theory  
To better explore and understand the objectives and purposes of these approaches, and the extent to 
which these have been achieved, it helps to understand the purpose and uses of moral theory, and how 
such theories describe and envision justice. In the following sections I outline work by Sen (2009) on 
different approaches to moral and political philosophy. Following this I outline the concept of 
capability, which Sen himself advocates for as a component of an “accomplishment-based” component 
of a realised-focused theory of justice.  
This thesis draws on a range of moral and political philosophy; however, these philosophies rarely fall 
neatly under one of these labels and it is difficult to decipher where moral theory becomes political and 
where political philosophy becomes moral. For example, in his edited collection of classic moral and 
political theories, Morgan (2011) describes included theories as being moral theories, political theories 
or “both”. Therefore, in this thesis I often use the term “moral theory” as a broad catch-all for this 
collection of over lapping and intersecting scholarship.  
A key idea permeating the purposes of moral and political theories is that they offer a means of 
identifying and articulating problems in such a way as to point towards avenues for amelioration. As 
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Bufacchi (2011 p.32) summarises O’Neill (1984), “we need moral theory in order to recognise a 
problem as being a moral problem at all”.  Sen (2009) makes a useful distinction regarding this, 
suggesting moral theories achieve this in one of two ways: they can either outline what a perfectly just 
society looks like and then attempt to illustrate how a given situation falls short of this ideal picture of 
justice; or they provide a comparative framework to assess which of two options is more desirable.5  
Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) 
Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009) Sen (2009)  refers to the former as 
“transcendental institutionalism” and the latter as “realised-focus comparison”, both aforementioned 
approaches to energy justice draw on varying combinations of these types of theories. It is useful to 
understand these distinctions as they help to justify the later use of certain moral and political concepts 
in this thesis.  
1.4.1 Transcendental institutionalism  
According to Sen (2009), transcendental institutionalism attempts to identify social characteristics of 
justice that cannot be transcended. Transcendental theories attempt to describe the most just society 
theoretically possible, being the most just vision of a society this vision cannot be “transcended”. By 
this Sen means transcendentalist are initially concerned with identifying “the nature of the just”. These 
theories therefore focus on envisioning an ideal society. They do so through focusing on the institutions, 
that is the public rules, systems, offices, and values, which would result in a perfectly just society. Sen 
adds that these institutions also rely on non-institutional features, such as the social interactions and 
behaviours of actual people, which arise in the form of “specific behavioural assumptions” which “are 
made that help the working of the chosen institutions”. In other words, assumptions regarding the 
behaviours of people exist to complement how a certain institution would function. To elaborate this 
point Sen includes a quote from Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, who falls into the category of 
transcendentalism: “the other limitation on our discussion is that for the most part I examine the 
principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act justly and 
to do his part in upholding just institutions” (Rawls, 1971 pp.7-8). Sen suggests that these types of 
theory have come to dominate contemporary political and moral theory.  
1.4.2 Realised-focused comparison 
Realised-focused comparison describes a set of theories which involve comparisons of societies that 
either already existed or which could plausibly exist. Therefore realised-focused comparison is 
concerned with judging which out of multiple plausible scenarios is more just than the other. Sen 
describes these theories as being primarily concerned with the removal of manifest injustice in the 
worlds in which they were developed, as opposed to outlining the conditions and assumptions under 
 
5 This is similar to distinctions between ideal and non-ideal theory, whereby ideal theory describes the 
assumptions which precede justice and where non-ideal theory lacks idealised assumptions about justice. (See 
Meshelski, (2019) and Valentini, (2012) for further discussion). 
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which a perfectly just society could exist. Sen argues that realised-focused understanding of justice 
focuses on actual realisations and accomplishments, rather than on only theorising the right institutions 
and rules. The realised-focused comparison approach therefore focuses on things which can emerge in 
societies, such as the lives people can lead. It is this type of theory for which Sen advocates. 
Sen (2009 p.15) argues “if a theory of justice is to guide reasoned choice of policies, strategies or 
institutions, then the identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient”. 
To illustrate this point Sen uses the example of trying to choose between two pieces of art, a Picasso 
and a Dali. He argues “it is of no help to invoke a diagnosis (even if such a transcendental diagnosis 
could be made) that the ideal picture in the world is the Mona Lisa” (Sen, 2009). This may initially 
seem trivial but Sen is making the point that it is not necessary or helpful to know that the Mona Lisa is 
the most perfect artwork in world, if we are choosing between two other non-perfect options. Sen (2009) 
then states that this point may appear deceptively simple and asks “would not a theory that identifies a 
transcendental alternative also, through the same process, tell us what we want to know about 
comparative justice?” to which he answers “no”.  
Sen outlines how a transcendental approach does not account for the dimensions in which objects or 
options differ, arguing that descriptive closeness is not necessarily approximate to “valuation 
proximity” - or closeness to a set of values. Sen draws another analogy: “A person who prefers red wine 
to white may prefer either to a mixture of the two, even though the mixture is, in an obvious descriptive 
sense, closer to the preferred red wine than pure white wine would be” (Sen, 2009).  
The idea here is that two options, both imperfect, may embody and reflect different dimensions and 
qualities which are not so easily compared by contrasting them with an ideal, perfect, but non-existent 
option. Sen builds on this logic advocating for an “accomplishment-based” understanding of justice 
based on the idea that a theory of justice cannot supplant the importance of the lives and experiences 
people can live and have. This is not to say that institutions and rules are not important but rather that 
realised aspects of justice extend beyond arrangement-based understandings. Sen suggests we should 
understand this in terms of people’s “capability”, a concept which has gone on to spawn a field of its 
own (see Sen et al., 1991, Robeyns, 2005, Smith and Seward, 2009, Robeyns, 2016b, Nussbaum, 2001, 
Nussbaum, 2011). This thesis draws on the idea of capability in several ways to explore and articulate 
the links between energy dilemmas and justice. The following section outlines capability in more detail.  
1.4.3 Capabilities 
As alluded to above, the idea of capability is posited as a means of comparing and articulating quality 
of life, but also as a space in which questions of social justice such as inequality can be meaningfully 
discussed (Sen, 2001). Others, such as Martha Nussbaum, have drawn on the idea of capability to 
develop a “partial theory of justice” that prescribes a universal set of capabilities, to which all humans 
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are entitled to “basic” levels, whilst others have sought to analyse certain institutions and social 
practices through a capabilities approach (see Robeyns, 2016a).  
The approach centres around two concepts, “capabilities” and “functionings”. Functionings describes 
the things we are able to do and be, for example, being nourished or educated, whilst capability refers 
to the ability of a person to achieve valued functionings (Robeyns, 2005). The approach therefore 
focuses on a person’s capability to achieve valued “functionings”. It is the opportunity or freedom to 
achieve these functionings that is important within the approach. 
A core theme within any application of the capability approach is the claim that the attainment of well-
being, in the form of capability, is of utmost moral importance (Brighouse and Robeyns, 2010, 
Nussbaum, 2003). Central to this claim is the distinction between the means to and ends of well-being 
attainment. Means to well-being, which are not capabilities themselves, are considered purely 
instrumental, whereas well-being is seen as an end in itself (Robeyns, 2005). However, a capability 
which is an end can also be a means to another capability. For example Robeyns (2005), notes that “the 
capability of being in good health is an end in itself, but also a means to the capability to do work”.  
Underpinning the development of capability, was the idea that traditional “goods” and “rights” which 
contemporary moral and political philosophy sought to distribute did not account for interpersonal 
differences in the ability of people to convert the same resources into valued outcomes. Sen (1979) 
argues this in response to a particular set of goods Rawls (2001) prescribes called “primary goods” 
(these are the goods Rawls (2001) describes as ‘what persons need in their status as free and equal 
citizens, and as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life’). Sen argued 
that given the same quantity of resources and the same values, there may be a significant disparity 
between the valued outcomes two people could achieve depending on certain differences between them: 
“if people were basically very similar, then an index of primary goods might be quite a good way of 
judging advantage. But, in fact, people seem to have very different needs varying with health, longevity, 
climatic conditions, location, work conditions, temperament and even body size…so what is involved 
is not merely ignoring a few hard cases, but overlooking very widespread and real differences.” Sen 
(1979 pp.215-216)  
Nussbaum’ (2001) universal list includes the capabilities of: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; sense; 
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over 
one’s environment (a more detailed list is included in chapter 2). Unlike Nussbaum, Sen avoids defining 
a universal list of capabilities and instead argues that a community’s capabilities should be self-defined 
through a process of public deliberation and reasoning (Sen, 2001). As is outlined in the following 
section the use of capability in this thesis treads a line between these two approaches, pointing to the 
practical use of well-reasoned predefined set of capabilities but also emphasising the importance of a 
concept that can enable people and communities to articulate their own values through various forms 
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of deliberation and procedures. It is important to note that although this is seen a key point of departure 
for the two approaches, Nussbaum (2001) suggests her list does not have to be fixed and is open to 
additions and changes. 
Regardless of approach, the conceptual space which the capability approach forms to understand 
various aspects of the world can be understood as the “capabilities space” (See Day et al., 2016). As 
outlined in the following section, it is this ability to connect and frame a range of different circumstances 
that makes capability a viable starting point to understand the moral impacts of energy dilemmas. 
As with all theories, the capabilities approach has its limitations. One frequent criticism of the capability 
approach, which is worth addressing here, is that the approach is too individualistic and pays insufficient 
attention to groups (See Robeyns, 2005, Smith and Seward, 2009). Robeyns argues that this 
individualist critique of capabilities is often derived from the conflation of the capability approach’s 
ethics and ontology.  Robeyns (2005) distinguishes between the ontological and ethical aspects of the 
capabilities approach, arguing that the approach commits to ethical individualism but incorporates an 
ontology which recognises the that recognises the connections “between people, their social relations, 
and their social embedment” (Robeyns, 2005 p.108).  Schlosberg and Carruthers (2010) takes this a 
step further, arguing that communities and groups are capable of suffering injustice. They highlight that 
when environmental movements discuss capabilities, they do so as much at a community level as they 
do an individual level. In other words, communities are just as capable of possessing functionings as 
the individuals of which they consist. 
1.5 Energy, moral theory, and the ultimate end: aims and research questions 
Based on the previous sections, we can deduce two common characteristics of moral and political 
theories. Firstly, these theories provide concepts necessary to articulate why a certain situation or action 
is problematic - moral concepts they provide enable us to articulate dynamics which we previously 
could not. Second, in describing why something is morally problematic, moral, and political theories 
also point towards avenues of amelioration – whether by enabling the comparison of different responses 
or through imaging a completely just world. Sometimes decoupling these two characteristics can be 
useful - to use the descriptive aspect without necessarily subscribing to the overall moral sentiments of 
an approach. For example, in chapter three I note a utilitarian approach can help yield an understanding 
of the thought and decision-making processes behind certain energy developments, even if we do not 
find the approach a particularly compelling way to describe the things we value or make decisions.  
The overarching aim of this thesis is to assess and then develop the extent to which moral theory informs 
our understandings of the relationships between energy and the things we value. Understanding this 
relationship can be instrumental in finding appropriate ways to more effectively address the 
underpinning dynamics which perpetuate energy dilemmas. To fulfil this overarching aim the two 
characteristics of moral and political theory mentioned above form the basis of two sets of research 
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questions. The first set focus on the role of moral theory in existing approaches to energy justice and 
explores the efficacy of energy justice approaches in using moral theory to understand energy dilemmas 
and to produce normative guidance. The second set of questions focus more broadly on the role moral 
theory can play in informing our understanding of energy dilemmas and the things we value and 
implications this might have on developing more viable understandings of energy justice. 
1.5.1 Existing approaches: what are they doing? 
The first set of research questions revolve around asking whether existing approaches to energy justice 
can perform the same functions as those outlined in the above paragraphs. Two research questions 
become useful in exploring this: 
1. What purpose is moral theory serving within existing approaches to energy justice? 
2. Are approaches to energy justice able to derive genuinely novel guidance from the moral theory 
they cite? 
Expanding on the first question, part of this thesis involves investigating the ability of these approaches 
to articulate the problematic aspects of energy dilemmas at a sufficient level of abstraction. One which 
provides a meaningful understanding as to how an energy dilemma can impact the valuable aspects of 
a person’s or community’s life, and vice versa, how a person’s circumstances can impact their 
vulnerability to energy dilemmas.  
Despite both energy justice approaches drawing on different combinations of transcendental and 
realised-focused theory, both offer brief transcendental-like visions of energy justice i.e. they provide 
conceptualisations of an ideal energy system which can act as a transcendental point of comparison. 
The TCEJ aims to ‘to conceptualize a world where all individuals, across all areas, have safe, affordable 
and sustainable energy that is, essentially, socially just’ (Jenkins et al., 2018), whilst the principled 
approach envisions “a global energy system that fairly disseminates both the benefits and costs of 
energy services, and one that contributes to more representative and impartial energy decision-making” 
(Sovacool et al., 2016). Galvin (2019) notes something similar, suggesting that current approaches to 
energy justice have an underdeveloped moral foundation and tend to default to a Rawlsian-style 
transcendentalism. Pellegrini-Masini et al. (2020) also note comparable limitations regarding the 
grounding of energy justice approaches in philosophical thought (both Galvin (2019) and Pellegrini-
Masini et al. (2020) provide their own solutions to these limitations which I outline in chapter five).  
When the goals of energy justice approaches are discussed in reference to Sen’s comparison of 
transcendentalism and realised-focused comparison, these goal’s transcendental leanings – envisioning 
a just or fair energy system – do not, at least on their own, lend themselves to the comparison or analysis 
of different energy dilemmas or scenarios. However, a theme in both approaches to energy justice 
revolves around the procedures through which we respond to energy dilemmas. The TCEJ discusses 
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this broadly within the context of “procedural justice” and the principled approach refers to this as “due 
process” (although it also uses the term “procedural justice”) (Jenkins et al., 2016, Sovacool and 
Dworkin, 2015). These approaches recognise procedural aspects of justice as pertinent in responding to 
energy dilemmas, however the use of moral concepts to inform on how procedural spaces should 
function in relation to energy dilemmas is relatively underdeveloped. General calls for information 
disclosure, “equitable procedures” that engage all stakeholders, impartiality, and fair representation 
appear to fill this gap (Jenkins et al., 2016, McCauley et al., 2013, Sovacool et al., 2017).  
In response to these limitations, the first line of enquiry of this thesis focuses on the purpose and uses 
of moral theory in existing approaches to energy justice, asking (1) whether approaches to energy justice 
are using moral theory to articulate and describe aspects of energy dilemmas in a way that was 
previously not possible. We can then ask (2) if moral theory genuinely aids in producing the normative 
guidance or avenues for amelioration these approaches claim to offer. These are pertinent questions, 
especially with regards to the claims made by authors of the TCEJ – that the approach can produce 
normative guidance and find what is “just and equitable” in reference to various energy dilemmas (see 
Jenkins et al., 2018, Heffron et al., 2015). If the answer to these questions is negative – that moral theory 
is not being drawn on- it does not just mean the impact of including moral theory in these approaches 
is limited. It also suggests certain aspects of these approaches are misleading. Placing normative claims 
side-by-side with moral theory and ideas of justice, creates the perception that normative claims have 
been substantiated by moral theories. I am not saying broad, looser, or colloquial language of justice, 
divorced from theory, should not be used when talking about energy dilemmas. Rather, I am saying that 
if an author is to cite a set of moral concepts and then proceed to make broad normative claims then 
they should show how and why these moral concepts relate to their claims.  
Importantly, this issue presents a potential gap in broader energy justice discourse as to the role and 
uses of moral theory in exploring and describing energy dilemmas. The following section presents how 
this gap can be developed.  
1.5.2 Capability, moral theory, and energy dilemmas 
The second set of research questions revolves around the descriptive use of moral theory and the use of 
moral theory to produce normative guidance. This culminates as two closely connected research 
questions: 
3. How can moral theory be drawn on to describe and explore energy dilemmas? 
4. How can moral theory be drawn on to effectively develop  ideas of energy justice? 
The “ultimate end” exercise discussed earlier, becomes relevant here, particularly to question three. As 
part of an attempt to improve on existing understandings of energy justice and to respond to both 
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question three and four this thesis seeks to explore a viable way of using moral theory to articulate and 
better understand the impacts of energy dilemmas on those who endure them.  
As illustrated earlier in the exercise in finding the “ultimate ends”, whichever concept we arrive at can 
be used to help frame the impacts of energy access or energy deprivation, but also the wider impacts of 
energy systems, such as environmental harms. In this respect, key to understanding the links between 
energy systems and the things we value is the selection of moral concepts that can meaningfully 
articulate these issues and relationships. The capability approach, I argue, is well positioned to do this. 
A number of papers, external to energy justice approaches, have sought to use capabilities in this way 
(Day et al., 2016, Middlemiss et al., 2019, Hillerbrand, 2018). Whilst, other contributions have used 
capabilities to articulate the impacts of environmental issues (Holland, 2008, Holland, 2014).  
I do not try to outline specifically what this “ultimate end” is. However, as indicated in the preceding 
section, I set the foundations for exploring a plausible space in which people can come to meaningfully 
connect the impacts of energy dilemmas to the things they value. This entails being able to understand 
the capabilities, concepts, and procedures necessary for a person or community to be able to engage in 
these spaces. In this sense the “ultimate ends” refers to the valued things a person or group can 
meaningfully articulate when given the sufficient conditions. The ultimate ends becomes a broad, but 
confined, pluralistic space which can facilitate the articulation of certain values and their relationship 
to energy dilemmas.  
A key aspect of the capabilities approach which I find appealing is that we should make these 
comparisons based on the types of lives people are able to lead and the things they value. As both Sen 
(2001) and Nussbaum (2001) argue, this is best understood in terms of capabilities. The capacity for 
capability to account for difference between people yields a sensitivity to the social, economic, 
geographic and a wide range of other disparities, which underpin people’s varying vulnerability to 
energy dilemmas. Energy scholarship, particularly within recent years has begun to engage with the 
range of socio-economic issues which intersect energy systems to form “energy dilemmas” (Liddell 
and Morris, 2010, Marmot et al., 2011, Walker and Day, 2012, Snell et al., 2015, Gillard et al., 2017, 
Mattioli et al., 2017). The same technical or logistical issue combined with varying circumstances of a 
person or community who endure the issue can produce entirely different circumstances.  
The second question focuses on developing energy justice discourse, it moves from a descriptive focus 
to ways in which understandings of energy justice might be better developed. Given the focus on 
guiding policy and decision making that already pervades energy justice discourse and approaches, I 
find Sen’s outline of realised-focused comparison approaches to justice a compelling and plausible 
approach to exploring energy dilemmas. An appealing aspect of this approach is that applications of 
realised-focused comparison can be analogous to formulating and choosing between different policy 
options – none of which will result in a perfectly just energy system, but some of which will be more 
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just than others. We can compare the circumstances in which a current energy dilemma sits to the 
circumstances different responses may plausibly create. 
The case can be made that capabilities provide a suitable space in which to articulate and understand 
the impacts of energy dilemmas in relation to the things people value. However, even if we can now 
use this space to articulate what is morally problematic about energy dilemmas, this does not mean we 
now have solutions to these dilemmas. A key point of emphasis in this respect is that moral theory 
should be used as extensively, in the formations and details of the procedures and processes which 
enable us to arrive at these normative conclusions, as it is in the frameworks which demand these 
processes. Both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s approaches place significant focus on participating in political 
processes as a means of attaining capabilities. Sen’s approach posits that essential capabilities should 
be decided on through communities’ deliberations, whilst Nussbaum’s list contains a number of 
politically centred capabilities i.e. control over one’s environment which is partly defined as “being 
able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political 
participation, protections of free speech and association.” (Nussbaum, 2001 p.79-80). In either case, the 
attainment of capabilities can be seen not just as the products of certain events but also as necessary to 
engage in procedural spaces. In this respect, the extent to which moral theory can inform on procedural 
spaces is seen as significant way of meaningfully contributing to energy justice discourse.  
1.6 Methods: Applying and synthesising philosophy  
This thesis can be framed broadly in terms of exploring the “ultimate end” to which energy systems 
aims and developing a space in which to understand and articulate this end. It involves asking whether 
existing approaches offer a means to explore what this end might be, or how we might better understand 
and discuss this end. Finding negative answers to these questions, this thesis then moves to investigate 
these questions independently of existing energy justice approaches.  
The methods employed in this thesis fall broadly into what might be described as applied philosophy. 
Usually in philosophical works the methodology is implicit, and not discussed. However, given the 
interdisciplinary nature of the work contained in this thesis, it is useful to outline this general 
methodology. 
Informal logic 
A key aspect of philosophical arguments revolves around constructing a set of propositions to support 
an argument. In general, philosophical arguments are underpinned by “informal logic” or “a theory of 
argument”. Hitchcock (2007 p.106-107) defines arguments as “claim-reason complexes” which consist 
of premises and conclusions and explains “it is appropriate to conceive of an argument as a sequence 
consisting of a set of reasons followed by a conclusion indicator followed by a conclusion” (a 
conclusion indicator is a word which suggests an inference e.g. “therefore”). A key aspect of 
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argumentation then is both providing true premises and conclusions which follow from the premises. 
We can therefore criticise an argument based on the truth of its premises, and the validity of the 
inference to the conclusion (Hitchcock, 2007). 
This relatively simple logic underpins much of the work in chapters three and four, especially in sections 
which explore and critique existing approaches to energy justice. These chapters look at the underlying 
premises and arguments of existing approaches to energy justice and essentially scrutinise whether their 
premises are true, the arguments work, and accordingly, whether we should accept their conclusions. 
However, these chapters are not solely restricted to this method. As outlined above, this thesis also 
entails exploring the role different moral theories and concepts can play in understanding and 
articulating the ethical impacts of energy dilemmas. The methods entailed in this are best described as 
an empirical approach to applied philosophy.  
Applied and empirical philosophy  
Bufacchi (2011 p.43) describes applied philosophy broadly as covering all philosophical research that 
has bearing on issues of practical concerns stating, “applied philosophy is primarily concerned with 
making a theoretical contribution to some issue of practical concern.”  Bufacchi (2011) suggests applied 
philosophy can either suggest solutions to practical ethical issues or explicate problems that need to be 
resolved and advocates for an “empirical approach” to achieve this: 
1. Empirical research begins with a practical issue and is seen as problem driven. At this stage, 
any prior philosophical knowledge should be used to define a problem, as opposed to creating 
an a priori philosophical hypothesis. In other words, we should not create a philosophical 
hypothesis before we have defined the problem we are investigating.  
2. Reflective equilibrium: based on empirical research a preliminary theory is constructed. The 
theory is then tested both deductively and inductively, empirical research is re-examined in 
reference to the new theory, then the theory is refined in response through a cyclic process. This 
part of the process is referred to as “reflexive equilibrium”, which describes the mutual 
adjustment between the philosophical theory and our intuitive responses (Glover, 2012, 
Bufacchi, 2011).  Key to this idea is that the philosopher should be willing to go “back and 
forth”, being both inductive and deductive, until the philosophical hypothesis coincides with 
the empirical research (Bufacchi, 2011). 
3. The determining role of case studies: empirical case studies become an essential input in the 
development of a philosophical theory, such studies therefore are beyond just supportive of a 
philosophical proposition and instead essential in its formation.   
As is now evident, this process of inductive and deductive reasoning has partially already begun. I have 
described different types of energy dilemmas and have outlined a theory which might best explain and 
articulate their moral relevance.   
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However, this process of inductive and deductive reasoning began before I selected these theories. Both 
Nussbaum and Sen undertook this process during the development of their respective theories. Having 
both developed and tested their respective approaches on case studies, interviews and in Sen’s case his 
own lived experience (Sen, 2001, Nussbaum, 2001). For example, when referring to her list of 
capabilities Nussbaum (2001 p.75) states “the list represents the result of years of cross-cultural 
discussion, and comparisons between earlier and later versions will show that the input of other voices 
has shaped its content in many ways.” 
These theories therefore have already been through significantly more cycles of testing and refinement 
than I could hope to achieve in this thesis. In a way I am drawing on the results of this empirical 
philosophy, whilst perhaps attempting to perform this cycle in a marginal way on distinct concept’s 
ability to reflect, describe, and connect the aspects of energy systems we find important or problematic. 
It is important to emphasise that this process is cyclic and therefore depending on field-specific 
developments, its application does not have to start at empirical research but can begin at reflective 
equilibrium or the determining role of case studies.  
Although they do not frame their research in this respect, I see Day et al. (2016) as a seminal endeavour 
into using a moral concept to describe, then explain the connection between energy systems and well-
being, at a meaningful level of abstraction which can increase our understanding of an energy dilemma 
and plausible responses.  
The method of testing a moral concept to see how well it describes or coincides with an issue is drawn 
on significantly in all chapters of this thesis. Chapter two essentially tests the ability of the capability 
space to articulate the moral dilemmas at the intersections of energy systems, societies, and the 
environment, using the example of climate change, fossil fuel dependency and climate change 
mitigation. Chapter three provides a means of comparing theories in this respect as a push to expand 
the range of moral concepts energy justice approaches utilise. Chapter four also draws on this method, 
developing the way in which capabilities can reflect underpinning dynamics which perpetuate energy 
dilemmas. 
Theoretical synthesis 
Although there are some marginal contributions to the refinement of certain theories attempted in this 
thesis many of its contributions result from what Sovacool et al. (2018) refer to as “theoretical 
synthesis”. This entails the connection and integration of existing concepts into a new conceptual 
framework. In chapter two, this synthesis manifests in the integration of several capability-centred 
concepts which enable the construction of a framework which encapsulates issues of energy production 
and consumption within the same moral frame i.e. capability. Similarly, chapter four brings together 
several descriptive dimensions of justice and work on the capability approach to set the foundation for 
a viable account of energy justice. However, this does not solely involve synthesis. Articulating the 
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connections between these concepts, to some degree, involves “invention” (Sovacool et al., 2018). The 
concepts themselves are not novel, but the connections between them are.  
1.7 Methods, chapters, and structure 
This thesis is structured in the following way. Each following chapter employs a combination of the 
above methods. Figure 1-5 illustrates the over-arching structure and thematic connections between each 
chapter of this thesis.  
 




Chapter two entails a theoretical synthesis of several capability-centred concepts to bring the 
production-consumption binary into the same frame. With regards to the empirical philosophical 
method, this chapter can be seen as implementing step one of the cycle, using prior philosophical 
knowledge (in this case pre-existing capability centric-concepts) to define the well-being tensions 
between climate change impacts, climate change mitigation, and fossil fuels dependency.  
Chapter three 
Chapter three can be interpreted as applying an informal logic methodology asking whether the 
premises energy justice approaches put forward align with the overall conclusions. Here it is helpful to 
think of their premises as their underlying philosophical conceptions and views of energy dilemmas and 
their conclusions as their over-arching frameworks and outputs. Following this, chapter three outlines 
a method which resonates with the empirical-philosophical method, illustrating a means of testing 
different moral concepts’ ability to define an energy dilemma before suggesting how this practice could 
help refine existing approaches to energy justice. 
Chapter four 
Chapter four focuses solely on the TCEJ and offers the strongest application of informal logic in this 
thesis. This chapter explores the claims of the TCEJ in detail and scrutinises the frequent claims of this 
approach’s ability to produce more “just” energy systems and to provide viable normative guidance in 
response to energy dilemmas. Following this, the chapter employs both theoretical synthesis and aspects 
of empirical philosophy to develop a foundation for a viable account of energy justice. This chapter 
simultaneously synthesises a range of moral and political concepts whilst illustrating the ability of the 
capabilities approach to define and illustrate the relationship between dimensions of a trivalent account 
of justice, recognition, procedure, and distribution. 
Chapter five 
Chapter five of this thesis offers a discussion of the findings and outputs presented in earlier chapters 
and points to future avenues of research. 
Combined these chapters present the state of energy justice approaches and seek to develop the ways in 
which we connect moral ideas, the things we value, and energy systems.  
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2 Chapter 2 Tensions, capabilities, and justice in 
climate change mitigation of fossil fuels 
 
N. Wood, K. Roelich  
Abstract 
In order to mitigate the well-being impacts of climate change effectively, we must reduce our use of 
fossil fuels. However, many contemporary forms of well-being attainment still depend heavily on the 
use of fossil fuel derived energy. Therefore, certain necessary forms of climate change mitigation are 
likely to conflict with current means of well-being attainment in many groups and societies. In particular 
our concern is that certain forms of mitigation, which target lifestyle choices, consumption behaviour, 
and technological choices, do and will have disproportionate impacts on certain vulnerable groups in 
society e.g. households in fuel poverty or individuals with particular disabilities. It is evident that 
climate change mitigation discourse has only sparsely integrated well-being thought. We argue that a 
fuller integration of well-being into mitigation thinking could help avoid exacerbating current and future 
well-being conflicts that will arise between climate change mitigation and fossil fuel derived energy 
use.  
To help achieve this, we reason that climate change mitigation and fossil fuel derived energy use must 
not be viewed separately but by their relationships to well-being. We articulate the individual processes 
of fossil fuel derived energy use, climate change mitigation, and well-being attainment in more detail, 
presenting their relationships to one another in the form of tensions. We present a capabilities 
conception of well-being that we argue is best suited for operationalising well-being with regards to 
fully capturing these tensions. We then develop a conceptual framework through a theoretical synthesis 
of existing literature on well-being, energy, and climate change, which illustrates how these tensions 
arise. This framework also serves to illustrate how a change in one process will affect the others. We 
outline how this framework can help illustrate the points at which misguided climate change mitigation 
can conflict with current means of attaining well-being from fossil derived energy. We then conclude 
that the use of this framework and further integration of well-being thought could help avoid and 
ameliorate well-being conflicts when developing future climate change mitigation. 
2.1 Introduction  
Energy plays a role in the attainment of well-being (Nussbaum, 2001, Martínez and Ebenhack, 2008, 
Karekezi et al., 2012) and its absence can be a contributing factor to well-being deprivation (Liddell 
and Morris, 2010, Sovacool, 2014, Lucas et al., 2016, Day et al., 2016). It is also the case that many of 
the energy services and goods on which well-being attainment partly depends are currently powered 
by, or in part produced using fossil fuel derived energy (FFDE) e.g. current means of transport, heating, 
35 
 
lighting and energy production (Fell, 2017, Mattioli et al., 2017, Day et al., 2016, Simcock and Mullen, 
2016). We therefore take FFDE to currently be a key, but extrinsic component of well-being attainment 
of many people around the world.     
It appears that energy use naturally intertwines with the attainment of well-being.6 However, the results 
of intensive energy use and production (in particular fossil fuels derived energy) can have converse 
impacts on well-being attainment globally7 (Mitchell, 2011, Holland, 2014, Healy et al., 2019). Climate 
change is a prominent example of this. Primarily the result of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from the 
excessive use of FFDE, climate change has and will continue to have substantial and widespread, 
negative global well-being impacts (Adger, 2001, Pachauri et al., 2014). To mitigate these impacts we 
must significantly reduce GHG emissions (IPCC, 2018). In many cases this means reducing or changing 
consumption behaviour and lifestyles which we ordinarily rely on to attain well-being (we refer to these 
as a type demand-side mitigation and these forms of mitigation are our main focus throughout this 
paper) (Springmann et al., 2017, Lamb and Steinberger, 2017, Creutzig et al., 2018).  
It is evident that tensions exist between well-being attainment, FFDE use and climate change mitigation 
(CCM). As Creutzig et al. (2018) suggest reducing energy use and GHG emissions must be balanced 
with the goal of enhancing human well-being. A challenge arises, however, when noting the limited 
incorporation of well-being into CCM discourse. In a review of human well-being and climate change 
mitigation, Lamb and Steinberger (2017) state ‘climate change mitigation is fundamentally motivated 
by the preservation of human lives and the conditions which enable them’. Despite this ostensibly true 
claim, they find the field has so far failed to incorporate well-being thought beyond a superficial level 
(Lamb and Steinberger, 2017). A pertinent example is the United Kingdom’s Climate Act, which sets 
out clear targets for emissions reductions but does not refer to well-being once (CC Act, 2008).8 Indeed, 
when exploring the acceptance of energy transitions Demski et al. (2019), found values associated with 
needs and justice, such as fairness and equity are perceived by the public to be side-lined or even absent. 
Outputs from Just Transition and Energy Democracy discourses have included the concept of well-
being to a limited extent, largely within the design of qualitative studies. McCauley and Heffron (2018) 
note this shift from quantitative to qualitative focuses on dimensions of injustice within environmental,   
climate, and energy justice scholarship, with studies focusing on more procedural aspects of research. 
For example, Damgaard et al. (2017) utilise the capabilities conception of well-being when assessing 
the energy justice implications of bioenergy developments in Nepal. However, a robust 
conceptualisation of the relationships between well-being, energy, and CCM is lacking. In particular 
 
6 It is important to note that after a point energy intensive pursuits have diminishing and limited abilities to 
deliver gains in well-being See Brady et al. (2007). 
7 Including impacts of extraction and global supply chains, see Mitchell (2011) and Healy et al., (2019). 
8 PDF word search feature for ‘well-being’, ‘wellbeing’, ‘health’, ‘welfare’, ‘inequality’, & ‘equality’ – although 




there is limited examination of the extent to which well-being issues which result from the combustion 
of fossil fuels and CCM can be framed as justice issues using the same theoretical lens.  
In essence links between well-being and CCM are being made, but there is a need to integrate this into 
CCM more effectively. This must be done whilst recognising that well-being is currently strongly linked 
to FFDE use, in order to recognise and address the implications of CCM strategy on FFDE-dependent 
means of attaining well-being.  
These processes and the relationships between them are complex and need to be communicated more 
effectively. Therefore, in Section 3.2 we articulate these processes in more detail along with the tensions 
and relationships between them. In section 2.3 we present a capabilities conception of well-being which 
lends itself to being operationalised within this context, arguing that a broad, holistic conception of 
well-being must be used in order to more fully capture these tensions. In section 2.4 and 2.5, using this 
conception of well-being, we develop a new framework through a theoretical synthesis9 of existing 
conceptualisations of the relationships between energy use and well-being, and the links between well-
being and environmental issues. Finally, in section 2.6 we discuss the implications and uses of our 
framework as a tool and guide for assessing and developing CCM strategies.  
We argue that it is not just the links between CCM and well-being that require substantiating, but also 
the conception of well-being which we utilise to illustrate them. As such, we draw from, and expand on 
substantial existing work on the capabilities approach, utilising it as a means of assessing a person’s 
freedoms, opportunities, and abilities to attain well-being (Sen, 2001, Nussbaum, 2001, Holland, 2008, 
Holland, 2014, Smith and Seward, 2009, Day et al., 2016, Schlosberg, 2012). We take well-being to be 
tantamount to attaining sufficient levels of Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities, enabling a person 
to live a life of dignity (Nussbaum, 2001) . Importantly, the capabilities approach frames the ability to 
attain well-being as a matter of justice, and conversely that the deprivation of capabilities constitutes an 
injustice (Nussbaum, 2001). This enables us to frame the potential well-being implications of CCM-
fossil fuel energy conflicts as justice issues, which we believe to be an important contribution to 
grounding energy justice within philosophical discourse. We also highlight that the work within the 
capabilities approach can incorporate distributive, procedural and recognition components of justice 
(Holland, 2014, Holland, 2017, Schlosberg, 2012, Sovacool et al., 2016). We suggest the framework 
becomes most useful when combined with information about vulnerable groups, in particular those with 
already pressing needs and requirements for which extra access to energy is essential. We illustrate the 
benefit of continuing this work within the capabilities space. We outline the expansive tool set the 
capabilities approach yields as both a normative framework, which can guide the development of CCM, 
 
9 We use this term based on the definition given in Sovacool et al. (2018) on promoting novelty, whereby the 
theoretical synthesis entails integrating existing theories on concepts into a new conceptual framework.  
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and a partial theory of justice which can assess current and potential injustices caused by disruption to 
current means of well-being attainment.  
2.2 The tension triangle 
Here we provide more clarity on the tensions and relationships between FFDE use, CCM, and well-
being attainment. We find a useful way to visualise this, is in the form of a triangle. At each point on 
the triangle sits a process; FFDE use, well-being attainment, or CCM, with each process sitting in 
relation to the adjacent processes.10  
 
Figure 2-1 'The Tension Triangle' illustrating how FFDE use, well-being attainment, and climate change mitigation sit in 
tension to one another. 
We refer to ‘tensions’ as the relationships between these processes that pull in different directions e.g. 
the use of FFDE to attain well-being conflicts with well-being implications of climate change which is 
caused by FFDE use.  These tensions arise primarily from two conflicting processes. First, our 
dependency on fossil fuels for well-being provisioning energy services leads to excessive GHG 
emissions and climatic change. Second, the resulting climate change poses large scale well-being issues, 
which to avoid, or at least reduce, requires substantial mitigation efforts (IPCC, 2015).  
In order to understand how these issues relate to one another, we need to assess the issues driving these 
tensions through a well-being lens. To help better understand the importance of these processes in terms 
of well-being we briefly outline the links between well-being and FFDE use, well-being and climate 
change.   
2.2.1 FFDE use and well-being 
There are both positive and negative connections between well-being and FFDE use, it is these 
connections which create a tension between the two processes. The positive connection between FFDE 
use and well-being lies in the general relationship between energy use and the attainment of well-being. 
 
10 CCM, fossil fuelled derived energy use and well-being attainment could also be described as outcomes. 
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However, the majority of nations still rely predominantly on the combustion of fossil fuels to derive 
energy (IEA, 2017). As such, many relationships between well-being and energy that exist are currently 
facilitated by FFDE.11 Perhaps most prominently the relationship between energy and well-being can 
be seen within developmental literature. Development itself is hailed as a major source of well-being 
enhancement (Sen, 2001, Nussbaum, 2001). Energy is acknowledged to play a prominent role within 
this, having a positive impact on productivity, health, education, safe water and communication services 
process (UN, 2005, IEA, 2011, Gaye, 2007). FFDE in particular is paramount to many forms of well-
being maintenance, such as household heating, heat for cooking, and many contemporary forms of 
transport, which enable access to a greater range of well-being enhancing services such e.g. education, 
healthcare, recreational areas (Walker and Day, 2012, Mattioli et al., 2017). Malakar et al. (2018) argues 
that shifting towards the use of modern energy carriers such as electricity, liquid petroleum, and natural 
gas, could eliminate the well-being constraints associated with the use of solid fuels such as wood, dung 
and crop residue within the developing nations – of course this shift might contribute to other issues 
regarding growing GHG emissions. 
The importance of energy in attaining well-being is echoed within justice literature. Sovacool et al. 
(2013) argue that people have a derivative entitlement to energy services if any of the basic goods which 
they are justly entitled to can only be secured through the use of energy services. In essence, if energy 
services are the only means through which an individual might achieve a particular good or state of 
well-being that a theory of justice prescribes, then energy becomes an entitlement of that individual. 
The negative relationship between FFDE use and well-being we focus on here is climate change.12 It is 
well established that the combustion of fossil fuels, and the subsequent greenhouse gas emissions, are 
the largest contributor to ongoing climate change (IEA, 2012). Climate change continues to have well-
being impacts throughout the globe including an increased frequency of severe weather events, 
disrupted weather cycles, and irreversible damage to provisioning ecosystems (Pachauri et al., 2014). 
(York, 2012) 
Both global inequality and the regions subject to significant climate hazards renders developing nations 
particularly vulnerable (Shue, 2014). Sea temperature increase will further contribute to global food 
security concerns, particularly as many vulnerable nations depend on seafood as a primary source of 
 
11 It is important to note therefore that other renewable sources of energy could replace fossil fuel use and still 
provide similar means of well-being attainment. However, at a certain point increasing energy consumption 
does not appear to contribute to gains in well-being (Steinberger and Roberts, 2010). Therefore, a focus on 
maintaining and attaining other means of well-being may help partially decouple the energy-well-being 
relationship, and could provide avenues to maintain well-being whilst mitigating climate change (Brand-Correa 
& Steinberger, 2017). It is also worth noting that the introduction of renewable energy sources does not 
necessarily displace the use of fossil fuels (York, 2012). 
12 it is important to note that the extraction, production and combustion are linked to and the cause of a plethora 
of well-being issues throughout the globe, for example, land rights issues, air pollution, environmental 
degradation at the point of extraction etc (see Healey, (2019) and Mitchell (2011)). 
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protein (FAO, 2016), with studies observing habitat destruction and fish stock migration in line with 
ocean warming (Allison et al., 2009). Rising temperatures will also contribute to sea-level rise, which 
poses the threat of coastal flooding to regions in which a growing proportion of humanity resides 
(Nicholls and Cazenave, 2010). An increased frequency of flooding and droughts will be a growing 
source human suffering especially in the global south (Pachauri et al., 2014). Within the global south, 
women and children are thought to be particularly vulnerable to abuse during these events (Lane and 
McNaught, 2009). For example, during times of drought, many young women in Ethiopia and 
Bangladesh were obliged to labour for cash in local towns, forgoing education opportunities in doing 
so, and increasing their exposure to potential abuse and exploitation (Swarup et al., 2011). Although by 
no means exhaustive, this list illustrates some of the potential and ongoing impacts to human well-being 
that climate change poses.  
These relationships illustrate the positive and negative well-being implications of fossil fuels which 
create an intrinsic tension between FFDE use and well-being attainment.  
2.2.2 Climate change mitigation and well-being 
As with the relationship between FFDE use and well-being attainment, the tensions between CCM and 
well-being attainment, manifest through two relationships, one positive and one negative. 
The positive relationship occurs through CCM’s motivation to preserve well-being attainment and to 
prevent further well-being deprivation that will occur through unchecked climate change. To avoid or 
minimise the well-being impacts of climate change discussed above we must implement broad forms 
of mitigation, a necessary means of doing so is to reduce our use of FFDE (IPCC, 2015). CCM is 
primarily motivated by the maintenance of current systems of well-being attainment e.g. well-being 
provisioning systems, a stable climate and the issues we outline in section 2.1 (Adger, 2010). Although 
climate change is already having widespread well-being impacts, prompt and effective mitigation could 
help avoid or minimise these in the future (IPCC, 2018).  
The negative relationship between CCM and well-being arises through certain forms of mitigation, in 
particular demand-side mitigation, which requires broad changes to consumption habits and lifestyles. 
In essence, we must restructure many current means of well-being attainment, such as those listed in 
section 2.1 above. However, attempts to curtail certain consumption choices and dis-incentivise certain 
activities may impact certain groups more than others e.g. low income households, those with 
disabilities or susceptibility to illness, and elderly demographics (Snell et al., 2015, Walker and Day, 
2012) . Numerous studies illustrate the regressive impacts of carbon taxes, energy policy, and carbon 
trading, which are frequently criticised for disproportionately impacting low income and vulnerable 
groups (Wier et al., 2005, Ayres, 1997, Bristow et al., 2010, Callan et al., 2009, Feng et al., 2010, 
Starkey, 2012, Barrett et al., 2018). A pertinent example are UK energy policies which are designed to 
support a transition towards a low carbon energy system. The UK government added a levy to household 
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energy bills, 20% of which is used to fund energy efficiency improvements within homes i.e. installing 
insulation and other energy saving measures. However research by Barrett et al. (2018), found that the 
UKs poorest households spend 10% of their income on energy, whereas the richest spent only 3%, 
meaning the levy on energy bills disproportionately impacted low income households.  Wier et al. 
(2001) found that energy needs for rural households were greater than those of urban households. Such 
disparities suggest forms of mitigation such a carbon taxation and carbon trading may impact rural 
homes disproportionately (Wier et al., 2005).  
These two relationships illustrate that CCM’s motivation to preserve well-being may in some cases 
result in the curtailing of people’s well-being elsewhere.  
2.2.3 FFDE use and climate change mitigation 
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3 illustrate that both CCM and FFDE use are linked through their conflicting 
means of preserving and delivering well-being attainment. Thus, we can see a direct tension between 
CCM and FFDE use, it is unlikely we can continue one process without disrupting the other. If we 
continue to combust fossil fuels for energy use, our ability to curb climate change through effective 
mitigation will be curtailed. Likewise, if we implement effective CCM it is likely that we will not be 
able to depend on FFDE for current means of well-being attainment. As a result, we can see that CCM 
and FFDE use sit in direct tension to one another.  
We find that in order to fully capture the tensions between CCM and FFDE use, a robust and holistic 
conception of well-being must be utilised. Dominant forms of assessing well-being have largely been 
hedonic, focusing on maximising utility through satisfying commensurable and transitive preferences 
(Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017). A lack of stability in peoples preferences make such approaches 
to well-being poor assessors of social policy and systems that contribute to well-being attainment 
(O'neill, 2008). By extension we believe hedonic conceptions of well-being also make poor assessors 
of the well-being attainment we derive from the environment (the process that CCM is motivated to 
protect). Brand-Correa and Steinberger (2017) argue that eudaimonic conceptions of well-being, 
through focusing on how a person can flourish in the broader context of their society, lend themselves 
to analysing the role of social institutions and political systems in the attainment of well-being. Again, 
by extension, we believe eudaimonic approaches to well-being can make for clearer and more robust 
assessments the links between the environment and well-being attainment. Assessing these links is 
paramount to outlining the well-being implications which are motivating CCM and how these conflicts 
with forms of well-being attainment from FFDE use.  
In the following section we argue that the capabilities approach provides a broad and robust eudaimonic 
conception of well-being, through which we can conceptualise the issues embodied in tension triangle. 




2.3 Introducing capabilities  
We opted to use the capabilities approach for its applicability as a normative framework and as a partial 
theory of justice, as well as the substantial contributions and expansions which provide the conceptual 
infrastructure for our own contribution.  
Conceptions, such as Martha Nussbaum’s, which we expand on later, outline the approach as a ‘partial 
theory of justice’ in that it provides a specific list of capabilities of which each person should possess 
at least a threshold level, any level below this threshold constitutes an injustice (Nussbaum, 2001). As 
a partial theory of justice, it cannot inform on all matters of social justice. However, as we go on to 
explain, expansions and contributions to the approach yield enough scope to enable us to produce a 
framework that captures and reflects many of the justice issues which arise from both climate change 
and CCM, whilst illustrating these injustices, the approach also enables us to inform where policies 
might be improved as to avoid further injustices. Just as these principles can constitute what situations 
amounts to an injustice they can also help in avoiding the creation of new injustices as they can provide 
a guide to which factors we should consider when making decisions that impact people and societies, 
in the case of our paper, how we should mitigate climate change. This is what we mean by using the 
approach as a ‘normative framework’. Within development ethics, for example, the approach can be 
utilised as a normative framework e.g. describing how a policy or society should be. The approaches 
falls into the eudaimonic category of well-being approaches focusing on the Aristotelian conception of 
flourishing (Nussbaum, 2001). 
Importantly, capabilities offer a holistic understanding of well-being, making two normative claims. 
First, that freedom to achieve well-being is of utmost moral importance. Second, that freedom to achieve 
well-being should be understood in terms of people’s opportunities to achieve valued functionings i.e. 
their capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001, Sen, 1992). The capabilities approach revolves around two main 
concepts: ‘capabilities’ and ‘functionings’. Capabilities are a ‘person’s freedom to achieve valued 
functionings’ and ‘functionings’ can be categorised as either ‘beings or doings’ (Anderson, 1999). 
‘Beings’ for example, could mean being educated, being well nourished, and being housed in a warm 
home. ‘Doings’ could mean voting in an election or making use of adequate fuel to heat one’s home.13  
Instead of focussing on the distribution of resources, as many accounts of justice do, the capability 
approach focuses on what people are able to do and achieve, in part based on their capacity to convert 
primary goods into meaningful outcomes in their life; ‘an individual’s capability to function’ 
(Brighouse and Robeyns, 2010). Although here our main focus is on the processes outlined in the 
tension triangle, this perspective become useful in regards to climate change in general, which has 
disproportionate impacts on particular marginalised groups around world, based on gender, ethnicity, 
 
13 ‘Being in a warm home’ and ‘making use of adequate fuel to heat one’s home’ are both aptly mentioned as 
examples of functioning in Robeyns (2016). 
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geography and inequality (Lane and McNaught, 2009, Swarup et al., 2011, Pachauri et al., 2014, 
Schlosberg, 2012). For the same reasons this makes the approach useful for assessing the impacts of 
CCM strategy, which as noted impact different groups depending on their social and physical situation. 
As we expand on later, the approach embodies elements of procedural and recognition justice, (Holland, 
2017, Schlosberg, 2012), elements which are also pertinent to energy justice theory (Sovacool et al., 
2016)14. 
The capabilities approach has played a key role in framing international development, particularly in 
the human development index (Stanton, 2007, Sen, 2003). Further, the approach has been used in 
framing issues of global gender inequality and disabilities (Nussbaum, 2001, Robeyns, 2003). Similarly, 
the capabilities approach has proven beneficial within environmental and energy literature (Day et al., 
2016, Gardoni and Murphy, 2009, Holland, 2008, Holland, 2014).15  
Various uses have led to extensions, reinterpretations, and new abstractions. Sen’s conception of 
capabilities and functionings is broadly open to interpretation based on the values and deliberative 
processes within differing societies (Sen, 2001). Alternately, Nussbaum’s conception, proposes a list of 
incommensurable ‘central human functional capabilities’ essential for human dignity (Nussbaum, 
2001). Nussbaum argues that these capabilities have no relative weight and therefore cannot be ordered 
by priority. Hence, she argues, that the state should provide each citizen with a minimum level of each 
capability. Her list contains relatively abstract conceptions of capabilities: 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length, not dying prematurely, or before 
one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.  
2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately 
nourished; to have adequate shelter.  
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one’s bodily boundaries 
treated as sovereign. 
4. Senses, imagination, and thought. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees 
of education, freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom 
of religious exercise.  
5. Emotions. Being emotionally developed, able to have attachments to things and people outside 
ourselves; (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be 
shown to be crucial in their development.)  
 
14 How to operationalise capabilities and other justice theories using an energy justice framework is an issue we 
are working on in a separate paper. Although the framework we present later in this paper may aid in this task. 
15 Energy and environmental health are both conceived to be essential in minimising gender inequality 
(Robeyns, 2003).  
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6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience.)  
 
7. Affiliation. (A) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to have the capability for both justice 
and friendship. (B) Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be 
treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.  
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world 
of nature.  
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.  
10. Control over one’s environment. (A) Political. Being able to participate effectively in political 
choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech 
and association. (B) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and moveable goods), not just 
formally but in terms of real opportunity.  
  (Nussbaum, 2001)  
Adapted and shortened for use in this paper, we recommend viewing the full list in Nussbaum (2001) 
p78-80. 
2.4 Conceptual building blocks: linking FFDE, CCM, and capabilities  
Nussbaum’s abstractive list of capabilities provides a useful tool to explore and outline the processes 
through which we derive capability, functions, and ultimately well-being. We find a number of 
contributions to the capabilities approach lend themselves to our aim of articulating in more detail the 
relationships embodied within the tension triangle. The tensions between CCM, FFDE use, and well-
being, are complex and have been largely overlooked, with each process often being dealt with 
separately. Linking them within well-being framework will enable us to more clearly articulate where 
these processes might conflict and how these conflicts might be avoided in the future. The following 
sections expand on the tension triangle, outlining how the relationships embodied within it can be 
articulated in reference to the capabilities conception of well-being.  
2.4.1 Ecological meta-Capabilities and capability conflicts 
Understanding the well-being motivation behind CCM, and the subsequent tension that this results in 
with FFDE use (the base of the tension triangle), depends on having a clear understanding as to how 
climate change impacts our ability to derive well-being from a stable environment. Holland (2008) 
suggests that the majority of capabilities are dependent on certain environmental preconditions or 
‘meta-capabilities’ i.e. we derive many capabilities directly from interaction with the environment. For 
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example, both bodily integrity and bodily health depend on certain environmental factors e.g. clean air 
and water permit us to move freely from place to place without incurring negative health impacts. 
Holland goes on to argue that to ensure people can attain minimum required levels of capabilities for a 
life of dignity, ecological protection is required. Holland proposes a meta capability of sustainable 
ecological capacity which she defines as: 
“being able to live one’s life in the context of ecological conditions  that  can  provide  environmental  
resources  and services that enable the current generation’s range of capabilities; to have these 
conditions now and in the future” (Holland, 2008 p.324) 
Another concept outlined by Holland (2014), abstracted from Nussbaum (2000) are capability conflicts. 
These are conflicts which occur between different means of well-being derivation. For example, a 
household near a river may derive sanitation, and thus bodily health, from using the river as a means of 
refuse disposal. However, a household downstream may use river as a source of drinking water to derive 
bodily health. But the downstream household is now prevented from doing so because the refuge 
disposed of by the upstream household has rendered the water unpalatable and unsanitary. 
Holland’s notion of capability conflicts and meta-capabilities can help conceptualise the links and 
motivations between FFDE use, climate change mitigation, and well-being deprivation. The use of the 
atmosphere as a sink for GHG emissions, may allow a person to attain well-being from processes which 
require the combustion of fossil fuels, for example, the combustion of fuel to power transport. This use 
over a large enough scale will contribute to the ongoing warming of the atmosphere. Many other people 
and societies (and indeed the very same people and societies), may derive many capabilities via the 
environmental services (or ecological meta-capabilities) that are supported by an atmosphere with stable 
temperatures. For example, stable weather patterns and temperature cycles which aid agricultural 
productivity, adequate drinking water and stable environments which enable the attainment of 
capabilities bodily health and play. We can see here that the extensive use of the atmosphere for the 
former purpose conflicts with the latter use.  
Schlosberg (2012) suggests that a capabilities approach to justice can aid in assessing a broad range of 
issues posed by climate change, arguing it is an approach which may help capture distributions of 
vulnerability, the impacts of mal-recognition, and the impairments to functioning climate change poses 
(Schlosberg, 2012). Drawing on Fraser (1997), Schlosberg details how mal-, mis-,and non-recognition 
(for simplicity we refer to these issues collectively as misrecognition from here in) leads to the neglect 
of peoples and cultures which are impacted by climate change in ways which threaten the preconditions 
for those cultures to exist and the attainment of capabilities within them (Schlosberg, 2012). Schlosberg 
argues that capabilities approach, through its deliberative nature may help ameliorate the recognition 
issues of local, individual, and community needs and vulnerabilities (Schlosberg, 2012).  
45 
 
Schlosberg also suggests that misrecognition inhibits the fair participation of individuals and 
communities in deliberative and democratic procedures. And further, that these preconditions of 
participation and recognition depend broadly on the environment. Drawing on Holland’s (2008) 
conception of ecological meta-capabilities and Nancy Frasers (1997) concerns over recognition justice, 
Schlosberg holds that recognition is key to designing substantive policy responses to threats (climate 
change in particular) to human functionings and the incommensurable role of the environment in 
achieving them.  
2.4.2 Capability from energy services  
Understanding the well-being tension between CCM and FFDE use also requires an understanding of 
the process through which well-being is derived from services which depend on FFDE. Understanding 
this process, enables one to assess the points at which CCM might conflict with current means of well-
being attainment from FFDE use. One incorporation of the capabilities approach is Day et al.’s (2016) 
conceptualisation of the relationship between energy, energy services, and well-being outcomes. Day 
et al. (2016) utilise capabilities to conceptualise the means through which we derive well-being from 
household energy services. They then outline the processes through which capability deprivation may 
occur or be prevented by insufficient or adequate energy access. 
With reference to Sovacool et al. (2014), Day et al. (2016) argue that energy demand is not derived 
from an intrinsic want or need for energy, but instead arises from the services and activities that energy 
enables us to use and do. As such, they utilise the concept of secondary capabilities to conceptualise the 
links between the use of energy services and basic capabilities. Day et al.’s framework allows one to 
illustrate heterogeneity of services and subsequent capabilities derived from energy. This is in part 
achieved through the incorporation of Smith & Seward’s (2009) conception of ‘basic’ and ‘secondary’ 
capabilities. Secondary capabilities here embody a positivist approach, in that they can be observed and 
measured, e.g. driving a car, using a washing machine, and utensils used in preparing food. Basic 
capabilities embody constructivist ideals, for example, Nussbaum’s capability of Affiliation. There will 
be multiple ways in which we might define or view affiliation, such as being able to empathise, identify 
with, or physically meet individuals. A secondary capability such as driving or being in transit might 
facilitate these actions. Day et al. (2016) aptly describe secondary capabilities as ‘precursors to basic 
ones’. The adoption of secondary capabilities into a framework is essential for identifying the 




Figure 2-2 Day et al., 2016 conceptualising the relationship between energy, services and outcomes with interventions in 
areas which aid in avoiding fuel poverty. 
Day et al.’s framework (figure 2-2) shows the use of fuel and other energy sources, feeding into 
domestic energy or other power supplies, the energy’s subsequent use in domestic services, its 
utilisation in the form of secondary capabilities, and finally energy manifested in the form of basic 
capabilities. Each stage represents a transformation of energy. 
This framework allows Day et al. (2016) to formulate a definition of energy poverty within the space 
of capabilities, based on disruptions to this chain of derivation acting ultimately as forms of capability 
deprivation: 
 ‘an inability to realise essential capabilities as a direct or indirect result of insufficient access to 
affordable, reliable and safe energy services, and taking into account available reasonable alternative 
means of realising these capabilities.’ (Day et al., 2016) 
This definition is important in justifying our framework because of its ability to capture the well-being 
implications and injustices CCM might yield if it curbs an already vulnerable citizen’s access to energy 
derived from fossil fuels. This approach enables Day et al. (2016) to identify where certain causes of 
energy poverty arise as a result of inadequate access to energy and energy services, and consequently 
where interventions should occur to minimise them (Day et al., 2016). The framework presented by 
Day et al. (2016) can already be used to illustrate the process of capability derivation through domestic 
energy services powered by fossil fuelled derived energy, particularly if we omit other energy sources 
listed within it. Through expansions it may capture various other means of capability derivation that 
FFDE contribute too.  
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2.4.3  Capability from transport 
Day et al.’s framework considers only the relationship between direct domestic energy consumption 
and capabilities derivation. However, transport is another widely used means through which FFDE is 
utilized to provide a service, for example, accessing healthcare and education, or recreational sites via 
a car, and therefore is likely to conflict with certain forms of CCM (Woodcock et al., 2009). As with 
other forms of fuel poverty, inadequate access to transport can have significant consequences for a 
person’s well-being, barring them from accessing important services and sources of well-being 
attainment (Mattioli, 2016). Transport can therefore be seen as means of attaining functioning and 
capability and it has been suggested that the capabilities approach could yield many lessons for transport 
planning (Hananel and Berechman, 2016, Beyazit, 2011). Simultaneously, transport is responsible for 
a substantial portion of many nations emissions (IEA, 2012). Vehicles and fuel have been the subject 
of proposed and existing emissions reductions policy. A policy which seeks to reduce emissions from 
transport may inadvertently reduce vulnerable group’s access to capability supporting services 
(Mattioli, 2017). 
Day et al.’s framework does not capture the relationship between fossil fuelled private transport and 
basic capabilities. Transport is currently a source of capability attainment, but because of its current 
dependence on FFDE, it is linked to GHG emissions and subsequently climate change. If climate change 
mitigation, motivated by well-being concerns is introduced to target emissions from transport, 
motivated by climate-well-being concerns, it also poses the risk of inhibiting well-being derivation from 
these sources. Incorporating ecological meta-capabilities and capability conflicts within this framework 
would inherently account for the negative links between FFDE and well-being, and help frame the 
tensions between the well-being implications of climate change and CCM. Being able to capture this 
relationship is instrumental in outlining the impacts that CCM can inadvertently have on vulnerable 
groups. 
2.5 Expanding the tension triangle: creating a well-being lens  
Here we combine Day et al.’s framework with Holland’s capability conflicts and ecological meta-
capabilities and extend it to include private transport. Day et al.’s framework is an important first step 
in conceptualising the process of capability derivation from energy use and they suggest their 
framework may be expanded beyond its initial scope. We aim to focus solely on energy derived from 
fossil fuels because of their significant links to climate change. We incorporate transport into the 
framework to more broadly capture uses of FFDE. We are aware that many of the processes we outline 
can occur through the use of other energy sources. However, our focus is specifically on fossil fuels as 
to provide a conceptual snapshot that illustrates the relationships between the processes that make up 
the tensions triangle. This expansion will later aid in outlining the process through which certain policies 
might disrupt the flow of capabilities currently derived from fossil fuels. 
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2.5.1 Incorporating transport  
To encompass emissions from private transport, ‘domestic energy or power supply’ featured in Day et 
al. (2016) needs to be expanded. Thus, in the model presented below this stage is termed ‘private energy 
and supply’ (PES). This allows for the incorporation of refined fossil fuels into this stage of the 
framework. Refined fossil fuels are often used in private transport and consequently, the next stage in 
the framework ‘domestic energy services’ is replaced with ‘private energy services’ to reflect the private 
use of FFDE outside a domestic environment. From there, the secondary and basic capabilities derived 
from energy use can remain unchanged.  
The extended framework can now illustrate how we might derive capability through petroleum fuelled 
private transport. For example, fossil fuels may be initially combusted to provide energy for the 
refinement and transport of petroleum. This petroleum is then combusted within a private vehicle 
generating mechanical power, which provides a secondary capability of transit. The ability to transit 
then yields the opportunity to derive a number of basic capabilities. For example, the capability of 
affiliation – one might be enabled to physically affiliate with others through the use of private transport. 
Another example might be enabling access to distant health care facilities and in turn the capability of 
bodily health might be derived.  
 
Figure 2-3 Capability derivation chain from fossil fuels through private energy use. 
2.5.2 Meta-capacities and capability conflicts 
The initial framework (above) illustrates how we arrive at basic capabilities through the combustion of 
fossil fuels, and thus illustrates the relationship between FFDE use and well-being outlined earlier in 
the tension triangle. To link this relationship to the well-being impacts of climate change i.e. the well-
being motivation of CCM, we draw on Holland’s (2014) conception of ecological meta-capabilities and 
capability conflicts. Holland’s framing of these two concepts enables us to conceptualise the well-being 
impacts of climate change within the capabilities space. Additionally, as described, climate change’s 
primary driver is the combustion of fossil fuels. Thus, to extend the model we link sources of emissions 
to conceptual carbon space consumption. Opschoor (2010) define ‘carbon space’ as: 
‘…long term maxima for temperature rise or concentrations of greenhouse gases [which] 
defines spaces within which further emissions of these gases are to remain.’ 
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 (Opschoor, 2010)  
Or more simply, carbon space is the capacity of the atmosphere to hold a particular concentration of 
GHGs16 whilst maintaining a particular temperature.  
To achieve this extension, we conceptualise an ongoing tension between carbon space consumption and 
what we term ‘homeostatic ecological meta-capabilities’. These are sets of capabilities that could 
potentially be derived from a less strained environment in which a more sustainable society is 
embedded. This is essentially the aim of CCM. For example, a climate that is less subject to change 
because society has avoided further emissions, may yield more stable and predictable weather patterns 
and less severe weather events, this might in turn aid crop yields which depend on more predictable 
weather cycles. This could lead to improved food security and avoid famines and hunger, helping to 
maintain people’s capability of bodily health and integrity. However, in our less sustainable reality, 
climate change continues to disrupt the environment and weather patterns, our ability to derive a wider 
array of capabilities from the environment declines e.g. bodily health and integrity, identity and culture, 
affiliation etc. This conflict then feeds back negatively to secondary and basic capabilities (represented 
by the red connections in figure 2-4), illustrating the capability depriving impacts of climate change. 
Therefore, as we overconsume one particular environmental service – carbon space – we reduce our 
ability to derive other ecological meta-capabilities. Holland (2008) suggests that when such a state of 
ecological conditions exist which enable minimum levels of capability thresholds to be meet that an 
‘environmental justice threshold’ has been met or surpassed. 
As we noted earlier our focus here is on the well-being conflicts that occur between FFDE use and 
CCM. However significant well-being impacts occur at other points within our framework, in particular 
during extraction and refinement. Healy et al. (2019) illustrate these ‘hidden injustices’ that occur 
throughout trans-boundary supply chains by introducing the concept of ‘embodied energy injustices’ 
linking energy extraction to violence, forcible displacements, pollution, and human rights violations. 
Ecological meta-capability conflicts might occur elsewhere in the supply chain simultaneously to 
climate impacts. For example, air quality degradation from fossil fuelled transport is a clear ecological 
meta-capability conflict, where by one means of deriving capability erodes another (Holland, 2008).  
 




Figure 2-4 Combined framework of capability derivation from fossil fuels and capability conflicts between carbon space 
consumption and ecological meta-capabilities. Blue arrows indicate the flow of energy, services and well-being from energy 
use and the environment to capability attainment. Red arrows represent the conflicts that result from emitting activities at the 
stages of fossil fuel extraction and refinement, private energy services, secondary capabilities such as combusting fuel in a 
car to achieve transit, and the subsequent deprivation of secondary and basic capabilities that result from the collective 
environmental impacts that reduce our ability to derive capability from the environment. 
2.6 Discussion  
Marino and Ribot (2012) state ‘as climate-related crises produce winners and losers, so may discourses 
and plans made to avert such crises’. Our framework, taken with considerations of recognition issues 
(such as those presented by Schlosberg (2012) and Fraser (1997)), illustrates the interplay between 
fossil fuel derived well-being and well-being depriving climate change, and subsequently conflicts that 
can arise through mitigation attempts. 
Through including a broad range of activities that depend on fossil fuels, we illustrate the heterogeneity 
of emitting activities from which fossil fuelled societies derive well-being. This enables us to better 
illustrate the points at which CCM might disrupt a person’s current means of well-being attainment 
from FFDE use. Through illustrating this process in the capabilities space, we are able to outline how 
capability deprivation resulting from misinformed CCM can compound injustices that were overlooked 
during its formulation. When referring to Schlosberg’s (2012) inclusion of Fraser’s (1997) recognition 
concerns in a broad capabilities approach, it becomes apparent as to how these injustices result. Having 
a full set of capabilities is paramount to being able to participate within the democratic processes and 
achieve ‘democratic equality’, which in itself integrates equal recognition. In recognising this, we can 
see how the impairment of someone’s capability derivation from FFDE might prevent them from 
participating in deliberative procedures in which they might attain some sort of recognition and the 
eventual amelioration of their well-being deprivation (Anderson, 1999).17  
 




The interplay between capabilities, the attainment of recognition (or lack thereof), and CCM becomes 
further ostensible when we consider how misguided CCM can compound these injustices.  Because of 
their existing capability deprivation and misrecognition, vulnerable groups may find it difficult to 
participate in policy formulation and other democratic process, even through simple processes of 
transiting to areas in which these processes occur. This can lead to the formulation of policies which 
fail to take account of these groups’ concerns, and therefore may be more likely to disproportionately 
impact these groups than other groups who have a greater capability to be politically active. 
As such a process unfolds in which vulnerable groups become further marginalised as they are 
continually distanced from societal participation. This aligns in particular with Schlosberg’s (2012) 
view that vulnerable group’s statuses are at least, in part, ‘socially, politically, and economically 
constructed’ and that it is therefore necessary for them to attain some form of control over their political 
environment in order to ameliorate their position. For example, within the UK 11% of households are 
in fuel poverty, in this position members of a household may be struggling to heat their homes and 
subsequently may develop health issues, thus reducing their capability of bodily health (DBEIS, 2017). 
These health issues may inhibit a person’s capability to engage in society and to exercise political 
control within their environment, for example, the ability to attend public consultations and even 
visiting polling stations (Gillard et al., 2017). Therefore, through facing existing capability deprivation, 
members of these household may find it difficult to engage in a discourse which could either alleviate 
or exacerbate their position – Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) term this ‘corrosive disadvantage’. In the case 
of climate mitigation, a policy which increases the cost of household energy, would risk further 
exacerbating capability deprivation.   
Illustrating that CCM discourse can be analysed through a well-being lens is pertinent in providing a 
framing of climate change mitigation in reference to its well-being impacts, both positive and negative. 
If our motivation to mitigate climate change is found in climate change’s detrimental impact on human 
well-being, then our concern should be extended to those vulnerable groups whose well-being is risked 
as a result of misguided climate mitigation.  
We noted earlier that “at a certain point increasing energy consumption does not appear to contribute 
to gains in well-being (Steinberger and Roberts, 2010). Therefore a focus on other maintaining and 
attaining other means of well-being may help partially decouple the energy-well-being relationship, and 
could provide avenues to maintain well-being whilst mitigating climate change (Brand-Correa and 
Steinberger, 2017).”  Our framework outlines the current means and capabilities we depend on to attain 
well-being. However, these capabilities need not be tied to fossil fuels permanently. Many of these 
capabilities could instead be ensured by more inclusive solutions, for example, improvements in 
accessible public infrastructure, such as replacing roads with trams and bus lanes, utilising industrial 
heat through combined heat and power plants, mandating energy efficiency measures in new homes 
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and subsidising retrofits in inclusive and equitable ways. An awareness of the potential well-being 
conflicts CCM could cause is paramount in guiding the formation of well-being enhancing responses 
to climate change. Viewing these CCM and FFDE use in relation to well-being as done through the 
tensions triangle will help avoid the separation of these issues.   
2.7 Conclusion 
We have argued that in order to minimise well-being impacts of climate change mitigation we must 
view both climate change mitigation and FFDE use through a well-being lens. To effectively do so 
requires a robust and holistic conception of well-being capable of capturing the complex relationships 
between these conflicting processes. We have argued that the capabilities conception of well-being 
provides this and that viewing these relationships in terms of capabilities allows us to assess and shape 
current and future mitigation strategies that consider vulnerable groups to minimise and ameliorate 
potential well-being conflicts. 
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3 Chapter 3 Substantiating Energy Justice: creating a 
space to understand energy dilemmas  
 
N. Wood, K. Roelich  
Abstract:  
This paper explores the relationships between the moral philosophical foundations and strategic goals 
of two conceptions of energy justice; the ’triumvirate conception’ and the ‘principled approach’. We 
explore the extent to which the goals of these approaches align with their core aims and strategies. 
Having initially been developed to capture and reflect the values of activist-led environmental justice 
movements, we find that the triumvirate approach’s adoption of a trivalent conception of justice 
currently lies in tension with its overarching top-down approach. We note that the principled approach 
does not face the same tensions as the triumvirate conception of energy justice but would benefit from 
illustrating the consequences of framing the same energy dilemma with conflicting moral theories. 
Aiming to ameliorate these limitations and further develop conceptions of energy justice, we outline a 
case study of hydro power in Hirakud, India and propose a framework which illustrates how using 
differing theories of justice to conceptualise the same energy dilemmas can result in substantially 
different normative framings and guidance. We illustrate how this framework, combined with a 
pluralistic appeal to moral theory can enable both approaches to draw on a wider range of moral theory 
to assess energy dilemmas. This in turn provides a broader socio-political backdrop in which to view 
energy dilemmas. We outline how this backdrop contributes to the creation of a space in which the 
grievances of those who suffer in relation to energy systems and be heard and better understood.  
3.1 Introduction 
The term ‘energy justice’ can be a source of confusion as it describes both a research agenda and a set 
of conceptual approaches. As a research agenda, energy justice has focused on a range of issues that 
arise in relation to energy systems from issues of access such as fuel and energy poverty, to issues 
regarding the extraction, production, and distribution of energy, and how such issues relate to ideas of 
“justice” and “fairness”. The idea of justice in particular has been drawn on in ways ranging from broad 
and ambiguous interpretation, synonymous with intuitive ideals of fairness, to the application of 
accounts of justice drawn straight from moral and political theory. Bickerstaff et al. (2013) for example, 
contains a collection of works which engage with justice scholarship at various levels of abstraction to 
discuss and frame different sets of energy dilemmas such a fuel poverty, energy vulnerability, nuclear 
energy, and sustainable energy transitions. Elsewhere, the scholarship has drawn on a diversity of moral 
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theory to develop discrete conceptions of energy justice which can be used to frame and respond to a 
range of energy dilemmas throughout whole energy systems (McCauley et al., 2013, Sovacool and 
Dworkin, 2014).  
In this paper we focus on two prominent conceptions of energy justice: the conception set out in 
McCauley et al. (2013), which we refer to as the triumvirate conception of energy justice (TCEJ); and 
the conception set out initially in Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) Global Energy Justice, which we refer 
to as the principled approach.  
Both approaches share some similarities in that their goals broadly revolve around integrating ideas of 
justice or fairness into energy policy and decision making processes (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014, 
Jenkins et al., 2017a). However, their use of moral theory to underpin their given conceptions of what 
the “justice” in energy justice consists of diverges in a number of ways, as do their respective strategies 
of attaining their individual goals.  
We therefore focus on three aspects of these approaches; their use of moral theory to underpin their 
respective conceptions of energy justice, their overall goals, and the strategies which underpin them. 
By “strategies” we mean the conceptual outputs that enable the attainment of their respective goals. 
These might take the form of heuristic frameworks through which to view and inform on energy 
dilemmas for example. We posit that tensions between these three facets, to varying extents are 
inhibiting the ability of each approach to create a space in which to hear and understand the voices and 
grievances of those who are subject to the ills of energy systems. By extension, we argue that the 
absence of this space, to varying extents, inhibits the ability of these approaches to normatively inform 
energy policy and decision-makers.  
When drawing on moral theory to create a new approach, it should follow that the motivating moral 
theory of an approach should also be embodied in its goals and strategies. Put simply, we can ask if the 
underlying values motivating an approach to energy justice are reflected in its overall goals and 
accompanying strategies. This is a pertinent question since the elaboration and interpretation of any 
given moral theory or concept will substantially influence how it is structured and operationalised. This 
in turn dictates whether an approach is successful in creating a useful space in which the grievances of 
those who are subject to the ills of energy systems can be heard and better understood. Such a space is 
required if energy dilemmas are to be understood in relation to broader social and political 
circumstances which might underpin them.  
From here, we use the term ‘moral theory’ broadly to refer to the philosophical ideas on which these 
conceptions of energy justice are based. For example, the triumvirate approach to energy justice 
describes justice as consisting of distributive, procedural and recognition-based ideals – broad concepts 
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which find their basis in both moral and political theory (Jenkins, 2018). Although such concepts also 
find their roots in political philosophy, for now, we refer to these collectively as “moral theory”. We 
use this term to describe sets of rules and concepts which allow us to evaluate existing situations through 
various justice lenses, provide guidance as to what we ought to do in response and which describe 
structures and goods (and their accompanying distributions) we should use to articulate the normative 
aspects these issues (see section 3.3). We expand on these concepts further in the paper, illustrating how 
different moral theories can be used to create a space in which to explore and understand energy 
dilemmas and their relationship to people’s lives.                                                                 
Our contribution is not necessarily to advocate for a single approach to conceptualising or articulating 
energy related injustice, but rather to provide a framework which enables energy justice scholars to 
explore, utilize, and critique a wide range of moral theory in reference to energy dilemmas. In particular, 
our framework provides a means of critiquing the given usefulness and ability of various moral theories 
to frame energy dilemmas in reference to broader socio-political situations which underpin them. Later 
we explain how this ability to frame an energy dilemma within a broader socio-political circumstance 
is necessary in coming to understand how energy dilemmas come to impact the people and societies 
they do.  
We identify two key areas where approaches to energy justice could be strengthened: 
• A stronger outline and discussion of the moral foundations on which the various approaches 
rest, including how such accounts relate to or conflict with the non-philosophical, strategic aspects of 
each approach. 
• A broader integration of a range of moral concepts and approaches, which in turn can act as a 
source of normative guidance and a means of embedding complex energy dilemmas within broader 
socio-political situations. 
The paper is structured as follows. The triumvirate and principled approaches’ moral and strategic 
underpinnings are critiqued and compared (section 3.2). Potential short-comings, tensions and areas 
which could be further developed are used to motivate a discussion regarding the effective pluralistic 
use of moral theory in analysing and conceptualising energy dilemmas (section 3.3). This discussion is 
then applied to a case study on the construction of the Hirakud hydro power dam, which illustrates the 
benefits and limitations of using different moral theories in analysing and framing energy dilemmas and 
producing normative guidance. In particular, we emphasise that different moral theories may yield 
significantly different normative outlooks and guidance (Section 3.4). Based on this case study we 
outline a framework regarding the use of moral theory in framing energy dilemmas within a broader 
socio-political context whilst creating a conceptual space in which to analyse and understand energy 
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dilemmas and the grievances of those who endure them. We then outline how this framework, combined 
with the adoption of a broad pluralism can to varying extents, help ameliorate the tensions within both 
the triumvirate and principled approaches to energy justice (section 3.5 & 3.6).  
3.2 The world through an energy justice lens 
In this section, we outline the relationships between the underlying moral theory, strategies, and goals 
of the triumvirate and principled approaches to energy justice.  
3.2.1 The triumvirate conception: foundation and theory 
The triumvirate conception of energy justice (TCEJ) has had significant uptake in broader energy justice 
discourse, being utilised in a growing number of empirical and conceptual works (Healy et al., 2019, 
Demski et al., 2019, Sareen and Haarstad, 2018, Jenkins, 2018, Jenkins et al., 2018, Gillard et al., 2017, 
Damgaard et al., 2017, Fuller and McCauley, 2016)18, as well as being the subject of numerous reviews 
(Jenkins et al., 2014, Jenkins et al., 2016, Heffron and McCauley, 2017). As this paper is concerned 
with the TCEJ’s moral foundations and strategic goals, we focus primarily on conceptual contributions 
to the approach as opposed to its applications (McCauley et al., 2013, Heffron et al., 2015, Heffron and 
McCauley, 2014, Jenkins et al., 2016, Jenkins et al., 2014).  
3.2.1.1 Moral Theory 
Although the seminal TCEJ paper by McCauley et al. (2013) refers briefly to work on both 
environmental and climate justice, the approach most closely resembles Schlosberg’s trivalent 
conception of environmental justice with McCauley et al. (2013) stating that energy justice is ‘founded 
in literature on environmental justice’ simultaneously citing Schlosberg (Schlosberg, 2013, Schlosberg, 
2009). The approach consists of a “triumvirate of tenets”; distribution, recognition and procedure, which 
are also found Schlosberg’s (2004) earlier conceptions of environmental justice (Jenkins et al., 2016, 
McCauley et al., 2013).19 
Based on Jenkins et al. (2016) and McCauley et al. (2013): 
 
18 This is not an exhaustive list, the number of works which now utilise the triumvirate energy justice framework 
is far larger. 
19 We were aware of an exploration of restorative justice by Heffron and McCauley, (2017). However, in a 
following paper in McCauley and Heffron (2018) create a ‘new triumvirate of tenets (distributional, procedural 
and restorative)’ although recognition is still briefly discussed in the paper it is omitted from the triumvirate 
without explanation. As such we focus on the initial conception of TCEJ which has had wider uptake within 
energy justice discourse. 
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• The distributional aspects of energy justice attempts to capture “where injustices emerge”, be 
this spatially or temporally - in other words how the benefits and burdens that energy systems produce 
are distributed through space and over time.  
• Recognition focuses on how parties, communities and individuals are represented and 
recognised in reference to energy related events and situations. For example, how indigenous people 
might be overlooked during the decision making process of coal mining20 or how low-income, fuel poor 
households might be under-represented in the development of energy policy21. The concept of 
recognition is largely based on work by Nancy Fraser (Fraser, 1996). 
• Procedural justice focuses on the processes and means of ameliorating injustices which have 
been identified i.e. which procedures and structures could be implemented that incorporate previously 
misrecognised parties (McCauley et al., 2013, Jenkins et al., 2016). 
It is worth noting that despite mentioning “just outcomes”, “just distributions” and “injustices” a 
number of times the authors of this approach do not specify what they take justice to mean or consist 
of – whether this is through theoretical accounts or testimony and claim making (McCauley et al., 2013, 
Jenkins et al., 2016, Jenkins, 2018). 
The approach also embodies aspects of cosmopolitan justice, viewing all humans as ‘world citizens’ 
whom are of equal moral worth and standing (Heffron et al., 2015). This global view of justice is 
discussed in relation to transboundary energy dilemmas such as nuclear energy and its governing 
intuitions (Heffron et al., 2015). 
This cosmopolitan outlook is reflected in the TCEJ’s goals. McCauley et al. (2013) state the TCEJ 
“aims to provide all individuals, across all areas, with safe, affordable and sustainable energy.” And 
this goal is restated in Heffron and McCauley (2014), Jenkins et al. (2014), Jenkins et al. (2017a), 
Jenkins et al. (2017b) and Jenkins (2018).  
In a much cited conceptual review, Jenkins et al. (2016) outline how the triumvirate conception offers 
an opportunity to explore where injustices occur and how these might be avoided or remedied stating 
that it is ‘an agenda that inspires both evaluative accounts and normative solutions’ (p.176). The TCEJ 
has been framed as a tool for addressing dilemmas through whole energy systems, from production to 
consumption (Jenkins et al., 2014). Much of the conceptual work on the TCEJ has thus focused on 
relating these tenets to existing energy dilemmas or methods of informing decision-makers. Jenkins et 
 
20 See Healy (2018) for an account of ‘embodied energy injustices’ in relation to open-pit coal mining in La 
Guajira, Colombia. 




al. (2016) discuss a range of ways in which the principles manifest in practice. For example, procedural 
aspects of the approach are reflected in processes of mobilising local knowledge and information 
disclosure, whilst ideas of mal-distribution and mal-recognition are used to frame a wide range of 
energy dilemmas, from Germany’s energy strategy energiewende, which is framed as producing 
distributional injustices22; to links to the mal-recognition of vulnerable groups in the UK and their 
vulnerability to fuel poverty. 
3.2.1.2  Strategies, goals and underlying tensions  
The TCEJ is argued to have two key strategic benefits which other justice (environment and climate) 
movements lack (Heffron et al., 2015, Jenkins, 2018): 
• It provides a way to focus on energy dilemmas in isolation from broader issues. 
• Its use as a decision-support tool which offers a means of ‘embedding justice in policy’.  
Both these benefits rest heavily on critiques of environmental and climate justice, in particular that 
certain aspects of these movements have limited their success in affecting policy (Heffron et al., 2015, 
Jenkins, 2018).  
Jenkins (2018) argues that ‘one of the challenges and therefore potential failings of the environmental 
and climate justice movement is their breadth and lack of clearly defined content.’ Jenkin’s outlines 
how energy justice provides a means of ‘bounding’ out energy dilemmas from wider range of issues 
addressed by environmental and climate justice movements (Jenkins, 2018 p.119).23 Jenkins (2018) 
then outlines that through adopting a whole systems perspective (viewing energy systems from 
extraction through to consumption and waste), energy justice can focus on the dilemmas that arise at 
each stage of a whole energy system in isolation from other societal issues.  
This approach of bounding and separating out particular energy dilemmas from broader discourses is 
in-turn facilitated through the adoption of a ‘top-down methodology’ (Jenkins, 2018). Jenkins argues 
that this top-down methodology is enabled because of energy justices’ ‘lack of an anti-establishment 
past’ that ‘opens the door for significant contributions to mainstream policy-making’. Jenkins goes on, 
echoing critique from Heffron et al. (2015): 
‘Energy justice does so by overcoming what may be identified as the “naïve” approaches of 
environmental and climate justice – the presumption that society would support their ideals - focusing 
 
22 This is one of many examples of energy injustices outlined in Jenkins et al. (2016), we recommend viewing 
the paper for more. 
23 It is worth noting that Jenkin’s quotes Bickerstaff et al. (2013) who are referring to energy justice as a 
discourse and not the TCEJ in particular. 
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instead on embedding justice in policy. This “top-down” methodology offers the potential for a refined 
“practice”’(Jenkins, 2018 p.120). 
Although Jenkins follows this with a caveat acknowledging the importance of recognition and activism, 
the integration these with top-down approaches represents something of a methodological issue for the 
TCEJ. The TCEJ is evidently critical of environmental justice’s roots – it is true that the movement is 
broad and does not represent a concise body of literature with clearly defined content - but this is exactly 
what Schlosberg’s conception of environmental justice, on which the TCEJ is largely based, sought to 
reflect. Schlosberg’s trivalent account of environmental justice is an approach which was specifically 
developed as a space to accommodate and reflect the broad values of activist-led, community driven 
movements which accrue to produce a view of global environmental justice (Schlosberg, 2004, 
Schlosberg, 2009).  
Environmental justice movements were motivated in part because the interests and values of 
marginalised groups were not being reflected and recognised by power-holders and in policy formation 
(Schlosberg, 2009, Walker, 2012). This is a key reason as to why recognition and a pluralistic 
conception of justice – the idea that there are many conceptions of “the good” and what is right - are 
key components of Scholsberg’s trivalent approach. They exist to help articulate the idea that different 
groups will have different values and ways of expressing and articulating those values. So although 
TCEJ authors are acutely aware of the importance of recognition and activism, the TCEJ’s foundations 
do not necessarily align with its core strategies of “top-down” policy making. As a result, the ability of 
the TCEJ to act as a space to explore energy dilemmas is curtailed. 
To be clear we are certainly not arguing that a greater appeal and accessibility to policy makers is not 
beneficial, rather we posit that this method is in tension with the TCEJs own foundations. 
Environmental justice movements arose because the voices of multiple community and activist led 
groups were not being heard and reflected in existing environmental policy processes (Walker, 2012).  
This tension then brings the approach’s goal of providing “all individuals, across all areas, with safe, 
affordable and sustainable energy” into question. This goal is distinctly prescriptive and top-down. 
Granted there is an expansive range of literature which can be used to support the claim that energy, in 
some form, is an essential part of all human lives. But this is not explored or defined in reference to this 
goal, nor are definitions of “sustainable”, “safe” and “affordable” given in reference to the goal 
(although these concepts are discussed in TCEJ literature). The goal is rather vague – this might be 
purposeful, but this is neither stated nor explained. In a sense, the goal embodies traits of mal-
recognition, the same dynamics the approach is keen to ameliorate – it embodies the assumption that 
all communities prescribe to this goal. Broader energy research includes an abundance of accounts of 
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how the attempts of states or power-holders to supply energy to communities who aren’t consulted 
results in a range of distributive and recognition issues (Healy et al., 2019).  
It is worth noting the similarities between this goal and the 7th sustainable development goal of ensuring 
‘access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all (United Nations, 2018). 
Hillerbrand (2018) offer a critique of the 7th sustainable development goal, which to a large extent 
mirrors the goal of the TCEJ to provide all individuals with “safe, affordable and sustainable energy”. 
Hillerbrand argue that this goal fails to adequately capture the interconnections between the 
environment, humans, and technology and by doing so inhibits the goals implementation. Although 
TCEJ authors do discuss the socio-technical nature of energy systems they do not attempt to explain or 
justify their goal of providing safe, affordable, and sustainable energy for all in reference to these 
concepts or their own trivalent approach.   
3.2.2 The Principled Approach; foundation and theory 
The principled approach proposed by Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) in Global Energy Justice sets out 
a conception of energy justice as a means to produce ‘a global energy system that fairly disseminates 
both the benefits and costs of energy services, and one that contributes to more representative and 
impartial energy decision-making’. 
3.2.2.1 Moral Theory 
Sovacool and Dworkin lay out a broad exploration of a range of moral theories and conceptions of 
justice. Sovacool et al. (2017) states ‘in very simple terms: [energy justice] attempts to apply principles 
and concepts from social justice to the global energy system in its broadest sense’ (p.677). The 
principled approach, like the TCEJ, reflects distributive, procedural and recognition-based values to 
justice but these emerge in an eight principled conception of energy justice24. Before outlining their 
approach Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) present and outline numerous moral theories. Each is then 
paired with differing energy dilemmas to illustrate how a particular theory might frame and offer 
normative guidance in ameliorating the issue being discussed. For example, they justify the 
implementation of a carbon tax through drawing on utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill, arguing that such policies might increase the overall utility of a populous. In another 
chapter, Sovacool and Dworkin discuss energy poverty through a capabilitarian and contractarian lens, 
referencing the work of John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and Amartya Sen.  
Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) (p.374) describe their approach:  
 
24 In Sovacool et al. (2017) resistance and intersectionality also debut on the list of principles.  
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‘Our energy justice framework has elements of Kantian ethics, which takes each person as an end. It 
has libertarian elements of freedom and choice, suggesting that good societies present people with a set 
of opportunities or substantial freedoms, so they can choose to exercise these or not. It is pluralist about 
value, holding that capabilities for people are different and also that their own interests vary. It is 
concerned with justice as recognition, noting that failures of procedural justice can result in 
discrimination and marginalization. It, also, has elements focused on utilitarianism and welfare, 
attempting to improve the quality of life for all people, as defined by their capabilities.’ 
The earliest conception of this approach drew almost exclusively on western-centric theories of justice. 
However, Sovacool et al. (2017 p.678) illustrates how the principled approach to justice can ‘tap into 
the rich insights offered by non-western justice theorists’, drawing on such concepts and approaches as 
Ubuntu, Confucianism, Dharma and a range of indigenous perspectives of the Americas, as well non-
human systems of value.  
The principled conception seeks to connect energy policy and technology to eight philosophical 
concepts: virtue, utility, human rights, procedural justice, welfare and happiness, freedom, posterity, 
and fairness (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). The approach then uses these concepts to frame eight 
energy issues as matters of justice. These principles are underlined by a cosmopolitan foundation 
implying that they are universally applicable and reflect the equal moral worth of all humans (Sovacool 
et al., 2016). The main output of these principles is a conceptual framework consisting of eight values 
which should be embraced by decision and policy-makers; availability, affordability, due process, 
transparency and accountability, sustainability, intergenerational equity, intra-generational equity and 
responsibility. 
3.2.2.2 Strategies, goals, and underlying tensions  
Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) position the approach as a useful analytical and decision-making tool for 
framing and responding to energy dilemmas. LaBelle (2017) describes how the cosmopolitan aspects 
of this approach allow it to act as a universal, normative check-list for energy decision making and this 
seems very much to be the approach’s strategy – to investigate and apply the principles and lessons 
from a range of works of justice to the complex issues which arise in relation to energy systems. 
This does well to illustrate how framing a specific issue, for example energy poverty, with a given 
theory of justice can yield valuable normative guidance and ethical framings, which help move to 
ameliorate the issue. These framings often prove their use through creating a conceptual space in which 
the experience of energy poverty can be articulated and better understood. Despite drawing on a range 
of moral theory they do not subscribe to one particular notion of the good, and instead subscribe to a 
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pluralistic conception of value which is articulated through the concept of capability (which we expand 
on later). They illustrate the benefit of using a given theory in assessing a given energy dilemma.  
Of course, one could argue that the selection of a given set of values to analyse an energy dilemma 
might just follow the views of the author i.e. an author might choose a theory that reflects their existing 
values and conclusions. However, the importance of theory becomes particularly important when 
analysing a complex energy dilemma that might not necessarily be directly voiced or seen by a given 
group. For example, Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) draw on an Aristotelian approach to describe why 
efficiency is key to a functioning energy system. The efficiency of large scale energy systems will 
impact people and different groups in many ways e.g. affordability and reliability. However, these 
issues might not be voiced in respect to the efficiency of the system supplying them energy, and when 
airing their grievance might not include any reference to efficiency or the broader energy system. As 
such, people who interact with any particular part of an energy system will be creating a local account 
of justice, which does not have the language necessary to offer guidance as to how to structure such a 
system. Through drawing on a particular theory, namely Aristotle’s ideas of virtue and happiness, 
Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) are able to outline the value of an energy system aimed towards the 
betterment of human lives.  
Although this exploration of moral theory has resulted in a well-grounded set of principles, we note that 
the methods presented by Sovacool and Dworkin currently have some limitations. First, although their 
exploration of justice theory is substantial, there is no clear explanation as to why one theory is used to 
frame a specific issue and not another. For example, why energy poverty is framed by contractarian and 
capabilitarian approaches and not libertarian or human rights-based approaches. This poses an issue for 
their normative check-list, it does not yet explain why it frames one issue with a particular moral theory 
and not another. Therefore another level of justification is required to explain the particular selection of 
moral theory which underpin the values in this energy justice approach. Second, Sovacool and Dworkin 
select specific and different conceptions of justice to conceptualise a number of different energy related 
issues (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014 pp.14-15). As a result, the approach does not illustrate how 
framing the very same energy issue through a different approach to justice can yield drastically different 
normative conclusions (although they acknowledge that different ideas of justice can and will 
conflict25).  
This is a particularly pertinent point which relates to broader energy justice discourse. There is a need 
to explain why certain moral theories are used over others in the formulation of energy justice 
approaches. This might be to do with a moral theories’ ability to capture the complex interactions 
 
25 See Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) p.18 and pp.372-372 where the authors acknowledge tensions between 
moral theories and touch on issues of relativism. 
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humans have with energy systems, or the normative principles which might best guide and frame future 
energy policy decisions. Regardless of the reason, the selection of moral approaches and concepts will 
alter the normative outlook and the operationalisation of the approach. Since these approaches are 
intended to have real-world impacts through use in research, policy and decision making the use of 
moral theory to provide guidance must be balanced with the ability of a given approach to energy justice 
to capture and understand the experiences of those who endure energy dilemmas. 
3.2.3 Summarising both approaches 
In sum both approaches, to varying degrees, could be improved by expanding on their engagement with 
moral theory (table 3-1). Both are limited in creating a space through which to analyse or understand 
energy dilemmas, and this limits the efficacy of both approaches in effectively conveying the impact of 
energy dilemmas on people’s lives to policy and decision-makers.  
Table 3-1 The foundational theory, strategies, goals and underlying tensions of the triumvirate approach and 
principled approach to energy justice compared. 
 The triumvirate approach The principled approach 
Foundational 
theory 
The approach primarily appeals to a 
trivalent account of justice, consisting of 
three broad dimensions; distributive, 
recognition-based and procedural justice. 
These three dimensions are used to frame 
and normatively advise on different 
aspects of energy dilemmas.  
The approach appeals to a range 
of moral theories and 
perspectives and in doing so has 
distilled a range of principles 
through which to frame, analyse 
and advise on energy dilemmas.  
Strategies and 
goals 
This approach is intended to be used as a 
“decision-support tool” and as a means 
of embedding ideas of justice in policy 
via a top-down methodology (See 
McCauley et al. 2017). This approach is 
accompanied by the method of 
separately focusing on energy dilemmas 
in isolation from broader issues.  
A normative check-list to be 
used by policy and decision-
makers consisting of eight 
values; availability, 
affordability, due process, 
transparency and accountability, 
sustainability, intergenerational 
equity, intra-generational equity 





The TCEJ requires additional concepts 
and framings if it is to create a useful 
conceptual space in which the grievances 
of those who suffer in relation to energy 
systems can be articulated, heard and 
better understood. Without the creation 
of this space it is hard to see how the 
approach can achieve its goal of better 
integrating ideas of justice into energy 
policy. This difficulty is compounded by 
the approach’s apparent dismissal of the 
grass-roots, activist values on which the 
trivalent account of justice was initially 
founded. The same logic applies to the 
justification of their goal of safe, 
affordable and sustainable energy for all. 
The approach currently lacks the 
concepts necessary to justify this goal or 
explain why it might relate to the 
attainment or avoidance of some 
conception of justice or injustice. 
The approach has provided only 
a limited justification as to why 
it chose the values and theories 
it did. Such an explanation is 
warranted if the approach is to 
justify why such a combination 
of theories can produce the 
necessary space in which to 
articulate and act on grievances 
which arise in relation to the 
energy dilemmas the approach 






3.3 Moral theory and a space for understanding energy justice 
In this section, we outline how certain ways of employing of moral theory can help frame and make 
sense of energy dilemmas. In turn, we explain how these framings help to create the conceptual spaces 
required for current approaches to energy justice to produce meaningful insights and normative 
guidance. We outline how different moral theories can paint drastically different normative views of a 
given situation and subsequently produce different guidance regarding how to articulate or ameliorate 
an issue.  
The vast quantity and diversity of justice scholarship makes it difficult to define exactly what a moral 
theory or account of justice does or aims to do. As such we do not attempt to characterise or provide a 
single definition of justice. A simple means to approach moral theory, as Sandel (2010) posits, is to 
view these theories as presenting answers to the question ‘what’s the right thing to do?’ To answer this 
question we have to have some sort of account as to what makes something right or wrong. There are 
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two broad, and often inter-related perspectives, which offer explanations as to how this might be 
achieved. Firstly, we might assume that justice, is what those who claim to suffer injustice say it is26. 
However, we might have situations, especially in relation to energy systems in which claims of injustice 
vary in their severity. For example, how can we compare the claims of injustice of a group who have 
been violently displaced because of a coal mining operation and the claims of a community who argue 
a nearby wind development spoils their enjoyment of nearby landscapes? We take both these issues to 
be legitimate concerns but here moral accounts of right and wrong (the second perspective), if used 
pensively, can create spaces and language through which those suffering oppression or hardship, and 
its severity can be heard and understood. 
The idea outlined in the following section is thus that certain moral theories and ideas of justice can 
help to create spaces to articulate and understand the impacts of energy dilemmas on people’s lives, but 
with the requirement that these spaces must be broad enough to incorporate a diverse range of voices 
and conceptions of  what is right. This breadth or scope for a diversity of understandings of what is 
good or just is what we will refer to from here as pluralism. Pluralism in this sense reflects the idea that 
there exist multiple, overlapping and sometimes conflicting conceptions of  what is right (Schlosberg, 
2009). A useful example and application of pluralism is found in Schlosberg’s account of environmental 
justice (Schlosberg, 2004, Schlosberg, 2009). Schlosberg’s account embodies a broad pluralism as to 
create space for the articulation of grievances from a diversity of communities who form the 
environmental justice movement. Schlosberg notes that many accounts of pluralism arose as critiques 
of universalist and singular conceptions of justice following arguments regarding the inability of a 
singular approach to reflect real life experiences of injustice (Schlosberg, 2009). Despite this, 
Schlosberg does not conclude that these theories have no use or value and instead argues:  
‘We have numerous components and conceptions of justice, and see that different and multiple theories 
can apply to various issues, cases, and contexts. Using the range of theories available to us, and 
understanding how they overlap and interact, will illuminate problems more thoroughly. Such an 
approach will also bring us to see that what we may now understand as disparate issues and movements 
may be brought together with this shared and overlapping discourse of justice.’ 
Schlosberg (2009 p.173) 
3.4 Justice: different theories, different answers  
A useful way to describe how moral theories answer the question “what’s the right thing to do?” is by 
observing the good or ‘metric of justice’ through which they frame the world. Saying ‘good’ or ‘metric’ 
here does not necessarily refer to something material like resources. Although many theories and works 
 
26 This if often referred to as “claim making”. Walker (2012) offers a useful explanation of this practice.  
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focus on resources or wealth, these terms can refer to abstract concepts, such as a human rights, 
positions of power, or aspects of well-being such as relationships and dignity. Robeyns and Brighouse 
(2010) frame this as asking ‘what should we look at, when evaluating whether one state of affairs is 
more or less just than another?’ Robeyns and Brighouse are referring to metrics of justice (sometimes 
referred to as ‘currencies of justice’).  
Often theories provide a way of describing how societies function and which structures, procedures and 
institutions might be required to facilitate this. These might be conceptions of the state, nations, 
international bodies and courts, (for example the study of these institutions, their underlying values and 
how citizens interact with one another through them - this falls under ‘political philosophy’). These 
institutions are often highly idealised and can embody normative assumptions, however, used with 
caution, they can add to a theory’s ability to frame the world through offering a broader socio-political 
backdrop in which to embed particular events or situations. As we expand on later depending on the 
theory, such ‘metrics’ can be used to capture and reflect both social and political maldistributions within 
a society.  
We compare the framings and insights produced by Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism and Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach when applied to the same energy dilemma. It is worth noting that 
Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) draw on both Nussbaum and Bentham in different chapters of Global 
Energy Justice - it is worth consulting this text to explore how these approaches can be applied to 
individual energy issues. However, they do not compare and contrast these theories using the same case 
– which is what we do below as a means of illustrating the variance of normative guidance different 
moral theories can provide when assessing the same energy dilemma. For each approach, we identify 
the metric of justice and the distribution of the good that they describe.  
Some of the conclusions from this case study may seem initially intuitive and obvious, but the point 
here is not necessarily to provide a conclusion as to whether the project was morally right or wrong, but 
to illustrate how the use of theory to frame an energy dilemma can yield substantially different framings 
and insights.  
3.4.1 Bentham’s Utilitarianism  
Jeremy Bentham begins An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation stating ‘nature has 
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone 
to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do’ (Bentham, 1781). Sandel 
(2010) suggests that through this reasoning Bentham concluded that the aim of morality should be to 
maximise happiness i.e. the overall balance of pleasure over pain. Actions and events which stand to 
promote happiness are therefore morally permissible, and ones that do not, are not. As such, the right 
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thing to do in any given situation is the action that will maximise overall pleasure within society 
(Bentham termed this “utility”).  
The metric of justice used by Bentham here is clearly utility, the distribution of which ensures that 
aggregate utility is maximised within a society. Sandel notes that Bentham not only intended this logic 
for decisions made by individuals but also by legislators and policy makers (Sandel, 2010). These ideas, 
in theory, could therefore lend themselves to the assessment of many issues pertinent to policy and 
decision-making themes in energy justice. However, utilitarianism has been heavily criticised by 
numerous scholars for its lack of attention of individual rights and its ability to effectively articulate all 
moral actions into a single metric (Sandel, 2010).  
It is worth noting that there are other approaches to utilitarianism that are more accommodating of 
individual rights and the unique value of different activities. For example John Stuart Mill’s approach 
to utilitarianism argues that liberty is of upmost importance to the individual and that utility should be 
maximised over time. Mill also argued that not all sources of pleasure are commensurable but that some 
sources of pleasure – ‘higher pleasures’ – are better than others (Crisp, 2002, Mill, 1861). For simplicity, 
this section draws solely from Bentham’s Utilitarianism to inform our comparison below. But using 
Mill’s approach to frame a given event or situation would yield different normative conclusions and 
guidance27 from both Bentham’s Utilitarianism and Nussbaum’s capability approach (which we outline 
next), as would any other approach to justice. 
3.4.2 Martha Nussbaum’s central human capabilities 
Martha Nussbaum’s account of central human capabilities provides a partial theory of justice through 
which to frame the world. The term ‘partial theory of justice’, describes a theory that can explore certain 
injustices relevant to its prescriptions but cannot specify what to do once these prescriptions are 
fulfilled.28 The approach focuses on what people are able to do and be. This indicates that each person 
must be viewed separately rather than on an aggregate level (this is converse to Bentham’s 
utilitarianism) (Robeyns, 2016a). Nussbaum (2001) bases the concept of capability on the freedom to 
achieve a range of ‘functionings’. ‘Functionings’ in turn are defined as the ability to do and be things 
which humans have reason to value. This can range from something fairly objective such as being free 
from illness (i.e. the capability of bodily health) to the abstract concepts of political and democratic 
participation (i.e. the capability of political control over one’s environment). (Robeyns, 2016b) 
 
27 Mill’s utilitarianism would consider liberty of individuals to have more weight relative to overall aggregate 
utility. 
28 See Robeyns (2016) for a further explanation.  
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The approach focuses on capabilities as ends in and of themselves, because the means for one person 
to achieve the same level of capability as another might be substantially different. For example, it might 
require significantly more resources for a less mobile person to gain the same level of bodily integrity 
as a more mobile person. Therefore, the approach foremost focuses on capability as opposed to the 
distribution of resources. Nussbaum argues that the state should ensure each citizen meets minimum 
threshold in each of a predefined list of capabilities; life; bodily health; bodily integrity; sense, 
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over 
one’s environment. This is an adapted and shortened version the full account can be found in Nussbaum 
(2001) (pp.78-80).  
In the case of this theory, the metric proposed is “capability”, the distribution is one which ensures a 
minimum level of capabilities for all. If this level is not attained, it might reflect that a claim to justice 
exists (Nussbaum, 2003). This minimum threshold however can be quite high or equal for all if it has 
reason to be. For example, one might argue that the capability of political participation, must be equal 
in all to ensure that a democracy functions properly and fairly.  
3.5 A case of hydro power: applying theory to produce a socio-political 
framing 
The moral theories outlined above will offer different framings of both the benefits and burdens of 
events and situations which occur in relation to energy dilemmas. A common example of an energy 
dilemma is the construction of a hydro power dam, which has the potential to yield a high output of low 
emission, renewable energy and to manage flooding in vulnerable areas, yet often involves the mass 
displacement of local populations and extensive ecological damage. When introducing the concept of 
utility, Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) briefly draw on the example of the Hirakud Dam in Orissa, India. 
They note the dam yielded a number of benefits such as helping to mitigate flood risks, providing 
irrigation for 75,000 square kilometres of crop land, and the production of 207.5 MW of hydroelectricity 
(Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014). However, they also note the costs of the dam’s constructions; the 
permanent flooding of 600 square kilometres of land and the subsequent relocation of 150,000 people 
from 22,000 families – many of whom had complained about the project but had been overlooked. 
Those being resettled faced a number of risks including marginalisation in their new homes, 
unemployment and lack of access to common resources (Nayak, 2013). An important dynamic within 
many of these issues is that certain groups and people are more vulnerable than others. For example, 
women in particular face loss of livelihoods as a result of dislocation and are often faced with more 
precarious and dangerous sources of income (Gururaja, 2000). Infants and the elderly are also affected 
heavily by dislocation (Nayak, 2013). 
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Evidently, this project yielded both substantial costs and benefits. It is important here to note that 
framing such a complex situation with different moral theories won’t necessarily yield a clear answer 
to whether or not a project was normatively the ‘right thing to do’ but will offer a perspective which 
might help inform or consult people on a decision or broaden our understanding of the situation at hand. 
So far, we have outlined a number of statistics and consequences without any normative framing (except 
perhaps our own intuitions). Drawing on a set of moral theories will likely create or change our 
perspective on the normative content of the statistics.  
Sovacool and Dworkin note that from a utilitarian perspective, particularly Bentham’s, if the overall 
contribution to utility outweighs the loss then the project is worthwhile. Sovacool and Dworkin do not 
endorse the project themselves because of this conclusion but rather state what those of a utilitarian 
disposition might conclude. As Sovacool and Dworkin did, we can imagine the thought process of these 
utilitarians. The relocation and overlooking of the views of 150,000 people from 22,000 families, would 
likely be a source of substantial disutility, foremost for those having to resettle, but perhaps to for the 
conurbations which may have struggled to receive them. For the families, it may well have meant the 
severing of ties to treasured landscapes, particular ways of life, sources of income, friends and more 
distant relatives. To a Benthamite utilitarian, these costs would all translate into varying losses of utility. 
The benefits the project yielded, perhaps agricultural gains, the mitigation of the devastating impacts of 
floods, and the production of energy and the activities this subsequently enables, would yield gains in 
utility. The fact that different individuals might suffer more or less depending on their social 
background, gender and age is not accounted for in this approach and these gains might not necessarily 
have been obtained by the resettled individuals, but a Benthamite would only be concerned with the 
overall gain or loss of utility within a wider population. Thus if these benefits represented a gain in 
utility of the population overall then they would argue that undertaking the construction of the Hirakud 
dam was the right thing to do. 
The above information of course can be reframed through a different moral lens, and changing this 
moral framing may yield substantially different outlooks and judgements. Framing the above through a 
capabilities lens does just this. The costs presented by the Hirakud dam can be framed in reference to 
Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities.  
It is clear that many peoples’ capabilities were compromised throughout this process. For example, the 
act of ignoring the complaints of those being forced to resettle might act to violate the capability of 
political control over one’s environment. It is evident that this project and the subsequent relocation of 
many people was not a voluntary choice. Such a circumstance may well have reduced political 
capabilities of those being forced to resettle, and indeed their capability of bodily integrity. A number 
of other capabilities might be impacted by resettlement, the capability of affiliation would be impeded 
as resettled communities become fragmented from one another. Simultaneously the resettlement 
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process might take a greater toll on more vulnerable groups, for example the elderly and less mobile, 
such situations would likely result in the impairment of their capability of bodily health.  
The dam simultaneously offered many means of capability enhancement. As outlined, the dam yielded 
a number of benefits, including flood mitigation, extra water resources and electricity. All of these 
benefits would likely have resulted in the enhancement of many people’s capabilities. The avoidance 
of severe floods would have prevented the deprivation of many capabilities, such as bodily health, 
affiliation and even life. The extra water resources will likely have increased food security in certain 
areas which will have promoted numerous capabilities directly and indirectly. For example, bodily 
health depends in part on access to food and is essential for one to properly affiliate and engage in 
society. The electrical output from the dam is likely to have enhanced a number of capabilities. In being 
a source of both heat and lighting, it will have enabled many activities, for example, enabling children 
to study in the evenings thus enhancing capabilities such as practical reason.  
The above benefits, however, would only be justifiable if those affected by the dam met a given 
threshold level of capabilities, which does not appear to be the case.29  As a result, the initial assessment 
as to which aspects of a situation are voiced or framed as an injustice are going to differ depending on 
the moral frame which is used. It becomes clear that switching theories to analyse this event is likely to 
yield different conclusions as to which aspects of the project related to justice. Understanding the project 
through a metric such as capabilities enabled us to see which aspects of people’s lives stood to be 
enhanced or compromised by the dam’s construction. Subsequently, this approach can provide insights 
on alternative ways of delivering the dam or alternatives ways of meeting the goals of the dam (i.e. 
electricity, flood alleviation and irrigation resources) that do not compromise these capabilities or that 
meet them in different ways.    
The utilitarian approach took a conceptual birds-eye view of events providing insights on an aggregate 
level, whilst the capability approach enabled the probing and conceptualisation of events which happen 
on a personal level. This dynamic feeds into the question of which moral theories lend themselves best 
to creating a space in which to capture, conceptualise and articulate the energy related injustice which 
energy justice frameworks seek to frame and ameliorate. In certain cases, a large scale energy project 
might be deemed necessary because its benefits outweigh its costs. However, this doesn’t imply that 
the event and its consequences should be explored only through an aggregate lens. The complexities 
and nuances of such a project might better be explored through a different lens.  
 
29 The capabilitarian perspective focusing on the lives of individual people, treating them as ends, would likely 
be opposed to the way in which people’s threshold levels of capabilities were traded to the benefit of others. 
This isn’t to say that the capability approach does not favour limiting the capabilities of some for the benefit of 
others if those people being limited have capability levels well above the sufficient threshold. See Robeyns, 
(2016c) for a further discussion on this. 
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3.6 Lessons for energy justice 
In using multiple theories to frame an issue (table 3-2), a conceptual space begins to emerge in which 
the impacts of an event on people’s lives and broader society can be explored in reference to certain 
values and socio-political circumstances. The circumstances provides a framing, or “socio-political 
backdrop” in which to contextualise the construction of the dam. A space was thus created which helped 
identify possible underlying situations which meant certain groups were already more vulnerable to this 
type of energy dilemma. The capabilities approach offered unique insights on the impacts of the dam 
on individual people’s and communities’ lives. Further, the approach pointed towards existing 
deprivations which likely compounded people’s vulnerability to the burdens of energy dilemmas. 
Simultaneously, the utilitarian framing offered insights into the likely logic employed by the decision 
makers. Importantly this broad conceptual space is not just for academics and decision-makers to probe 
historic energy dilemmas but can be drawn on as a space for the testimonies and voices those who 
currently endure such dilemmas to be voiced and better understood. 
Table 3-2 A comparison of the normative framings, insights and guidance produced by separate capabilitarian 
and utilitarian framings applied to the case study of the Hirakud dam. 
 Capability frame Utilitarian frame 
Scale Community and personal level Aggregate “bird-eyes” lens  
Normative 
framings 
The capability approach offered 
insights into the dam’s impacts on 
specific aspects of people’s lives. 
Through focusing on individual 
people’s or community’s existing 
levels of capability the approach was 
able to highlight how certain 
demographics and groups might be 
more vulnerable than others to adverse 
impacts of the dam’s construction 
through existing capability 
deprivations.  
The utilitarian framing focused on the 
aggregate impacts of the dam’s 
construction on the overall utility of 
the stakeholders. The outcome of the 
dam’s construction was therefore 
assessed based on whether it increased 
the utility of the overall affected 
population. Individual issues such as 
relocation, flood mitigation, habitat 
destruction are only weighted based 





The approach provided a means of 
identifying a diversity of groups which 
needed to participate earlier in the 
The broad and aggregate framing the 
utilitarian approach produced gave a 




Simultaneously, the approach offered a 
means of articulating and justifying 
which aspects of dam’s constructions 
were normatively problematic. 
Through identifying how certain 
groups or people may be more 
vulnerable than others to certain 
impacts of dam’s construction, the 
capability approach offered insights 
into which issues and measures could 
be focused on or implemented in order 
to mitigate capability deprivation. 
reasoning likely employed by the 
decision-makers involved in the dam’s 
construction. This framing offered an 
insight as to how the impact of a 
project can be assessed, but more so, 
in conjunction with a capabilities 
based framing, highlighted the flaws 
and important circumstances which 
can be overlooked by taking such an 
aggregate “bird-eye” view of a large 
scale energy project. 
 
3.7 A framework for the pluralistic use of moral theory  
Here we draw on the above case study to construct a framework outlining how a pluralistic use of moral 
theory can be drawn on to contextualise and explore energy dilemmas in reference to broader socio-
political issues which might serve to underpin and exacerbate energy dilemmas. We later explain how 
this framework can be used to strengthen both the TCEJ and principled approaches to energy justice, 
particularly in reference to the methodological issues outlined in section 2. 
In the case study, we note that both approaches were applied to the same situation, yet enabled a 
theoretical probing on different levels and at different depths, providing different normative conclusions 
and framings. These framings entail viewing a given energy dilemma in relation to external structures, 
principles and norms, as outlined by the particular theory being used. These components can combine 
to produce a socio-political backdrop in which to embed and understand an energy dilemma within a 
broader context. Figure 3-1 illustrates this process, showing how energy dilemmas can be framed by 
moral theories or approaches to yield valuable normative guidance and insights, and subsequently 
illuminating existing social and political issues, which intersect with an energy dilemma. Providing a 
view of an energy dilemma framed within a broader situation can enable researchers to explore related 
and underlying socio-political situations, which may have been previously concealed. In turn, exploring 
this broader framing can offer a greater variety of normative insights, which can be used to guide 
decision making processes. More importantly perhaps, this social and political backdrop can be used to 
highlight particular groups or societies which have been overlooked within decision-making processes 
i.e. those who may be deprived of the things a given theory holds valuable. Of course, this alone will 
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not inform on the experience of certain groups, but at the very least can highlight the value of enabling 
these groups to participate in future decision-making processes.  
 
Figure 3-1 A framework for framing energy dilemmas in relation to moral theory, yielding normative framing and 
guidance whilst embeding the energy dilemas within a broader socio-political back drop. 
Drawing on additional theory to explore energy dilemmas allows for a broadening of the socio-political 
backdrop in which energy dilemmas are embedded. When thinking about the case of Hirakud dam, we 
might firstly think of it in isolation from other socio-political circumstances. However, when these 
events are viewed through different moral lenses, a set of socio-political circumstances become 
illuminated. Take, for example, the mass resettlements. Initially this might be viewed as a symptom 
completely dependent on the construction of the dam. When viewed through a particular moral theory, 
in this case the capabilities approach, the resettlements are seen to be a symptom of an underlying and 
already existing deprivation of political capabilities. The dam’s construction and the mass resettlements 
acted to exacerbate this already existing deprivation. Thus the impacts of this particular event becomes 
clearly embedded in a broader socio-political setting, revealing opportunities and insights that might 
help mitigate such deprivation in the future. 
A pluralistic approach to using moral theory provided a multi-dimensional view of an energy dilemma. 
In the case study Bentham’s utilitarianism gave a potential insight into the viewpoints of the decision-
makers - that being one based on making decisions on aggregate. When contrasted with the capabilities 
view of those affected by the dam’s construction, shortcomings with such top-down decision making 
processes become apparent. The case study therefore did not just yield normative insights into those 
who were affected by the dam’s construction but also offered an insight into the potential flaws 
embodied in the decision-making processes preceding and during its construction.  
Listening to the voices of those suffering these events can go some way in explaining how these 
situations become unjust. However, energy systems are complex and expansive, and no one set of voices 
(or theories) will be able to articulate and reflect the complexity and scale of such circumstances alone. 
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The pluralism we propose therefore does not just embrace the idea that many conceptions of justice and 
“the good” exist, it also creates space for these complex energy dilemmas to be analysed through 
multiple moral framings and approaches. This can help link and articulate these events and voices 
together over various scales, creating an overview of energy dilemmas embedded in larger social and 
political systems. This is something that seems incredibly pertinent if energy dilemmas are to be 
addressed using a whole-systems approach.  
 
3.8 Implications for TCEJ and the principled approach 
In section 3.2, we outlined a number of tensions which, in different ways, inhibited the abilities of both 
the TCEJ and principled approach to create a space in which to articulate and understand the impact of 
energy dilemmas on those who suffer them. This section therefore outlines how the above framework 
and pluralistic appeal to moral theory can help ameliorate these issues.  
Firstly, adopting a pluralistic approach to the use of moral theory would strengthen the TCEJ, through 
enabling it to draw on and integrate a broader range of moral approaches and concepts. As the case 
study illustrates in section 3, being able to outline which aspects of a situation or event contribute to a 
communities’ or persons’ experience of injustice can provide valuable guidance as to how to ameliorate 
a given situation. This exercise would also prove useful in exploring the TCEJs goal of providing safe, 
affordable, and sustainable energy to all through a moral frame. It would enable triumvirate scholars to 
ground and detail why this goal is of moral significance by framing energy access by the components 
or ideas of justice it helps deliver and the features of injustice it helps ameliorate.  
Moral theory has been drawn on in similar ways within broader energy justice discourse. For example, 
Day et al. (2016) conceptualise energy poverty through a capabilities lens, enabling them to explore 
and articulate which important aspects of a person’s life might face deprivation because of limited 
access to energy. Day et al. found that the adoption of a capabilities approach helped broaden traditional 
European conceptions of fuel poverty, which are limited to thermal comfort and health, to encompass 
wider impacts of energy poverty such as the deprivation of social respect and the ability to maintain 
relationships (Day et al., 2016). The latter impact is echoed empirically in analysis by Middlemiss et al. 
(2019) of people who have experienced fuel poverty. Wood and Roelich (2019) draw on the capabilities 
approach and Day et al.’s framework to articulate issues of climate change mitigation in terms of well-
being. Approaches which draw on moral theory in this way help provide the normative guidance that 
the triumvirate conception seeks to produce. They do so through offering language through which to 
articulate the concerns and grievances of those who endure a range of energy dilemmas. The adoption 
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of a broad pluralism into the TCEJ would enable the approach to integrate and draw on a broader array 
of existing justice literature without having to subscribe to a defined set of values.  
Adopting a pluralistic use of moral theory would also go some way in helping to alleviate the tensions 
between the TCEJ’s top-down initiatives and its underlying foundational ideas of justice. With the goal 
of “embedding justice” in policy, the TCEJ’s aims reflect a concern with enabling policy makers to 
understand and operationalise ideas of justice – or to create spaces in which people’s conceptions of 
justice can be understood. Integrating a pluralistic approach would enable the TCEJ to acknowledge the 
importance of its triumvirate whilst drawing on other moral accounts to explore how top-down policy 
strategies can come to embody ideals of distribution, recognition and procedure. Although the theories 
we discuss in this paper are more likely to be described as distributive theories of justice, the TCEJ 
could draw on this approach by appealing to theories of procedural justice or theories of democracy30. 
Recognising the value of certain theories can also assist in distilling these concepts into useful tools or 
heuristics which can guide policy-making decisions. As such a broader, pluralistic use of moral theory 
would enable the TCEJ to maintain its core tenets through developing its own foundation around them. 
It is interesting here to note a study by Milchram et al. (2018) who draw on the TCEJ to explore the 
values and conflicts which underpin public debate on smart grids. Reviewing a number of Dutch and 
British newspaper articles, they find that a number of values such as sustainability, transparency, 
control, privacy and security are all associated with the implementation and operation of smart grid 
systems. Subsequently they recommend that energy justice needs to be broadened to include such 
values. It is interesting to note therefore that such values are reflected in numerous existing works of 
moral theory (Sen, 2001, Nussbaum, 2011, Adger, 2006, Rawls, 1971, Anderson, 1999).  
Our earlier concerns regarding the principled approach were that it was yet to explain why it drew on 
one theory of justice over another when framing a particular energy dilemma. And secondly, that it did 
not explore the implications of framing the same event with differing theories. Given that the approach’s 
principles are developed from an original survey of literature it doesn’t face the same foundational 
tensions between its philosophical grounding and it strategic initiatives. However, we found that the 
beneficial probing of literature that Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) layout can be enhanced through 
providing broader analysis of the same energy dilemmas through using opposing (or at least differing) 
moral theories. Certain theories will be able to capture and articulate the impact of energy dilemmas on 
 
30 Certain theories are often described separately as either distributive, recognition of procedural theories of 
justice. However, in some cases it might be more accurate to describe them as sitting on a spectrum, with certain 
theories sitting between these three dimensions of justice. For example, a number of Nussbaum’s central 
capabilities embody aspects of recognition and procedure. We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for 
prompting us to think about this further. 
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people’s lives more powerfully than others and exploring this can help justify why we might draw on 
one theory over another in developing guiding principle for decision-makers.  
The above case study also serves to illustrate the relativism embodied in certain accounts of justice, 
whether community based or singular accounts, it illustrates that different voices and theories will 
embody and reflect different and sometimes conflicting values. There are still challenges to overcome 
in this respect. Assessing which accounts of justice are best suited to evaluating a particular set of 
circumstances can represent a normative judgement in itself. Regardless, using multiple theories of 
justice can serve to highlight and explain these differences, as well as act as guides in deciding which 
set of values might best be drawn on when analysing an issue. This is essential when discussing large-
scale transboundary energy dilemmas such as climate change, which affect a diversity of communities 
whom each have their own value-sets and concerns.  
3.9 Conclusion 
To summarise, through comparing both the triumvirate and principled approach to energy justice, we 
have revealed a number of theoretical and methodological limitations. We have argued that the adoption 
of a broad pluralistic use of moral theory would enable the utilisation and comparison of moral concepts, 
which in turn can facilitate and support the goals and methodological underpinnings of both approaches. 
We have illustrated the outputs of using a range of moral theories to articulate and conceptualise the 
impacts of energy dilemmas. Additionally, we have outlined the importance of bearing in mind the 
substantially different normative framings moral theories provide. We suggest that this method will 
help energy scholars to identify which approaches are best able to capture the complex and intersected 
injustices energy systems pose.  
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4 Chapter 4 Redefining energy justice: integrating 




Current energy justice frameworks make broad claims of their ability to analyse energy dilemmas and 
produce viable normative guidance. Proponents of one such prominent framework, termed here “the 
triumvirate conception of energy justice” (TCEJ), assert the framework’s ability to identify injustices 
and guide decision-makers to produce more “just” and “equitable” energy systems. This paper explores 
the validity of these claims and identifies whether this approach to energy justice can produce the 
outputs and findings its proponents state it can. This paper reviews and critiques two existing 
applications of this framework to energy dilemmas. It posits that the TCEJ’s current interpretation of 
trivalent accounts of justice and limited appeal to more applied justice theory impedes the approach’s 
ability to capture the complexities of energy dilemmas that might come to be described as “unjust”. I 
find that a more detailed interpretation of a trivalent conception of justice found within environmental 
justice theory, which captures the interdependencies of procedural, recognition-based and distributive 
dimensions of justice, can act as a viable foundation for an account of energy justice. Further, I suggest 
that the integration of the capabilities approach would enable the connection of a trivalent account of 
justice to the intersection of energy dilemmas and the valuable aspects of peoples’ and communities’ 
functionings. In sum, this foundation is positioned as a starting point for a broader account of energy 
justice – a space to initially articulate and better understand the broad array of hardships and demands 
at the centre of energy systems - as opposed to an analytical framework to produce normative guidance. 
4.1 Introduction 
“Energy Justice” has been described as a normative approach, a framework for analysis, a movement 
and a ‘cross-cutting social science research agenda’ (Jenkins et al., 2016b, Sovacool et al., 2016, Fuller 
and McCauley, 2016). As a research agenda “energy justice” does not appeal to any particular analytical 
framework or approach but consists of an array of contributions and themes which in themselves 
embody a diversity of approaches and conceptions of justice and fairness (See Bickerstaff et al., 2013). 
In turn this agenda has focused broadly on normative issues which relate to energy systems and people’s 
lives (Healy et al., 2019, Demski et al., 2019, Sareen and Haarstad, 2018, Damgaard et al., 2017, Snell 
et al., 2015, Fuller and Bulkeley, 2013). For example, the equitable mitigation of climate change, fuel 
poverty, the disposal of nuclear waste, and broader environmental degradation linked to energy systems 
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(Bickerstaff et al., 2013, Sovacool et al., 2014, Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014, Sovacool et al., 2016, 
Jenkins et al., 2016b).  
The aims of the energy justice research agenda are broad and hard to define. The decisions to research 
certain aspects of energy systems are as normative as the values or concepts that researchers use to 
analyse these issues. However, discrete conceptions of energy justice exist, which taken in isolation, 
contain more tightly defined conceptual structures, goals, and moral and political values (See McCauley 
et al., 2013, Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014). A tendency in the literature to conflate these energy justice 
frameworks and energy justice as a research agenda can be a source of confusion (for example see 
Jenkins et al., 2016b, McCauley et al., 2013). 
Individual frameworks tend to consist of conceptions of energy systems and the types of problems 
which arise in relation to them. These conceptual frameworks are used to frame and further explore the 
ethical dilemmas which emerge in relation to energy dilemmas, with a general aim of better informing 
energy policy and decision-makers on such issues (Jenkins et al., 2017a, Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014).  
The most broadly utilised discrete conception of energy justice was initially set out in McCauley et al. 
(2013). This conception revolves around three broad dimensions of justice; distributive justice, 
recognition-based justice and procedural justice (Jenkins et al., 2016b). McCauley et al. (2013) initially 
termed these three dimensions of justice as a “triumvirate of tenets”, from here this conception is 
referred as the “triumvirate conception of energy justice” or the “TCEJ”. Almost all iterations of the 
TCEJ revolve around concise summaries of distributional, recognition-based, and procedural justice. 
When this paper uses the term TCEJ it is referring to a specific interpretation of what we might call 
“trivalent accounts of justice”, that is, an account of justice which centres on these three dimensions of 
justice. There are other interpretations of trivalent accounts which are discussed later in this paper, such 
as those found in environmental justice literature. Here we can take TCEJ to refer specifically to the 
energy justice framework set out and developed in particular set of literature (McCauley et al., 2013, 
Jenkins et al., 2016b, McCauley et al., 2016, Jenkins et al., 2018, Jenkins et al., 2016a). 
Jenkins et al. (2016b p.179), who summarises and expands on the approach, states “the challenge of 
energy justice is to apply this three-pronged approach to energy policy across the whole energy system”. 
This challenge is taken literally by the TCEJ authors, who have retrospectively applied this three part 
approach to a number of case studies on energy dilemmas (Jenkins et al., 2018, Jenkins and 
Martiskainen, 2018, McCauley et al., 2016, Jenkins et al., 2017b).  
Outside of TCEJ literature the definitions of these dimensions of justice are often contested. Here they 
are summarised based on the definitions provided in the TCEJ. Later, alternate interpretations of these 
dimensions are discussed: 
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Distributional justice is often described as the spatial or temporal aspects of energy dilemmas 
i.e. where and how the benefits and burdens of energy systems emerge in space and over time 
(Jenkins et al., 2016b).  
Recognition-based justice regards how certain groups and communities are represented and 
recognised in reference to energy related events and situations. Recognition issues can refer to 
the stigma, insults, and stereotypes marginalised groups are subject to, as well non-recognition 
entirely – being seemingly invisible in policy and decision-making processes. A common form 
of misrecognition in energy literature is how those who endure fuel poverty can be stigmatised 
and stereotyped (Day and Hitchings, 2011). The concept of recognition in the TCEJ is largely 
drawn from work by Nancy Fraser (Fraser, 1996). 
Procedural justice: often described as a call for more equitable and inclusive decision making 
in energy decision-making processes and focuses on the processes and means of ameliorating 
injustices which have been identified (McCauley et al., 2013, Jenkins et al., 2016b). 
The TCEJ holds the goal of “providing all individuals, across all areas, with safe, affordable and 
sustainable energy” (Jenkins et al., 2016a, Jenkins et al., 2018, McCauley et al., 2013, Heffron and 
McCauley, 2014, McCauley et al., 2016). This goal is repeated throughout TCEJ literature but the 
definitions of safe, affordable and sustainable are rarely expanded on in respect to this goal and there is 
currently no outline as to how distribution, recognition, and procedure relate to the attainment of this 
goal.  
Heffron et al. (2015) describe this approach as “a conceptual framework, that seeks to identify when 
and where injustices in the energy sector occur and how best law and policy can respond to them” whilst 
McCauley (2017 p.1) describe the TCEJ as “a framework that allows us to critique the problems of the 
global energy system, as well as to lead us to better decision-making in future energy investments”.  
Frequent claims regarding the ability of the TCEJ to produce viable normative insights and guidance 
are repeated throughout much of the TCEJ literature. For example, Heffron et al. (2015) claim ‘energy 
justice can achieve a just and equitable balance between the three dimensions of the energy trilemma 
[policy, economics and environment]’; Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018) claim that the approach can 
“be used as a means to guide ethically sound decision making”; Jenkins et al. (2018) argue that the 
TCEJ must be engaged with to find accord over what is ‘just, equitable and right’ in transition literature; 
and Jenkins et al. (2018) state ‘energy justice has emerged to conceptualize a world where all 
individuals, across all areas, have safe, affordable and sustainable energy that is, essentially, socially 
just’.  
Statements such as those above, often imply that the TCEJ can produce viable normative guidance that 
can improve and resolve current inequities produced by and within energy systems. The purpose of this 
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paper is to explore the ability of the TCEJ to produce the outputs its proponents suggest it can and to 
then explore and develop alternate understandings of energy justice. This paper questions whether the 
TCEJ has presented an elaboration or exploration of how the trivalent space and its component 
dimensions interact to produce a viable account of justice which can meaningfully reflect the hardships 
and claims of those who endure energy dilemmas. In subsequent sections I argue that the TCEJ currently 
lacks this and as such has a limited ability to analysis and understand energy dilemmas. I offer an 
explanation as to how the dimensions of the trivalent space interact to create an account of justice and 
point to another set of theories which can further expand both the explanatory and analytical reach of 
energy justice frameworks.  
To explore the claims of TCEJ proponents, it is necessary to observe how the underlying components 
of this approach – the “triumvirate of tenets” - are intended to function and interact to yield an 
understanding of justice. To achieve this the TCEJ is outlined in more detail and two applications of 
this “three pronged approach” are reviewed in detail. The methods and novelty of the outputs of these 
case studies are then used to critique the TCEJ’s current understanding and operationalisation of its 
trivalent foundation.  
Following this, I revisit several key references which underpin the TCEJ literature, the work of David 
Schlosberg and Nancy Fraser, to review the dynamics the original trivalent conceptions of justice were 
intended to capture and reflect. I then outline how divergences between the TCEJ’s interpretation of the 
trivalent space and these earlier accounts limits the TCEJ’s ability to capture and articulate the 
normative complexities of energy dilemmas. Finally, the capability approach is introduced as a means 
of connecting and articulating trivalent conceptions of justice in reference to energy dilemmas. The 
capability approach is positioned as a normative framework which can contribute to theorising the 
intersections between energy systems and the aspects of people’s lives which they have reason to value. 
I conclude by proposing a redefined, capability-integrated, trivalent understanding as a useful space for 
developing an account of energy justice, which may itself guide and motivate the development of novel 
ways to explore and frame energy dilemmas, as opposed to a tool for directly framing and analysing 
energy dilemmas to produce normative guidance. 
4.2 TCEJ: the “three-pronged approach” a case study review 
The two case studies drawn on in the following section for more a detailed analysis, McCauley et al. 
(2016) and Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018), were chosen because they most closely reflect and detail 
the described application of the TCEJ by its proponent authors i.e. they recommended application of 
this “three-pronged” approach to energy systems (McCauley et al., 2013, Jenkins et al., 2016b, 
McCauley et al., 2016, Jenkins et al., 2018, Jenkins et al., 2016a).  
This section outlines the methods and findings of McCauley et al. (2016) and Jenkins and Martiskainen 
(2018). Both McCauley et al. (2016) and Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018) take individual dimensions 
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of the TCEJ and apply them to particular aspects of their given energy dilemma (See table 6-1 & 6-2 
for summaries in appendices). 
McCauley et al. (2016) draw on the TCEJ categorising and framing certain issues raised during expert 
interviews on energy developments within the Artic, as either distributive, recognition, or procedural 
issues. “We take each component of the framework in turn, identifying some key justice concerns raised 
in our expert interviews” who were either “conference attendees or speakers at international conferences 
or part of the researchers’ personal networks”. In McCauley et al. (2016) the TCEJ is positioned as a 
“framework for assessing the justice implication – or simply the injustice – of current policy decisions 
as well as making practical recommendations” and the framework is further described in line with the 
TCEJ’s goal, as an “analytical framework that aims to examine whether and how all individuals, across 
all areas can access safe, affordable and sustainable energy.”31 
To illustrate the application of the TCEJ, Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018) apply these tenets to the 
example of fuel poverty. Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018), state this case study “explores the role of 
the three-tenet energy justice framework” and by doing so illustrates the “danger of failing to 
acknowledge justice outcomes and, conversely, what doing so may practically look like”.   Jenkins and 
Martiskainen (2018) draw on previous work by Jenkins et al. (2016b), who propose ordering these 
dimensions of justice into a pseudo-procedure referring to distribution, recognition, and procedure as 
“what, who and how” respectively: 
“we chose to present each tenet of justice in the following order: distribution, recognition, and 
procedure. We did so on the understanding that if injustice is to be tackled, one must (a) identify the 
concern – distribution, (b) identify who it affects – recognition, and only then (c) identify strategies for 
remediation – procedure. In essence, addressing “what, who and how” (Jenkins et al., 2016b p.177) 
With the exception of Jenkin’s additional method of ordering these dimensions of justice, both case 
studies use the TCEJ in similar ways. The authors take points from a given source, either existing 
research findings or from interviews (both in the case of McCauley et al. (2016)) and categorise them 
into separate categories of either distributive, recognition-based, or procedural issues. For the most part 
these categorisations fall in line with the authors own characterisations to each respective dimension of 
justice. For example, Jenkins et al. (2016b) describes distributional justice32 as addressing the unfair or 
 
31 This goal is not focused on extensively here, however Wood and Roelich (2020) offer a brief critique of this 
goal in relation to the TCEJ’s own tenets. One pressing query is why the authors of this goal differentiate 
between sustainability and safety, and on which definition of sustainability they are basing this distinction. 
32 One issue that has not been explored or made clear in the TCEJ literature is an understanding of distributive 
justice. Distributive justice is a broad discourse which for a large part focuses on which goods (often abstract 
goods) should society concern itself with and which institutions, mechanisms and distributions should underpin 
these goods. There is very little discussion of this in the TCEJ literature except for a brief and occasional 
references of Rawls, and a short discussion of the work of Nozick, Rawls and Sen in McCauley (2016). There is 
even less conceptual work linking these goods to the circumstances created by outputs of energy systems.  
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inequitable distribution of benefits and burdens of energy systems and categorises issues of uneven 
energy access as a distributional issue. Similarly, Jenkins et al.’s (2016) categorisation of the stigma 
surrounding those who suffer fuel poverty as a recognition-based issues fall in line with their description 
of recognition-based issues manifesting as disrespect and stereotyping.  
McCauley et al. (2016) follows a similar method. For example, McCauley et al. also describe 
distributional justice and the spread of and proximity to the benefits and burdens of energy systems, 
and thus categorise the risk of oil spills associated with shipping lanes as a matter of distributional 
justice. McCauley et al. (2016) summarise procedural justice as “a call for equitable procedures that 
engage all stakeholders in a non-discriminatory way” and thus categorise the lax involvement of Sami 
people’s inArctic energy and other economic projects as recognition-based issues. 
Solutions to these issues rarely surpass calls to engage more in the concepts which these authors outline. 
Within the TCEJ, outlines of these concepts rarely exceed the superficial, and the application of these 
concepts to the issues these authors arise is thin. For example, there is no attempt to analyse the 
procedural issues they raise in a way that might result in effective procedural or participatory spaces. 
Rather, these issues are raised, classified as a form of injustice, and then a call is made for greater 
engagement or focus on that particular dimension of justice: 
“it is crucial to ensure that all those who can potentially be affected by these companies’ activities 
participate in the process of decision-making in regards to the Arctic’s future… However, stakeholder 
engagement and social accounting currently fail to achieve the goals they were established for. Hence 
a new approach to ensuring sustainability of Arctic resource extraction is needed. We propose a justice-
rather than simply a stakeholder-centred perspective. In other words, the inclusion, even mobilization 
(as suggested above), of local communities in business decision making is an insufficient expansion of 
stakeholder approaches such as social accounting.” McCauley et al. (2016 p.145). 
Here McCauley et al. are concluding that current procedures and means on engagement inArctic energy 
decision making are flawed. They then go on to conclude: 
“…energy justice scholars must continue to make the case for a fair re-distribution of burdens and 
benefits, and not just make the case for due process in decision-making. The Finnmark controversy in 
the first results section underlines the extent to which indigenous peoples are subject to distributional 
injustices—from a due process perspective of course, but also a proximity one as an energy 
infrastructure that benefits all, and burdens only some.” McCauley et al. (2016 p.145). 
Following the pattern I described above, McCauley et al. have outlined a conception of procedural 
justice, discussed issues in which situations in which these values are lacking and then have called for 
more engagement with these concepts. Similar patterns occur in Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018). For 
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example, Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018) discussion of the stigma and visibility issues surrounding 
fuel poverty results in the points in their concluding section:  
“…government and businesses must identify those who may be vulnerable and then both ascertain and 
make provision for vulnerable customers through targeted subsidies, exemptions and efficiency 
measures. This recommendation has bearing on energy efficiency policy in particular, where questions 
are raised about the equity and design of its implementation. In this context, justice principles can 
provide guidelines for policy interventions by ensuring that energy efficiency schemes reach households 
in a way that meets their specific needs (Gillard et al., 2017).” (Jenkins and Martiskainen, 2018 p.44) 
and 
“… as acknowledgement that fuel poverty goes beyond simple affordability to an outcome of living in 
an inefficient home, we require strong and consistent policies to upgrade the national housing stock, 
combined with consumer engagement programmes to enable participatory justice throughout this 
process. At the same time, we must be careful not to reinforce structural or social inequalities e.g. 
through stereotyping recruitment practices (Gillard et al., 2017).” (Jenkins and Martiskainen, 2018 
p.44) 
Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018) also offer broader, more general, conclusions as well such as “that 
issues of energy justice emerge, where inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, or via 
their inclusion can provide a means to solve them” and argue for “for greater engagement with the 
energy justice approach in both academia and in practice, where it can be used as a means to guide 
ethically sound decision-making”.  
As with preceeding examples, the process of defining a dimension of justice, categorising an issue as 
representing a lack of attention to said dimension, and then calling for a greater focus a certain type of 
justice plays out again. It becomes evident that this pattern recurrently underpins the application of the 
TCEJ in both the cases of Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018) and McCauley et al. (2016). 
The most substantial findings and conclusions from these case studies appear to be primarily drawn 
from a synthesis of other literature, as opposed to the components of the TCEJ creating new frames for 
analysis. This is not to say the conclusions of these studies are false, but rather that applying the TCEJ 
does not appear to have substantially contributed to their findings. For example, when McCauley et al. 
(2016) conclude that the burden of risk associated with shipping is disproportionately borne by local 
Arctic communities, it is not clear how distributive justice theory contributed to this conclusion – even 
if one can rightly classify this as a form of maldistribution. 
The problem here is that classifying something as a maldistribution on its own does not then provide a 
solution. It might be an important initial step but more substantial engagement with a specific 
distributive theory would be necessary to analyse an energy dilemma with the intent of producing 
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normative and policy guidance based on justice theory – as the TCEJ aims to do (See Wood and Roelich, 
2020).33 In other words, the level of exploration and detail provided within TCEJ literature is only 
enough to broadly classify a certain issue as one of distribution, recognition, or procedure.  
The point here is that the TCEJ in its current form, with this mode of application, does not offer an 
effective space in which to analyse energy dilemmas to produce genuinely novel insights and normative 
advice. The following sections of this paper posit that the TCEJ’s current mode of application is 
hampered in part because of its restricted interpretation of the trivalent space. The following sections 
of this paper revisit some key references underpinning the TCEJ to explain the approach’s current 
limitations.  
In particular, the following sections highlight two key aspects of the TCEJ which currently limit its 
explanatory power. Firstly, I will illustrate how the TCEJ’s interpretation of the trivalent space impedes 
the TCEJ’s ability to view injustice as resulting from complex interconnections between distribution, 
recognition, and procedure. 
Secondly, I will illustrate that the TCEJ lacks a means of articulating how an energy dilemma impacts 
or relates to a particular set of values. In other words, I will illustrate that categorising different 
dimensions of injustice, as the TCEJ does, is not the same as describing why or how an energy dilemma 
relates to certain values in such a way that we might describe it as an injustice. 
In response to this gap, I point towards a growing collection of scholarship which frames energy 
dilemmas in terms of their impact on capability, as a means of understanding these dilemmas in a 
normative frame. I outline how the capability approach can be used to integrate and better understand 
the interrelations between distribution, recognition, and procedure. Importantly, this integration is not 
initially aiming towards the same ends as the TCEJ of finding identifying and responding to injustice 
through policy, but rather to attain a simpler initial step of providing concepts which can more 
accurately and meaningfully reflect problems stemming from energy systems. I argue it is useful to 
refine this first step if we are to produce viable normative and policy guidance.    
4.3 Revisiting the trivalent space  
There are several examples of work in which a trivalent conception of justice has been used effectively 
to explore such dilemmas and frame certain movements. Perhaps the most well-known of these is 
Schlosberg’s (2009) account of environmental justice. This section outlines how the TCEJ’s own 
interpretation of this trivalent space diverges substantially from earlier conceptions. I then outline how 
 
33 Another approach to energy justice, that of Sovacool & Dworkin (2014) Sovacool, B. K. & Dworkin, M. H. 
2014. Global energy justice, Cambridge University Press., provide illustrate multiple examples as to how justice 
theory can be drawn on in this way. 
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the TCEJ’s reliance on its own divergent interpretation is limiting its ability to explain and discuss 
energy dilemmas in terms of justice.  
A frequent and key reference in early conceptual TCEJ literature is Schlosberg’s account of a trivalent 
approach to environmental justice (Schlosberg, 2009, Schlosberg, 2003, Schlosberg, 2013). The 
trivalent account of environmental justice has been drawn on and developed over the past decade 
including in climate and energy related discourses (for examples see Walker, 2009, Holifield et al., 
2009, Walker, 2012, Sze and London, 2008, Gillard et al., 2017, Bulkeley et al., 2014, Reed and George, 
2011).  Underlying Schlosberg’s conception are three interlinking and overlapping conceptions of 
justice, distributive, procedural, and recognition, which make up a “trivalent space”. These dimensions 
of justice are drawn on (loosely34) within the TCEJ, but their adoption, interpretation, and elaboration 
differ significantly from that of Schlosberg’s.35 Briefly describing key divergences between the 
structure and purpose of Schlosberg’s conception of environmental justice and the TCEJ’s own 
interpretation of this conception can go some way in illuminating the current limitations of the TCEJ. 
This serves two purposes, firstly it creates a space to compare and critique the TCEJ’s interpretation 
and use of a trivalent account of justice. Second, it points the necessary expansions and changes that 
rectify these limitations.  
A key point of comparison is the purpose the trivalent space serves in the TCEJ and in Schlosberg’s 
account of environmental justice. Schlosberg’s aim was to construct a broad enough conception of 
justice to articulate and capture the disparate calls for justice arising in diverse, activist-led 
environmental movements. Schlosberg’s motivation was to develop a global conception of 
environmental justice which embodied the demands of these movements because existing accounts of 
environmental justice were inadequate and primarily based on distributive accounts of justice. This is 
noteworthy, because unlike the TCEJ, this initial trivalent account of justice was not primarily used as 
a framework for analysing particular situations but as a means of unifying a broad and diverse 
movement “the environmental justice movement demonstrates the power of a unity without uniformity 
as it illustrates environmental justice on so many dimensions simultaneously” (Schlosberg, 2004 p.535).  
Schlosberg’s intention was then to outline recurrent claims to justice in a broad array of environmental 
movements, with the aim of outlining how certain democratic and institutional transformations could 
institutionalise a space for multiple conceptions of justice to be “shared, heard, understood and 
implemented” (Schlosberg, 2009). The TCEJ’s use of the trivalent space is partially converse to this. 
Instead of using these dimensions to articulate the recurrent manifest injustices, the TCEJ aims to 
 
34 The term “loosely” is used here, because although the structure of the TCEJ mirrors a trivalent conception of 
justice very little discussion as to the function and purpose of this space are discussed in TCEJ literature. 
35 Wood and Roelich (2020) illustrate tensions between the TCEJ’s strategic goals and critique of environmental 
justice, and adoption of Schlosberg’s trivalent account of environmental justice, which they argue limits the 
ability of the approach in creating a space to explore and understand energy dilemmas. 
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directly apply these dimensions of justice to energy systems via the aforementioned “three-pronged” 
approach. This initial description can be articulated as one of description versus application. 
Schlosberg’s account of environmental justice results from describing different types of claims to 
justice in the trivalent space, whilst the TCEJ seeks to apply the trivalent space.  
Schlosberg’s conception was underpinned by the language and characterisations of justice that 
environmental movements were using. Themes and language which resonated with ideas of distribution, 
recognition, and procedure arose frequently when these groups and movements articulated their 
grievances and demands. Throughout Schlosberg’s work, he outlines a broad academic landscape in 
which the connections and relationships between these conceptions of justice are articulated and 
continually contested. One important dynamic throughout Schlosberg’s work is that the interactions 
and relationships between these conceptions of justice are intimate and interdependent, with each 
affecting the other (See Walker (2012) p.65 for an informative illustration of these relationships). A 
clear example of this interdependency is found when Schlosberg (2009) describes how distributive, 
procedural, and recognition-based justice are being articulated in indigenous led environmental 
movements but does not discuss procedural calls separately in his summary because he ‘simply could 
not find such calls that were distinct from the demands for recognition’.  These dynamics are under-
conceptualised within almost all conceptual literature on the TCEJ, with proponents of the approach 
treating and applying each dimension of justice individually to various energy dilemmas (McCauley et 
al., 2013, Heffron and McCauley, 2014, Jenkins et al., 2014, Jenkins et al., 2016b, Heffron and 
McCauley, 2017, Jenkins et al., 2017a, Jenkins, 2018).  
A key reference for Schlosberg’s own application of the trivalent space is the work of Nancy Fraser 
(Fraser, 1997, Fraser, 1995). Fraser, also arises as a key reference within the TCEJ literature during 
summaries of recognition-based justice (Jenkins et al., 2016b, McCauley et al., 2013).36  
In much of Schlosberg’s work, Fraser is cited as providing a critique on the limitations of viewing social 
justice as purely a matter of distributive justice, citing Fraser’s arguments that recognition offers 
explanations as to why such maldistributions exist in the first place (Schlosberg, 2009, Fraser, 1997, 
Fraser, 1995, Fraser, 2000). A key point here is that Fraser’s work, although most widely noted for its 
content on recognition (in the TCEJ scholarship at least), focuses on broadening a conception of social 
justice to one which looks beyond distribution to incorporate dimensions of justice which underpin and 
sustain maldistributions37.  
 
36 Young (1990) and Honneth (1996) are also key references in Schlosberg’s discussion of recognition, which 
we do not outline in this paper, but are worth exploring further for any researcher interested in understanding the 
roots of the trivalent approach. (Schlosberg (2009) offers a concise and insightful exploration). 
37 The work of Young is cited in Jenkins et al. (2017b) but in reference to Young’s work on responsibility, not 
recognition.   
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Within the TCEJ such descriptions of Fraser’s work are almost non-existent (Fraser’s work is drawn on 
briefly in a distributive light when Jenkins et al. (2016a) cites Fraser (1996), but this is to link 
distributive justice to the topic of political economy). This is a key point in explaining why the TCEJ’s 
use of the trivalent space as a means of analysing energy dilemmas is currently limited. The TCEJ’s 
tendency to define and isolate each justice dimension, without further effort to integrate these tenets, 
limits the TCEJ’s ability to capture the intimate linkages between recognition, procedure, and 
distribution. This is both the case for the more general TCEJ approach of categorising certain issues as 
either distributive, recognition-based, or procedural and the “what, who and how” approach of Jenkins 
et al. (2016b).38  
These interdependencies can be partially illustrated by Fraser (2009). Fraser (2009) outlines the 
complex interdependencies between recognition and distribution, using the example of welfare reform, 
a redistributive policy which can stigmatize its recipients as “deviants and scroungers”. She goes on to 
argue that such redistributive policies “have misrecognition effects when background patterns of 
cultural value skew the meaning of economic reforms”. Fraser gives the example of the devaluation of 
single female caregivers, through the receipt of support, being cast as ‘getting something for nothing’. 
She argues that such redistributive policy cannot succeed unless it is in conjunction with a push for 
recognition, concluding ‘in short, no redistribution without recognition’ (Fraser, 2009 p. 85). 
This argument illustrates the importance of both distributive and recognition-based justice in resolving 
social issues without creating new ones. More importantly, it illustrates how multiple dimensions of 
justice work dynamically and simultaneously to explain and frame a particular circumstance. Fraser 
(2009 p.35) also notes that procedure does not necessarily follow recognition but often facilitates it, 
stating ‘an adequate account of the justification of recognition claims needs to incorporate a procedural 
dimension’. If the justification of recognition-based claims requires a procedural dimension, then it is 
not clear why procedure would occur only after a recognition claim to justice has been made. 
Furthermore, considering the now apparent intersection between recognition and distribution, 
procedure also appears necessary to ensure actions are taken to properly identify distributive 
injustices.39 In other words, procedure can be required to both recognize and ameliorate distributive and 
recognition-based issues.  
Once the components of the trivalent space are viewed in this light, a picture starts to emerge in which 
they work simultaneously to characterise a complex set of circumstances or situations. Based on the 
ordering provided in Jenkins et al. (2016), identifying a concern can only result in a distributive issue 
 
38 Jenkins et al. (2020) recently repeat this structure when integrating energy justice with value sensitive design, 
responsible research and innovation approaches. 
39 Schlosberg similarly notes that within environmental justice, the discourse on which energy justice is closely 




and recognition is confined to who this issue affects (as opposed to mal-recognition being seen as an 
issue in itself). Subsequently procedure is only utilized as a term for remediation, which is the correction 
of mal-distributions – as opposed to a space for facilitating recognition or solely acknowledging the 
intrinsic worth of engaging in procedural spaces.  
Fraser (1995) makes clear that recognition-based issues can be as harmful as material distributive issues. 
It therefore seems problematic that the TCEJ requires distributive issues to first be identified before 
recognition-based aspects of justice are addressed. This is not to say that the TCEJ does not value 
recognition based justice. Jenkins et al. (2016b) clearly outline a number of prominent recognition 
issues which relate to energy, such as the non-recognition issues faced by those in fuel poverty, and the 
stigma surrounding communities who campaign against the placement of wind energy projects near 
their homes. Rather, it is a problem with the ordering and separation of these dimensions of justice that 
frequently occurs within TCEJ which obscures their interdependencies. 
Distribution, procedure, and recognition are useful concepts to elaborate on individually to then piece 
together a more robust explanation as to what the demands and calls for justice communities and people 
might be making. However, it is the complex interrelations that provide depth to this picture of justice.  
TCEJ literature can often end up implicitly pointing to the links between these dimensions of justice, 
but the approaches’ own conceptual structure does not enable for this to be drawn out further. For 
example, Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018) discuss a range of impacts of fuel poverty (i.e. living in cold 
and damp homes and the associated health and education problems) in their section on recognition. 
They cite Sovacool (2015), who argues that the maldistributions underpinning fuel poverty result in 
fuel poor households having neither the time nor the means to participate in energy decision-making 
(i.e. procedures) that might improve their circumstances. There is a clear link here between the 
distributional impacts of fuel poverty and its connection to recognition, but the way the TCEJ is 
structured and applied does not allow for this dynamic to be captured and developed when applied to 
energy dilemmas. 
Here it is interesting to note the work of Walker and Day (2012) who also drew on a trivalent conception 
of justice to analyse fuel poverty, but did so before the banner of energy justice had firmly taken root 
in academic discourse. Importantly Walker and Day (2012) offer an explanation of how these three 
dimensions interact to produce an understanding of injustice. They describe their understanding of 
justice as: 
“distributional injustice positioned within a wider framing of lack of recognition and procedural 
injustice… each form of injustice is interconnected with each of the others. In this way we can see lack 
of recognition and lack of procedural justice as wrong in themselves, as interconnected and as 
underpinning the ongoing production of distributional inequalities” 
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Similarly, Gillard et al. (2017) draws on Walker and Day (2012) to utilise the trivalent space in a similar 
way, outlining the “interrelatedness” of distribution, recognition and procedure.  
More recently Velasco Herrejon and Bauwens (2020) have added significant weight to this interrelated 
narrative with their study on community acceptance of wind energy in Mexico. Velasco Herrejon and 
Bauwens (2020) found that although participants more frequently expressed distributive concerns 
regarding wind energy, these were linked in turn to procedural and then recognition-based concerns. 
This lead Velasco Herrejon and Bauwens (2020) to propose a nested-structure of the trivalent space in 
which distribution is embedded in procedure, and procedure embedded in recognition. In this paper I 
do not propose ordering these dimensions, but the fact that Velasco Herrejon and Bauwens (2020) 
observe such structure serves to illustrate the intimate connections between these dimensions.  
Interestingly, Walker and Day (2012) and Gillard et al. (2017) are both cited in various TCEJ literature 
but the interconnections of the trivalent space have been scarcely discussed in the core TCEJ literature 
since its inception in McCauley et al. (2013), who notes “these three pillars of  energy justice are 
interlinked and there are many overlapping issues”, without any further explanation. Without 
acknowledging the interaction of these dimensions of justice, it becomes difficult to fully capture the 
complex situations which energy dilemmas create. Energy dilemmas do not produce separate 
distributive, recognition, and procedural issues. Rather, they produce complex sets of circumstances 
which impact people’s lives, certain components of which might be described as one of these three 
dimensions – but overall are an amalgamation of the three.  
So far, this paper has established that the TCEJ’s interpretation of the trivalent space limits the approach 
to categorising different aspects of energy dilemmas, as opposed to explaining how these aspects 
combine to produce what we might call an injustice. Distributive, recognition-based, and procedural 
justice do not describe specific values but more general and broad dynamics in which we can understand 
injustice. On their own, they do not offer a means of exploring how energy dilemmas relate to or impact 
the things people and communities value. The following sections present the capabilities approach as 
plausible means of articulating how the trivalent space relates to the valuable aspects of people’s and 
communities’ lives. In doing so, the capabilities approach provides a means of detailing the things and 
person needs to do or be in order to be a recipient of distributive, procedural, and recognition-based 
justice.40 It is important to note that this does not let us jump to providing normative guidance and policy 
advice, but rather provides an pertinent initial step towards better understanding the ways in which 
energy dilemmas can impact the valuable aspects of a person’s life. 
 
40 It is worth noting here that TCEJ literature do occasionally cite certain philosophies of justice. For example, 
McCauley et al. (2016), describe both Rawls’ A theory of justice and Amartya Sen’s capability approach but 
never actually apply the concepts used in these theories to energy dilemmas. This is similarly the case for 
McCauley et al. (2012) and Jenkins et al. (2016b). 
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4.4 Capabilities  
The capabilities approach revolves around two main concepts, ‘capabilities’ and ‘functionings’. 
Nussbaum (2011) summarises capabilities as ‘a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve 
alternative functioning combinations’. ‘Functionings’ can be described as states of being or doing 
(Anderson, 1999). The approach uses these concepts to articulate two normative claims: 
1. Freedom to achieve well-being is of the highest moral importance. 
2. Freedom to achieve well-being should be understood as opportunities in terms of capabilities, 
or ‘valued functionings’. 
(Nussbaum, 2001, Sen, 1992) 
The capabilities approach concerns itself with what a person is able to do and be, instead of focusing 
on a specific distribution of resources, as many distributive theories do (Sen, 1979). Sen argued that 
primary goods do not take account of the differences between people, instead he argued, we should 
focus on what people are able to do and be. Sen illustrates this with the example of people with 
disabilities being less able to convert a set amount of goods into the same level of capability than that 
of a person without a disability (Sen, 1979).  
Nussbaum’s and Sen’s conceptions of capabilities differ in many respects.41 By Sen’s account 
capabilities are to be outlined through deliberative processes which occur within societies, whereby a 
society outlines the functionings that they agree each person should be able to attain (Sen, 2001). 
Nussbaum’s approach differs, in that she offers a predefined and universal list of capabilities (although 
she notes this list can be expanded and adapted), of which any state should ensure each citizen attains 
a minimum level (Nussbaum, 2001). These include the capabilities of life; bodily health & integrity; 
sense, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control 
over one's environment (Nussbaum, 2001). By Nussbaum’s account, any level below this minimum 
constitutes an injustice. Nussbaum refers to her conception as ‘a partial and minimum account of social 
justice’ – it can inform on the minimum threshold levels of capability but does not inform how society 
should act after these thresholds are attained.  
More recent contributions to the capability approach have sought to expand this frontier, developing 
more expansive capability based theories of justice that inform on how society should respond to or 
classify maldistributions of capability (Axelsen and Nielsen, 2015, Nielsen et al., 2017), whilst others 
have expanded the approach to issues of excess, introducing ideas of capability ceilings and limits. For 
 
41 Robeyns (2016a) points out that there are multiple conceptions of the capabilities approach that exist beyond 
that of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s. However, as we explain, we find Nussbaum’s approach a particular useful and 
clear framework from which to assess energy dilemmas. However, this does not limit us to drawing on various 
other aspects and accounts of the capabilities.  
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example, Robeyns (2016b), introduces the idea that there is reason to limit certain capabilities in cases 
of gross inequality. Holland (2008) introduced a similar idea of ceilings on the certain capabilities which 
exceed a threshold through practices which limit the capabilities of others. For example, prohibiting the 
use of private aviation, and therefore capping a person’s mobility, because of its excessive contribution 
to climate change which is a major source of capability deprivation itself.  
4.5 Capabilities and energy systems 
A key use of the capabilities approach in relation to ideas of energy justice is that it can act as a frame 
through which to judge the impacts of energy systems on people and communities (Day et al., 2016, 
Wood and Roelich, 2019, Velasco Herrejon and Bauwens, 2020). In contemporary energy scholarship 
these impacts tend to be discussed in either terms of consumption or production. However a there has 
been a push in  recent energy scholarship, the TCEJ and broader energy justice discourse, is the need to 
transcend the conceptual separation of energy production and consumption, and instead move to a view 
where these are seen as interdependent (Geels, 2010, Winskel, 2018, Jenkins et al., 2014, Sovacool et 
al., 2015) (Also see  Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017), Wood and Roelich (2019), and table 4-1 below).  
A capabilities-based approach can help conceptualise these linkages.  
The capabilities approach has been employed as a means of articulating the diverse array of demands 
and grievances which arise within the disparate environmental justice movement – many of which result 
from the production and consumption of energy (Schlosberg, 2012, Schlosberg, 2013) (also see Walker 
(2012) p.2 for a list of environmental justice issues, many of which relate to energy systems). Holland 
(2014) use capabilities to articulate the impacts of a range of environmental issues and then to inform 
on the procedural spaces which can be used to better understand and respond to these issues. Day et al. 
(2016) conceptualise and define energy poverty in terms of capabilities, revealing a number of insights 
previously obscured by contemporary definitions. Day et al. (2016) also illustrate that access can be 
disrupted by changes elsewhere within an energy system, therefore illustrating this linkage between 
production and consumption. Wood and Roelich (2019) use the metric of capability to expand this work 
to highlight and articulate the relationships and tensions between capability attained from fossil fuel 
derived energy and climate change mitigation. Hillerbrand (2018) articulate a range of energy dilemmas 
in terms of capabilities producing a critique of the seventh sustainable development goal of providing 
clean and affordable energy for all, arguing that normative visions of energy systems are often over 
simplified as “right or wrong” and are instead highly dependent on context. Hillerbrand (2018) then 
posits that capability provides a context sensitive metric through which to normatively assess these 
systems. In sum a core use of capabilities is that it acts as a frame through which to judge the impacts 
of energy systems on the things people and communities’ value. 
Transport provides another example of energy services which support a range of capabilities, most 
obvious is that of bodily integrity and being able to move freely from place to place (Beyazit, 2011). 
97 
 
This mobility can underpin other capabilities, for example accessing places of education and healthcare, 
therefore supporting capabilities of bodily health, education and the ability reason (Beyazit, 2011, Wood 
and Roelich, 2019). However, the combustion of fossil fuels to attain this mobility can be a source of 
capability deprivation through contributing to on-going climate change and air pollution (Wood and 
Roelich, 2019). This again illustrates the relationships between the production and consumption of 
energy. 
Table 4-1 Examples of energy's relation to capability through individual and overlapping issues of production and 
consumption 
 Consumption Production 
Relation to 
capability 
Access relates to the attainment of capability 
i.e. how and which energy services contribute 
and enable key capabilities which bring value to 
our lives. 
The unintended products of 
energy systems e.g. localised 
pollution, climate change, 
labour issues, mass-




Consumption and production issues interact to create unique circumstances. 
Access to certain types of energy can offer alleviation from existing energy 
dilemmas. For example, the supply of cleaner burning gas can resolve the health 
impacts suffered by those who cook indoors using solid fuels (Smith, 2006). 
Another example might be how access to energy through mobility services can 
provide safe means to escape slow-violence that can occur in extractive 
processes of fossil fuels (see Healy et al. (2019)). The identification of such 
connections can help transcend the conceptual separation between aspects of 
energy production and consumption that Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017) refer 
to as the production-consumption binary. Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017) for 
example, note that a change in the way energy is produced or transmitted can 
create “end-use” problems such as fuel poverty. 
 
4.6 Capability, energy, and trivalent conceptions of justice 
Clearly, both issues of consumption and production can be viewed constructively through a 
capabilitarian lens to link these issues more broadly to their diverse impacts on the quality of people’s 
lives. The approach’s ability to contribute to broader energy justice discourse is therefore apparent, as 
is the approach’s affinity for the creation of procedural spaces in which people can better articulate how 
complex energy systems interact with their lives.  
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The capability approach evidently already provides an apt space in which to articulate how people and 
their values can relate to the broader impacts of energy systems. These same characteristics however 
can capture how ideas of distribution, procedure, and recognition are all intimately tied with the 
outcomes and quality of people’s lives. Importantly the idea of capability can illustrate and capture how 
and why a trivalent conception of justice is worth maintaining as a core set of concepts in a space for 
exploring energy dilemmas. Similar to Velasco Herrejon and Bauwens (2020), this paper argues that 
the capabilities approach offers a more effective means of articulating and understanding the context 
specific impact of energy dilemmas through providing a means to better articulate the connections 
between distributive, recognition-based, and procedural justice. 
The primary purpose of the capability approach here then is to provide the language and concepts 
necessary to illustrate how a trivalent conception of justice relates to people’s lives. Individual 
capabilities can capture various aspects of these dimensions whilst attributing them to the overall well-
being of a person or group. Viewing each aspect of these dimensions as fundamental to a person’s or 
community’s set of capabilities, helps to make sense of the trivalent space’s ability to capture and 
understand a person’s experience of “injustices”. For example, the maldistribution of energy access can 
curtail a range of capabilities (Day et al., 2016), the deprivation of certain social capabilities can lead 
to recognition issues such as stigma, such stigma can impede an person’s capability to engage in 
procedures which might help improve their situation (Middlemiss et al., 2019, Sovacool, 2015). 
Furthermore, integrating the capability space with a trivalent conception of justice illustrates how 
closely intertwined these dimensions of justice are, revealing how they interact to form a more complete 
space in which to understand the grievances of those who suffer in relation to energy systems.  
Focusing on how people’s ability to convert certain situations and resources into valuable functionings, 
capability acts as a socially, materially, and spatially sensitive concept through which to frame the 
intersection between energy dilemmas and people’s lives. The definitions of distribution, recognition, 
and procedure in the TCEJ yield very little insight as to what it is people care about or value, or what 
things they need to achieve these. The upside of this, is that on their own these broad dimensions of 
justice do not become overly prescriptive (they do a little if combined with the assumption that everyone 
wants safe, affordable, and sustainable energy42), they leave a broad space to fill with a diversity of 
ideas and conceptions of what “justice” is. However, this is simultaneously a limitation, given that these 
dimensions and energy discourse in general holds some normative weight it is not clear why we should 
leave this space entirely empty. In broader energy justice discourse, that is energy justice work that does 
not necessarily revolve around discrete  conceptions of energy justice, there is a strong assertation and 
normative intuition that the production and consumption of anergy effect people in both positive and 
negative ways (Bickerstaff et al., 2013, Demski et al., 2019, Fuller and Bulkeley, 2013, Healy et al., 
 
42 See Hillerbrand (2018) for a critical discussion on the seventh sustainable development goal, which closely 
mirrors the goal of the TCEJ. 
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2019, Simcock and Mullen, 2016, Snell et al., 2015, Sovacool et al., 2014, Sovacool et al., 2017, 
Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015, Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014). The capabilities approach provides a 
means of explaining and further exploring this intuition. 
When connected to well-being and capabilities, distribution, recognition, and procedure all take on 
richer meanings. Mal-recognition, non-recognition and the concepts of stigma and hardships that 
accompany these can be viewed as not only impacting the distribution of adequate energy access but 
also as phenomena which directly degrade a person’s well-being – they become intrinsically important. 
whilst stigma and non-recognition curtail the ability of a person to participate in society, they can also 
directly curtail a person’s self-respect. In turn, this might impede their self-worth and engagement in 
political procedures or even their engagements with others in social situations – impacting the 
capabilities of affiliation and control over one’s environment. 
Procedural justice and participation, through a capabilities lens, also become intrinsic components of a 
person’s own well-being and simultaneously provides an account of the instrumental functionings a 
person needs in order to participate in a range of forums. Both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s account of 
capabilities places a heavy focus on participation and deliberation (Nussbaum, 2011). In more applied 
arenas, the concept of capability has underpinned and structured a range of participatory processes to 
enable communities, groups and people to articulate and map their values and interests in relation to 
certain systems and structures (Biggeri et al., 2006, Greco et al., 2015, Walker, 2018, Velasco Herrejon 
and Bauwens, 2020). Where contemporary modes of participation are based on antiquated conceptions 
of people as rational and informed consumers (see Chilvers and Pallett (2018)) capabilities offers a 
more plausible starting point in which personal and community capabilities can be self-defined and can 
create a more accurate representation of a person’s or community’s values. Participatory procedures 
can then be centred around these conceptions so that both procedures and outcomes are sensitive to the 
varying level of resources and information that people may require to achieve the same outcomes and 
understandings. Brand-Correa and Steinberger (2017) illustrate such possibilities using a well-being 
centric framework as the foundation of a deliberative approach to explore the relationship and potential 
decoupling of energy use and human needs.  
Distribution becomes a far richer concept. The maldistributions of energy systems are no longer viewed 
as the physical location of energy systems and accompanying problems or the distribution of issues 
associated with inadequate energy access i.e. fuel and energy poverty. Instead, these maldistributions 
become tied to webs of interdependent capabilities, providing a framework to understand the impacts 
energy systems have on people’s lives and offering the explanatory power the TCEJ currently lacks. 
We might expect to see tensions between certain goods-based distributive theories, such as those in 
Rawls (1971) (and other distributive theories) and the capabilities approach. We therefore might also 
expect such tensions to arise when integrating the capabilities approach into a trivalent conception of 
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energy justice, given the TCEJs focus on the distribution of the benefits and burdens of energy systems. 
However, it would be useful to see the capabilities approach as helping to further understanding the 
impacts of these distributions as opposed to challenging or trying to displace the distributive 
dimension of justice. This is an area in which the TCEJ would benefit from further clarification, it is not 
entirely clear whether does the distributive dimension of the TCEJ speak to broader ideas of 
distributive justice or primarily the geographic spread of energy dilemmas. Interestingly Jenkins et al. 
(2020b) also notes this issue but does not seek to clarify either way.  
In sum a capability integrated trivalent space can act a viable starting point from which to develop a 
deeper understanding of the intersection between energy dilemmas and the things we value.   
4.7 Conclusions: 
The TCEJ has illustrated its use as a structure through which to organise the findings of case studies 
and the findings of existing academic outputs. To some extent, the TCEJ has shown an ability to prompt 
researchers on areas and values which are currently lacking or under-represented in broader energy 
discourses. However, many of the conclusions that can be drawn from the applications of TCEJ 
explored here are drawn from a synthesis of empirical evidence as opposed to the application of justice 
theory and framings.  
The TCEJ’s current level of engagement with justice theory appears to act more as a motivation to 
investigate certain pre-defined normative issues as opposed to a means of producing normative 
guidance and change. In this respect the TCEJ’s power as an analytical tool and its ability to “lead us 
to better decision-making in future energy investments”; “achieve a just and equitable balance between 
the three dimensions of the energy trilemma [policy, economics and environment]”; “be used as a means 
to guide ethically sound decision making”; to find accord over what is “just, equitable and right” in 
transition literature; and “conceptualize a world where all individuals, across all areas, have safe, 
affordable and sustainable energy that is, essentially, socially just” has been shown to be limited by its 
own interpretation of the trivalent account of justice and lack of concepts through which to understand 
and articulate the impacts of energy dilemmas.  
The TCEJ’s interpretation of the trivalent space, combined with limited appeal or exploration of other 
justice theory limits the approach’s ability to capture and inform on the complex dynamics which arise 
in the intersection between energy dilemmas and people’s live.  
As an extension of environmental justice theory, a trivalent conception of justice can serve as a useful 
starting point to describe the demands being made by those who are enduring certain energy dilemmas. 
In other words, a trivalent space can serve as a useful starting point to develop an account of energy 
justice – a way of describing the dynamics and themes which arise when certain groups or movements 
articulate their experiences of energy dilemmas. However, for the TCEJ to derive normative or practical 
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guidance from ideas of justice requires more substantial engagement with theory. Research on public 
participation and democratic procedures surrounding energy systems presents plausible avenues to 
operationalise and apply certain normative approaches in the procedural realm (Pallett et al., 2019, 
Pallett, 2018, Pallett, 2019, Chilvers et al., 2018, Chilvers and Pallett, 2018). Such research agendas 
illuminate the problematic aspects of real-life procedures that contribute to their inefficacy. They can 
point to means of ameliorating these issues through reimaging and then reshaping these processes, as 
opposed to making broad calls for “more equitable” procedures and “greater engagement”.    
I have suggested a set changes of approaches and changes that can develop a more effective space in 
which to understand and explore energy dilemmas: a more detailed interconnected trivalent account of 
justice articulated using a capabilities based approach to understanding energy dilemmas. In concluding 
it is important to note how these additions to the justice scholarship arose. The theory Schlosberg (2009 
p.45) draws on to outline his account of environmental justice was informed and shaped by reflections 
on a range of social movements “civil rights, women’s, multicultural, gay and lesbian, sustainable 
development, anti-neoliberal and many more”. Listening to and understanding these movements has 
impacted our current understanding of the term “justice” and has explicate many previously concealed 
dynamics which perpetuate injustice (Schlosberg, 2009). Observing interactions between energy 
systems, communities and people’s values may also eventually change how we theorise justice as the 
need for new concepts arises to capture previously obscured dynamics. In other words, there might not 
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5 Chapter 5 Conclusion and discussion:  
The overarching aim of this thesis was to assess and then develop the extent to which moral theory 
informs our understanding of the relationships between energy and the things we value. Two lines of 
enquiry stemmed from this over-arching aim. One focused on existing approaches to energy justice 
asking two questions: 
1. What purpose moral theory is serving within existing approaches to energy justice? 
2. Are approaches to energy justice able to derive genuinely novel guidance from the moral 
theory they cite? 
The other focused on relating energy dilemmas to a range of moral theory and concepts. This line of 
enquiry also centred on two questions: 
3. How can moral theory be drawn on to describe and explore energy dilemmas? 
4. How can moral theory be drawn on to effectively develop ideas of energy justice? 
These lines of enquiry were closely linked with the latter building the former. A crucial component was 
to assess the extent to which current accounts of energy justice have been successful in integrating 
moral theory. By this I mean, the extent to which the integration of moral theory has shaped findings, 
outputs, and ideas of “energy justice” in energy justice scholarship. If this has been too limited, as has 
been argued in this thesis, the question arises as to what the integration and appeal to moral theory has 
been used for or achieved. Answering this question helped set the framing for the second line of enquiry.  
This chapter begins by drawing out the core themes, findings, and contributions of chapters two, three, 
and four. The proceeding sections summarise and discuss key issues regarding current approaches to 
energy justice which arose within those chapters. These are followed by a discussion of the limitations 
of this thesis and these limitations are drawn on to motivate the final sections which focus on two 
developments pertinent to the future impact of energy justice discourse: conceptual and procedural.  
These conceptual and procedural developments are closely intertwined and are discussed in tandem. 
These sections explore and discuss the potential avenues for the further development of energy justice 
and present avenues for developing the foundational account of energy justice set out in this thesis. 
These sections point towards where moral theory might be applied effectively in the future, with a shift 
of focus to the procedural realm. This section’s discussion is partly motivated by two contributions to 
energy justice scholarship I have been unable to discuss thus far, Galvin (2019) and Pellegrini et al, 
(2020). The final section offers conclusions and highlights the importance of justifying and 




This thesis revolved around three core outputs: 
5.1.1 Chapter 2 Tensions, capabilities, and justice in climate change mitigation of 
fossil fuels 
Chapter two illustrated that the impacts of environmental change and access to energy systems could 
be framed and articulated using the concept of capability. This chapter corresponded most closely to 
the second set of research questions in that it explored the potential of certain moral and political 
concepts in framing and explicating energy dilemmas. Using the example of fossil fuel dependence, 
climate change, and climate change mitigation, this chapter conceptualised how tension and trade-offs 
can come to exist between energy (and environmental) dilemmas and measures proposed to ameliorate 
these. 
Incorporating aspects of energy systems traditionally viewed as either production or consumption with 
the same metric can also be viewed as responding to calls in energy justice discourse to move beyond 
what Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017) refer to as the “production and consumption binary”. Using the 
same well-being framing to articulate why these issues are of normative import also resonates with a 
recurring theme throughout this thesis - that many, if not all our actions in energy research have a 
normative end, and that once we explore what these ends are we may often find they are the same. This 
logic therefore sets the foundation for another component of this thesis: that a viable and effective way 
to articulate these ends is through the language of capability and well-being.  
The purpose of a capabilities conception of well-being is two-fold. First, and as illustrated in this 
chapter, the capability approach provides a set of concepts which can be readily expanded to incorporate 
and articulate the impacts of complex systems and change on the things people and communities hold 
valuable i.e. it provides a language through which to connect abstract sets of values to “concrete” 
structures.  Second, and closely intertwined with the first, accounts of capabilities set out a normative 
logic as to why capability should be morally important and by some accounts can act as a metric of 
justice. This is achieved through drawing on the threshold-based partial theory of justice set out in 
Nussbaum (2001). This latter point forms an important first step in developing more viable accounts of 
energy justice – a key aim of this thesis - in that this brings the production-consumption binary into the 
domain of a partial theory of justice. This chapter illustrates that energy production, the accompanying 
environmental change, and energy system transformations can all deprive people of threshold levels of 
key capabilities and why such circumstances can be viewed as unjust.   
This chapter served as a partial foundation for both proceeding chapters. With respect to the third 
chapter, this chapter serves as an example of using moral theory to frame and analyse an energy 
dilemma with the ends of producing a richer understanding of the dilemmas and relevant normative 
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guidance. In respect to chapter four, this chapter motivates the integration of capabilities into an account 
of energy justice.  
5.1.2 Chapter 3: Substantiating Energy Justice: creating a space to understand energy 
dilemmas 
This chapter initially responded to the first set of research questions by critically reviewing current 
approaches to energy justice, “the triumvirate approach” and the “principled approach” based on their 
overarching goals, strategies for achieving these goals, and their philosophical foundations. A key point 
of comparison between these components was the use of moral philosophy and the normative 
assumptions embedded in the respective approaches goals and strategies (the next chapter showed that 
the former was particularly underdeveloped for the TCEJ). In other words this chapter asked where 
does the use of moral theory start and end in these approaches?  
Asking this question was not only key to illustrating and critiquing these approaches’ use of moral 
theory but also in highlighting the extent to which their proponents incorporate values prescribed by 
moral theory into their broader agendas. For both major approaches reviewed, the TCEJ and the 
principled approach, cut-offs, and issues with the application of justice were found (these are discussed 
in more detail in the key findings). A key issue facing the TCEJ was the inherent tensions between its 
own moral grounding, its critique of preceding environmental justice discourse, and the subsequent 
advocation for top-down approaches to resolving energy dilemmas. A key issue regarding the principled 
approach was the absence of clear reasoning as to why we should use one set of moral ideas to frame 
energy dilemmas over another. In the absence of this reasoning the selection of moral theory risks being 
perceived as selected based on the authors own normative intuitions. However, it was more difficult to 
be critical of the principled approach given it aims to and successfully produces a discrete output i.e. 
the normative checklist and in general makes more refined claims than its TCEJ counterpart.  
Following this review the chapter turned to the second line of enquiry on the role of moral theory in 
exploring energy dilemmas and developing ideas of energy justice. The remainder of this chapter set 
out a framework outlined a pluralistic approach to framing and analysing energy dilemmas in reference 
to broader sets of social and political concepts which moral theories describe. This framework 
illustrated the that different moral theories will paint substantially different pictures of the same 
dilemmas and therefore offer different guidance. The framework also outlined a suitable and viable 
means of using theory as an analytical tool, and in some cases as part of a space in which to better 
understand those who endure energy dilemmas, without necessarily specifying a set of moral 
prescriptions. Importantly this space envisioned the use of certain moral concepts to help those who 
endure energy dilemmas articulate their own experiences. The application of the framework to the case 
study of the Hirakud Dam also illustrated that certain moral and political theories may offer more 
relevant concepts to articulate and relate the valuable aspects of people’s and communities’ lives to 
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energy systems. A key motivation behind this chapter, was to illustrate the potential use of moral theory 
in assessing and responding to energy dilemmas, an implicit point throughout however is that moral 
theory will not definitively tell us what the “right thing to do” is. This relates to an important but 
understated aspect of this chapter; that by outlining the potential application of moral theory to energy 
dilemmas, we are also highlighting the limitations of moral theory; that it can help us understand energy 
dilemmas but can also ignore or mischaracterise situations, and that it can help inform decision-makers 
and power-holders with different perspectives but may not necessarily influence them.  
5.1.3 Chapter 4: Redefining energy justice: integrating capabilities and trivalent 
justice 
This chapter revisits and partially redefines how a trivalent conception of justice, integrated with a 
capabilities-based approach, can act as a foundation for a viable account of the of energy justice. Based 
on a critical review of current accounts and two applications of the TCEJ, I emphasise that a redefined 
trivalent space can be used to broadly reflect the demands being made by those who endure energy 
dilemmas. However, I argue that on its own, the trivalent space lacks the exploratory and explanatory 
power to frame and analyse how energy dilemmas interact with the goods people and communities hold 
to be valuable. This is compounded by the underdeveloped account of the interactions between 
distributional, recognition-based, and procedural justice at the centre of the TCEJ. In this respect, this 
chapter responded to both sets of research questions, it critiqued a current approach to energy justice’s 
use of moral and political theory and illustrated how we might use certain moral and political concepts 
to better develop ideas of energy justice. 
This critical review of applications of the TCEJ also highlighted the flawed method of applying such a 
framework to case studies. Unlike trivalent accounts of environmental justice, which used theory to 
articulate recurring claims of disparate environmental movements, the TCEJ does not draw on case 
studies or the demands of certain movements to inform its own structure but rather imposes its structure 
on these studies. This is not to say the recognition-based, distributional, and procedural issues are not 
afoot in these case studies, but that by shoe horning aspects of case studies into one of three categories 
of injustice without further theoretical engagement, risks missing particular and understudied aspects 
of these issues. On this basis, I argue for the integration of additional concepts to the trivalent account 
of energy justice, which can help better capture and articulate the unique relationships between energy 
systems and ideas of justice and therefore better justify the need for energy justice approaches. 
Drawing on chapters two and three, I show how the capabilities conception of human well-being is a 
sensitive metric of justice that can contribute to our understanding of energy dilemmas. Importantly, 
capability can aid in articulating how matters of procedure, mis, and mal-recognition and 
maldistributions interact to impact people’s lives. I then argue that the integration of the capabilities 
approach into energy justice thinking offers a means of displacing the antiquated conceptions of people 
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as “individuals” that underpin many mainstream participatory procedures, through offering a space in 
which people and communities can articulate their own values and interests in reference to energy 
systems.  
It is important to note that this paper shifted focus from the principled approach entirely. As mentioned 
in chapter one, the TCEJ draws more focus in this thesis because of it is broader claims of producing 
normative guidance and improving on existing grounded theories such as environmental and climate 
justice.  
5.2 Key findings: shortcomings in energy justice  
As has become evident much of the novel content within this thesis was motivated by limitations within 
current approaches to energy justice. These issues are summarised below:  
1. The compartmentalisation and use of moral theory 
The idea of using moral theory to frame energy dilemmas and guide energy decision making is prevalent 
in energy justice discourse. However, the application of these theories is often confined to analytical 
aspects of energy justice scholarship and values from these theories are rarely used reflexively to assess 
and inform on other theoretical and strategic aspects of these approaches. A common issue in both 
approaches was that although they draw on moral theory and make moral claims, they are not often 
presented as arguments, but instead tend to consist of statements without clearly underlined premises 
to support them. This relates back to the method of scrutinising the soundness of arguments based on 
the premises which underpin them in chapter one.  
The TCEJ 
The most apparent example of this was the TCEJ’s goal of “providing all people in all areas with safe, 
sustainable and affordable energy”, which seems intuitive and hard to dispute but the TCEJ never turns 
its trivalent frame to focus on justifying this goal.  
A key finding from chapter three was that the TCEJ’s use of moral theory was seemingly limited to its 
analytical framing, the TCEJ’s “top-down” approach, inclusion of recognition justice and critiques of 
activist led, bottom-up, environmental movements appeared to sit in tension to one another. 
Highlighting this tension, illustrates that the use of moral theory within the TCEJ does not expand to its 
overarching strategies and goals. To frame energy dilemmas as resulting in or from issues of recognition 
and then to advocate for remedies through structures which may exclude and misrecognise the groups 
who initially aired the grievance, clearly illustrates where the use of moral theory begins and ends within 
the TCEJ. 
The Principled Approach 
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The principled approach is successful in using a range of moral theories to frame different energy 
dilemmas, but less so in justifying why one theory should be used to frame a certain energy dilemma 
over another. When considering the question of the termination of moral theory, it becomes apparent 
that the use of moral theory ends where the proponents of this approach begin selecting different moral 
framings. In other words, the normative assumptions as to which issues counts as morally problematic 
and then which moral frame to apply to this issue illustrate the cut-off for the use of moral theory. This 
is because each moral frame will yield, often drastically, different normative insights and guidance. 
Without a justification as to why each frame is suitable for analysing a particular dilemma we are left 
to assume that these framings and their subsequent outcomes aligned with the authors own existing 
normative assumptions – as opposed to helping inform or change these assumptions. This is admittedly 
a more ambiguous, less clear cut-off point than the TCEJs, but raises some interesting questions 
regarding the limitations of drawing on moral theory and the reasons we might give to do so. 
2. Scarce opportunity to develop energy justice  
The method of application of energy justice frameworks has left little space for reflexivity. This is partly 
because of the rigid applications of energy justice frameworks, as illustrated by chapter 4, where 
different cases are categorised as opposed to analysed, this particularly applies to the TCEJ. Jenkins et 
al. (2020) have recently highlighted the tendency of energy justice scholarship of restating an over-
arching definition of energy justice without detailing it further. This rigidity has impeded the 
exploration of what aspects of energy dilemmas make them unique enough normative phenomena to 
justify the creation of energy justice frameworks. The principled approach, by outlining a refined and 
more specific output – the “normative check-list”, is less susceptible to this limitation.   
3. The ability of moral theory to frame and connect issues which transcend the production-
consumption binary 
Consistent calls to view energy dilemmas within a whole systems framing have not been met with any 
clear framework as to how we might understand these issues within the same moral frame, for example, 
how might we compare and connect the moral weight of issues traditionally framed as either 
consumption or production. Energy justice approaches are able to conceptualise and embed these issues 
within the same systems, but they are less able to draw out the ethical connections and tensions between 
such issues.  
4. Overstatement of the abilities of moral theory to create change 
Core approaches to energy justice consistently produce claims and suggest that the use of energy justice 
frameworks, derived from different moral concepts, can create more “equitable”, “fair” and “just” 
energy systems. There is often an implicit assumption that the creation of energy systems that embody 
these values is a matter of envisioning the right moral or justice framework and making this accessible 
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to decision-makers. In other words, the assumption that characterising justice and injustice in the “right 
way” will result in power shifts and actual change. The absence of any substantial discussion on issues 
surrounding relativity and differences between moral theories compounds these issues and has gone 
largely underexplored in current energy justice scholarship, as have the spaces in which we might be 
better understand competing claims to justice. 
5.3 Key contributions of this thesis 
These contributions are framed in reference to the findings above. Each numbered contribution 
corresponds to the numbered limitation raised above. In this sense, this section connects the first set of 
research questions, regarding the current state of approaches to energy justice, to the second set 
regarding the use of moral theory in understanding energy dilemmas and developing ideas of energy 
justice.  
1. Expanding the use of moral theory 
Chapter three developed a methodology for the use of moral theory in framing energy dilemmas and 
showed how different moral concepts can produce novel insights and normative guidance when applied 
to an energy dilemma. Chapter three set out a broad, pluralistic approach which tests the ability of 
different moral concepts to capture and explain the problematic aspects of energy dilemmas. The 
pluralism in this approach stemmed from the idea that consulting multiple theories, each with different 
conceptions of “the good”, can be useful in exploring energy dilemmas, so long as this is done pensively 
and with an awareness of potential flaws of using moral theory in this way. Firstly, that the selection of 
a moral frame, is itself a normative choice, and one which requires justification - as illustrated in chapter 
three of this thesis, different moral theories applied to the same case study will yield substantially 
different normative framings and guidance. Second, and closely related to the first point, is that a sole 
moral theory will not always have the language or concepts necessary to articulate and reflect certain 
types of oppression or grievances.  
This pluralistic approach helps to uncover the tendencies of certain theories to conceal or reveal 
dynamics underpinning or perpetuating an energy dilemma. Further, by incorporating and testing more 
theories the range of concepts available to explore and better understand energy dilemmas grows. This 
pluralistic approach was positioned as a means of extending the role of moral theory in existing energy 
justice approaches to scrutinise or substantiate their broader strategic goals and visions.   
2. Developing energy justice 
The pluralistic approach discussed above provided one means of developing and refining existing work 
on energy justice. However, the development of energy justice need not be confined to refining existing 
energy justice approaches.  
113 
 
A key critique of the TCEJ in chapter four was that its rigid application to existing energy dilemmas 
provided little insight or detail on the dynamics underpinning energy dilemmas. Furthermore, it was 
argued that the approach did not provide the concepts necessary to better develop the spaces in which 
we come to understand the impacts of energy dilemmas. Chapter four illustrates how the integration of 
capabilities with a trivalent account of justice can form the foundations of a viable account of justice. 
The presence of the capabilities approach does not only serve a descriptive purpose but also a set of 
concepts which can operationalise core procedural and recognition-based values at the centre of this 
account.  
A key aspect of this account is that its application does not have to pertain directly to the descriptive 
account. Rather, the account can describe values which require additional concepts and tools to 
operationalise. A central feature of this, revolves around the procedural realm and developing the 
participatory spaces in which grievances about energy dilemmas are heard and understood. The 
capabilities approach was suggested as providing a way to outline the things a person or community 
need requires to meaningfully engage within a participatory space.  
3. The ability of moral theory to frame and connect issues which transcend the production-
consumption binary 
Chapter two presented a theoretical synthesis of different capability-based concepts which were used 
to create a space in which to embed issues commonly associated with energy production or consumption 
within the same conceptual space. This was achieved using the example of the impacts of climate 
change, well-being dependence on fossil fuel derived energy, and proposals aimed at reducing the use 
of fossil fuels. The synthesis of ecological meta-capabilities, capability conflicts, and the framework set 
out in Day et al. (2016) illustrated that the same moral concept could be used to frame and articulate 
the ethical aspects of substantially different issues associated with energy systems. This framing created 
a means to illustrate the complexity and tensions between different energy dilemmas within the same 
system. This enables energy justice scholarship to move beyond characterising these impacts as 
connected technically through the same system, and instead to view them as morally intertangled in the 
pursuit or deprivation of the same values.  
Chapter three’s pluralistic approach provided a means of testing moral theories’ abilities to explain and 
connect these issues. This approach illustrated how certain theories can capture the trade-offs involved 
in energy developments. In the case study on the Hirakud Dam, the moral framings were applied to 
both the impacts of the dams construction and the benefits of the electricity it supplied, illustrating that 
the same theory can be applied to and connect issues of production and consumption.   
4. The abilities of moral theory to contribute to change 
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Chapter four focused exclusively on the TCEJ. This was in part because chapter three found the 
principled approach more reserved in its claims and goals, producing a discrete output i.e. the normative 
checklist. Whereas the TCEJ literature was shown to make consistent claims regarding the ability of 
the approach to produce viable normative guidance and change. Chapter four thus explored whether the 
moral theory employed in the TCEJ was useful in understanding energy dilemmas. Concluding that the 
TCEJ’s moral underpinnings lacked explanatory power and the findings often did not appear to be 
derived from the application of moral concepts, chapter four moved to propose a foundation for a 
redefined and capability-integrated, trivalent account of energy justice.  
Chapter four illustrated there are more steps involved in the use and application of moral concepts in 
creating change. This initial foundation was positioned as primarily descriptive, in that it was intended 
to describe and capture the frequent dynamics underpinning energy dilemmas, as opposed to be directly 
applied to energy dilemmas to produce guidance. Instead, the avenues for change stemming from such 
an account arise through its ability to inform on necessary and sufficient conditions for meaningful 
engagement in procedural spaces. This is based on the ideas presented by Schlosberg (2009) that 
distributive and recognition-based issues play out in the procedural realm.  
A final contribution in the remainder of this thesis, is how then can this foundational account and the 
procedural spaces that stem from it be developed? In this sense, it responds more broadly to questions 
regarding the ability of moral theory to inform on and contribute to change.  
5.4 Limitations 
This section outlines the limitations of the work contained in this thesis so far. Following sections seek 
to address these limitations by outlining possible avenues for future research. 
Realistically assessing the role of moral theory in changing energy systems 
Much of the work contained in this thesis focuses on improving the use of moral theory but not 
necessarily on pointing to means of improving how we respond to energy dilemmas. This thesis has 
repeatedly argued that current approaches to energy justice do not draw on moral theory in a substantive 
enough manner to generate original or novel ideas for change. The goal and expectation of change could 
have been stated and decoupled more clearly, especially in chapter two. In other words, the role of 
moral theory in energy justice jumps to creating “fairer” or more “just” energy systems. The role of 
moral theory in this thesis is to better characterise and articulate the impacts of energy dilemmas. Of 
course, in some ways the use of moral theory is to envision something “better” or “fairer”, and therefore 
motivate change, but the scope for change resulting from the use of moral theory is more muted than 
proponents of current energy justice approaches have argued. It is preferable to have a more reflexive 
detailed account of the intersection between energy systems and justice than not to have one, so that if 
the space for change does arise we can better reflect the views and experiences of those who the change 
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is intended to benefit. But understanding why something might be understood as unjust, even in a highly 
detailed way, does not on its own yield change.   
Recognising normativity in broader energy justice and my own research 
Throughout this thesis appeals to “justice” in energy justice scholarship have been shown to make 
substantial claims regarding the ability of justice-centric energy framings to produce more “just” or 
“fair” energy systems. Chapter one made the distinction between discrete contributions to wider energy 
justice discourse. However, chapters three and four focused almost exclusively on discrete approaches 
to energy justice. I want to stress that normative theory can impact our research in how we undertake, 
share, and present it. Moral theories can help in making the case for certain structural changes to our 
energy systems, but it will not on its own, no matter how sound and coherent, result in “better” energy 
research and energy systems. As has been highlighted by Galvin (2020), it takes more than reason to 
shift and change power structures which underpin and shape our energy systems. This thesis focused 
primarily on the use of moral theory in what I referred to as “approaches” to energy justice, but broader 
energy justice discourse will also contain normative assumptions about which energy related situations 
are most pressing and which of these are most deserving of attention. These assumptions will also 
impact the ways in which these issues are researched and even the findings of such research. Looking 
forward I would advocate for extending the normative scrutiny applied in this thesis to broader energy 
justice discourse.  
This thesis has only set out proposed foundations for an account of energy justice 
This thesis has pointed in a broad direction in which to develop energy justice but has not contributed 
significantly to issues regarding the differentiation of energy and environmental justice. The need to 
separate energy justice from environmental justice remains ambiguous, especially given that many, if 
not all the dilemmas featured in energy justice scholarship feature prominently in environmental justice. 
The key differences between environmental and energy justice which revolved earlier in this thesis 
which revolved around the addition of particularised and detailed socio-technical and spatial 
descriptions of energy systems seems to remain the key differentiator between energy justice and 
environmental justice scholarship. This thesis sets a broad foundation from which to develop an account 
but by doing so attempts to shift energy justice to resemble existing trivalent accounts of environmental 
justice more closely. This might initially be viewed as regressive, however I hope earlier arguments in 
this thesis have illustrated the relative theoretical strengths of the trivalent space as articulated within 
environmental justice scholarship.  
Moral relativity 
In chapter two a pluralistic conception of the good is used to help construct a space in which to articulate 
and connect a range of values to energy dilemmas. However, I have not discussed the constraints of 
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such a space. Many views and conceptions of the good will and do conflict but I do not intend to 
succumb to moral relativism within this thesis (the idea that morality is relative and depends on 
subjective standpoints). The use of the capabilities approach helps to lessen this issue through 
suggesting all people have rights to threshold levels of various capabilities and helps point towards a 
space in which these conflicts might be better understood. However, there are some conceptions of the 
“good” or what is “right” which I would not seek to accommodate within this space. I do not detail 
these here, but we do not have to look far for conceptions of the “good” which conflict with other’s 
abilities to participate in society fairly or seek to disadvantage certain groups. 
Distributional or distributive justice 
This thesis did not address the distributional/distributive confusion apparent in the TCEJ literature and 
assumed the spatiality of justice formed a single component of contemporary distributive justice. In 
some energy justice literature distributive or distributional justice seems to refer to broad, contemporary 
distributions of certain goods in society, in other works it can be taken to describe purely the spatial 
issues surrounding energy dilemmas, as described by Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017). The TCEJ has 
never sought to clarify this, and the definition changes frequently (interestingly (Jenkins et al., 2020) 
recently notes this). This thesis therefore assumed the TCEJ was primarily referring to distributive 
justice in a contemporary sense.  
Use of language 
The use and description of moral theory in chapter two largely aligned with discussions on the 
characteristic of distributive theories of justice. The language of constitution in chapter two reads as 
overly prescriptive and in retrospect I would have framed this more tentatively as a way of producing 
understanding as opposed to constituting injustices. Although I remain sympathetic to Nussbaum’s 
arguments for this. Chapter two was also developed before I engaged with more specific energy justice 
literature, and so is not framed as responding to the limitations of any particular energy justice approach.  
Connecting cross-limitations 
Many of the limitations above are related and can be responded to by further developing the ideas set 
out within this thesis. The role of moral theory in informing change and the development of this 
foundational understanding of energy justice into a more comprehensive account are addressed in the 
proceeding sections. 
The connection and response to these limitations is based on the understanding that to produce outputs 
which can help respond to energy dilemmas requires an initial account of the dynamics which underpin 
and perpetuate energy dilemmas. Therefore, these limitations are responded to in the following order. 
Firstly, a potential route to developing a viable account of energy justice is set out. Following this, the 
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role of an account in understanding and informing the procedural spaces in which we come to better 
understand and respond to energy dilemmas is discussed.  
5.5 Energy justice: developing the conceptual and procedural research agendas 
This section sets out set out a future research agenda on developing our understanding of the ethical 
impacts of energy dilemmas. I present additional concepts which complement those already presented 
in preceding chapters of this thesis, which can help develop a viable account of energy justice. These 
sections can be read as building on the second set of research questions, on developing the use of moral 
theory in understanding energy dilemmas and more viable ideas of energy justice.  
An important distinction here is between an account and what I have so far referred to as “approaches” 
to energy justice. By account I mean a descriptive work on the general dynamics which underpin energy 
dilemmas. When I have used approach, I refer to works which have been designed to be directly applied 
to an energy dilemma i.e. the TCEJ and the principled approach. Importantly the foundation for an 
account of energy justice I outline below is not intended to be directly applied to energy dilemmas but 
rather to detail the underpinning dynamics of energy dilemmas (perhaps more importantly, I should 
emphasise this is just the foundation of an account, not a fully-fledged work).  
Unlike approaches to energy justice, this account is not primed for rapid application to energy dilemmas. 
Instead this account is intended to create a reflexive space in which to understand energy dilemmas. 
The most useful form this might take is a description of the things people and communities need to do 
and be to engage meaningfully in procedural spaces and how energy dilemmas interact with these. 
Through doing so this account can contribute to the formation of effective spaces in which we can better 
learn about the impacts of energy dilemmas on the things we value.  
5.5.1 Towards a viable account of energy justice 
This section outlines how sufficientarian ideals can contribute to a foundational account of energy 
justice, through helping to articulate and understand the impacts of excessive and insufficient levels of 
capabilities in relation to energy systems. A central narrative in chapter four is that the prevailing 
approach to energy justice, the TCEJ, has not followed the same logic as its comparable predecessor, 
Schlosberg’s trivalent account of environmental justice (Schlosberg, 2009). Instead of creating an 
account to characterise a set of movements, demands, and dynamics the TCEJ has mischaracterised this 
trivalent space manifesting instead a set of tenets which are to be applied to energy systems. In a sense 
the TCEJ has omitted this step of creating an initial account of energy justice. This section outlines 
potential uses and components of such an account.  
As explorations and documentation of energy dilemmas increases so does the scope and potential for 
the creation of a viable account of energy justice. By “viable” I mean an account of energy justice which 
serves to effectively reflect under-theorised dynamics which underpin energy related injustice. As 
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outlined in chapter four, a trivalent conception of justice would likely form a functional foundation for 
this account. This is because there is ample evidence from intersecting environmental justice issues that 
these themes and dynamics arise in the claims of those who are impacted by energy dilemmas (Walker, 
2012, Schlosberg, 2009). Chapter four briefly touches on capability based sufficientarian accounts of 
justice (Nielsen et al., 2017, Axelsen and Nielsen, 2015). I see these accounts in the future being a key 
mediator in growing discussions of sufficiency regarding access to energy, especially as these 
discussions are yet to draw on ideas of sufficiency drawing from moral perspectives (See O’Neill et al., 
2018, Darby and Fawcett, 2018, Monyei et al., 2018). 
One attempt to develop the viability of existing approaches to energy justice can be found in Pellegrini-
Masini et al. (2020), who connect the TCEJ and the principled approach by explicating their shared 
egalitarian roots. Pellegrini-Masini et al. (2020) argue that both approaches share grounding in formal 
and substantive equality – ideas of equal political and material and opportune standing. Pellegrini-
Masini et al. (2020 p.6) suggest understanding energy justice in this way is beneficial for several 
reasons:  
“…it appears likely that EJ, if it were evident that it is rooted in equality, would be more easily 
understood, translated into policy, and possibly advocated for, by a considerable number of 
policymakers, thereby implying that it would be easier to evaluate EJ policies in terms of their 
outcomes. Further, their acceptance by the public might increase if they were perceived to reflect 
egalitarian principles.” 
Key to Pellegrini-Masini et al. (2020) argument is the work of Kymlicka (2002) who argues that any 
theory of justice attempts to define the conditions of a society in which all people are treated as equals.  
“On Dworkin's view, every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality. 
They are all 'egalitarian' theories (Dworkin: 1977 179-83; 1983: 24; 1986: 296-301; 1987: 7-8; cf. Nagel 
1979: m). That suggestion is clearly false if by 'egalitarian theory' we mean a theory which supports an 
equal distribution of income. But there is another, more abstract and more fundamental, idea of equality 
in political theory-namely, the idea of treating people 'as equals'.” (Kymlicka, 2002 pp.4-5) 
I agree with Pellegrini-Masini et al. (2020) and Kymlicka (2002) and in this sense this argument also 
applies to the content of this thesis. There is an underlying assumption within this thesis that all people 
are of equal standing. However, if we are to consider the matter of difference that capabilities seek to 
address – that different people will require more or less resources to achieve the same outcomes – then 
this abstract notion of equality is less useful in understanding variances in peoples vulnerability to 
energy dilemmas. We desire some abstract type of capability but may not desire an equal distribution 
of resources – or even capability. This is where ideas of thresholds and sufficiency become useful in 
developing an account of energy justice. 
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Capability based sufficientarian accounts provide principles to guide the distributions and limits on key 
capabilities after their threshold levels have been achieved (Axelsen and Nielsen, 2015). These 
principles differ for abstract and material goods. For example, once the threshold level of political 
participation has been met, it is desirable from a democratic point of view for that level to be equal to 
every other persons – this may indicate the need for specific measures to ensure no one person’s political 
capabilities exceed another’s. However, it may make less sense to equalise other capabilities - the 
capability of bodily health for example – there is no reason society should seek to equalise our bodily 
health to that of Serena Williams as long as we all have the capability to achieve an adequate, threshold 
level of health to engage meaningfully in society. Axelsen and Nielsen (2015) describes this logic: 
“Making people free from duress, then, entails making them free from great obstacles to pursue a 
successful life. With respect to some capabilities, this will mean giving people a relatively equal level—
either because their relative position directly determines their absolute capabilities for success or 
because they influence these indirectly.” pp.425-426 
To be clear this is not an argument against the idea that all humans are equal, but rather that abstract 
notions of formal or substantive equality to do not scale down when discussing the less abstract things 
we value. Equalising access is not necessarily useful when energy access is the focus of attention. 
Interestingly, members of public have voiced ideas which parallel ideas of sufficient levels of energy 
access to support a range of activities and practices to be able to engage meaningfully in society (Demski 
et al., 2019).  
I would also be wary of a focus on equality resulting in a shift of focus to the distributive realm, paying 
attention to an equal distribution of energy access as opposed to the capabilities energy access enables. 
I would stress that although equality should be a central value at the core of any account of energy 
justice, it does not necessarily serve to inform the ways in which we should respond to or understand 
energy dilemmas. 
Axelsen and Nielsen (2015) capture the difficulty in separating egalitarian and sufficientarian ideas in 
their sufficiency as freedom from duress: 
“It may seem, then, that freedom from duress is merely an egalitarian wolf in sufficientarian sheep’s 
clothing. This, however, is due to the unjust distribution that defines the world we currently live in, 
which constitutes the grim frame of reference within which we compare different distributive ideals. 
Under such circumstances, distributive improvements that conform to egalitarian, prioritarian, and 
sufficientarian ideals can be difficult to distinguish because of broad agreement (among political 
philosophers!) about giving priority to relieving the suffering of the severely poor.” pp.425-426 
Chapter two of this thesis focused on capability-conflicts which can occur when people excessively 
exercise certain capabilities. Moving forward ideas of sufficiency provide means of legitimising 
120 
 
measures to limit the excess capabilities of some for the sake of others and can contribute to our 
understanding the need to prioritise access to certain levels of energy services. To move towards a viable 
account of energy justice, we require concepts which can inform on the things people and communities 
require to achieve a range of outcomes. To achieve a sufficient set of capabilities that constitute a good 
life requires a sufficient level of access to energy, and to participate meaningfully in society and 
procedural spaces requires sufficient levels of certain capabilities. In developing this account of energy 
justice ideas of sufficiency can help to grasp these circular relationships.  
The purpose of developing such an account of energy justice is to produce an over-arching 
understanding of the dynamics that underpin and perpetuate energy dilemmas. It is important to stress 
that this account is not intended to be applied to energy dilemmas but instead to learn from and adjust 
its scope to reflect the ethical issues which arise in relation to them.  
Key to developing this account of energy justice is the idea that to contribute to change we must first 
have a deeper understanding of the unique dynamics which underpin energy dilemmas. It is therefore 
important to recognise the benefits which can flow a viable account of energy justice. Such an account 
can inform on the areas which can be practically developed, such as the spaces in which we explore and 
come to better understand the impacts of energy dilemmas, namely, the procedural realm. The following 
sections therefore outlines several procedural considerations which could stem from developing this 
account of energy justice. The motivations for these considerations are framed well by summarising 
and responding to Galvin (2019). 
5.5.2 Developing the procedural realm 
Galvin (2019 p.178) critiques existing energy justice approaches’ loose use of the term justice, noting 
that existing approaches to energy justice are yet to explore what it means to make a moral claim and 
aptly stating “we are left to assume or imagine what is in the authors’ minds when they do this”. Galvin 
argues that asking leaders and decision makers to make decisions based on a particular theoretical 
understanding of justice is unlikely to win their backing.  
Galvin makes a distinction between what he terms a rational meta-physical view and a pragmatist 
view.43 Galvin (2019 p.178) describes the rational meta-physical view as treating moral claims as if they 
were statements of right and wrong which exist “in some reified metaphysical realm” and which “can 
be discovered and explored by rational thinking”, and describes the pragmatist view as treating moral 
claims as “really nothing more than statements about human affect (feelings, wants, preferences)”. He 
goes on to argue that energy justice requires something in between these two views.  
 
43 This initially seems like Sen’s ideas of realised-focused comparison and transcendentalism outlined at the 
beginning of this thesis. On reflection I do not think Galvin’s distinction captures the same dynamics of imaging 
a completely just world verses comparing possible worlds that Sen’s does. This is not necessarily a criticism of 
Galvin’s distinction – his distinction aims towards a different end – but it is worth noting to avoid confusion.  
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Galvin proposes a Wittgensteinian approach to moral claims can serve as this in between. In this 
Wittgensteinian approach moral beliefs are seen as “formed in communities through people’s practices 
and discourse; individuals develop moral impulses, commitments, beliefs and behaviour as part of 
growing up, learning how to live in relation to others, and becoming functional human beings whose 
lives have meaning” p.182.  
Galvin argues that although our moral beliefs are initially “thick” and develop based on local experience 
we can extend our beliefs in a “thin” manner to widespread and global issues as we develop morally. 
Finally, Galvin argues that we must appeal to decision-makers already developed moral characters to 
have issues and findings of energy justice discourse taken seriously and acted on. 
I broadly agree with Galvin’s critique of existing energy justice work but to a lesser extent, his 
sentiments regarding the use of moral concepts in informing ideas of justice. I do not believe that 
understanding moral claims in this way, at least on its own, helps us to better understand, convey and 
respond to energy dilemmas. In responding to Galvin’s arguments below, I also point to a number of 
areas which are useful in outlining required developments in energy justice thinking more broadly. 
First, the idea that appealing to leader’s “already developed moral character” will result in change. The 
past decade of austerity, growing poverty – in many forms, and the work to distract from or deny this 
by recent leaders of the UK, suggests at the very least that leaders of the UK have a substantially 
different “moral character” to those of us who see these issues as morally wrong or are not “morally 
developed” at all. Watch any number of prime minister’s questions, where a series of the UK’s leaders 
have had testimonies of those living in hunger and fuel poverty read to them and you will see a denial 
or dismissal of these claims.44 Appealing to our leaders’ moral character does not always seem like a 
steadfast way to create change.45  
The second aspect of Galvin’s proposal I find problematic is the absence of moral theory in contributing 
to our understanding and articulation of justice. We cannot prove or disprove the extent to which ideas 
of freedom, inalienable rights, honour, harmony, or ideas of equality, which permeate different societies 
around the world, originate from lived experience or from theorising. It seems instead that there is a 
broad synergy between the two. It is difficult to dispute that axial thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, 
Confucius, and Buddha have not in some way shaped modern conceptions of what is good or right, just 
as it would be difficult to dispute that their own views were informed by their experiences. 
 
44 For examples see: https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2019/may/prime-ministers-questions-15-may-
2019/ and https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2020/june/prime-ministers-questions-17-june-2020/,  
45 It is interesting that Galvin suggests this as a means of developing energy justice. Elsewhere Galvin’s (2020) 
work on connecting energy justice to the civil rights movements, suggests the contrary, arguing powerful 
interests do not give up their privileges through polite conversation and non-disruptive practices.   
122 
 
Of course, it is also difficult to dispute the sentiments that using Rawls’ (1971) A theory of justice to 
explain why fuel poverty is morally problematic to the House of Commons would not be particularly 
appealing or compelling. But the use of moral theory to make such cases is more complex than this. As 
illustrated in chapter three of this thesis, there is a place for the pensive use of such theories in shaping 
how we might explore, understand, and then articulate certain moral claims. This is pertinent when 
these claims relate to complex issues which people and communities might initially have difficulty 
decoupling or articulating – this is especially the case when attempting to decouple our values from 
particular types of technology (Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017).  
The omission of relativity, adaptive preferences, and hermeneutical injustice also pose problems for 
Galvin’s proposition. The argument that moral character is developed through people’s practices and 
discourses does not offer a means to distinguish or critique the relativity of conflicting moral beliefs, 
nor does it offer a way to help people or groups identify and articulate hardships or forms of oppression 
in their lives. For example, how are we to argue that a person “who doesn’t believe in taking handouts” 
and believes “people should work for what they get” is not morally developed. This person evidently 
holds a moral code, developed from experience and this code may well appeal to leaders who are 
similarly “morally developed”, even if this moral character does not lend itself to understanding and 
responding to certain types of hardship and oppression which underpin or result from energy dilemmas. 
I am not disputing Galvin’s argument but rather the idea that “developed moral character” can be relied 
on to produce and receive moral testimonies that contribute to redressing issues at the centre of energy 
justice discourse. In a sense Galvin is in danger of proposing that to be morally mature is to agree with 
his own moral beliefs.  
The idea of adaptive preferences outlined by Sen (2001) is an important consideration when discussing 
the formation of moral character. Adaptive preferences refer to situations whereby a person comes to 
prefer certain circumstances which might limit their ability to flourish. We can imagine a situation in 
which a young woman has internalised the belief that it is right she undertakes domestic work and does 
not seek education (Nussbaum, 2001)46. It is difficult to say she is not morally developed - even with 
compelling reasons to dispute her own beliefs, doing so can challenge her autonomy and boarder on 
paternalism (See Khader, 2012)47.  
Miranda Fricker’s work on hermeneutical injustice outlines how certain groups may not have the 
concepts necessary to effectively articulate certain forms of hardship or oppression they are 
experiencing (Fricker, 2007, Also see Goetze, 2018). The use of additional moral concepts can help in 
 
46 We do not have to imagine this, there are many accounts, see Nussbaum, (2001) and Khader, (2012).    
47 This issue is more complex than I have space to explore here and admittedly I remain ignorant to many of 
these complexities.  
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articulating such grievances and dynamics. This also poses an issue for Galvin’s proposal as certain 
groups may require additional theorising or concepts to meaningfully articulate their experiences.  
In sum, I agree that moral beliefs are heavily influenced by and derived from experience, but I am 
concerned that the development, articulation, and communication of moral beliefs are more complex 
than Galvin’s description makes room for. Even if our moral beliefs develop from experience, they 
require more than a morally developed character to be meaningfully articulated, heard, and understood 
- especially in reference to complex systems or previously under theorised experiences.  
Responding to Galvin (2019) points to a necessary feature of a viable approach energy justice: people 
may sometimes need additional concepts or capabilities to articulate and connect their values to an 
energy dilemma. The following subsections point towards plausible means of outlining and creating 
spaces which help provide these concepts and capabilities. 
5.5.3 Energy justice and procedural spaces 
The discussion of Galvin (2019) above regarding the barriers which might prevent a person from 
articulating their grievances point towards the need for certain types of spaces to facilitate the 
articulation and connection of people’s values to energy dilemmas. Despite a significant focus on 
procedural aspects of justice, little energy justice scholarship has sought to develop or critique the 
processes and spaces through which people and communities participate. Instead, as illustrated in 
chapter four, discussions on procedural justice within energy justice approaches do not generally extend 
beyond broad and ambiguous calls for “equitable procedures” and “representation”. However, in other 
disciplines critiques and attempts to reimagine contemporary and traditional modes of participation are 
growing in number (Pallett et al., 2019, Chilvers et al., 2018, Chilvers and Pallett, 2018, Pallett, 2019). 
These critiques focus on residual realist aspects of contemporary modes of participation, such as 
conceptions of participants as rational and autonomous individuals, participation occurring as discrete 
“one-off” instances and as underpinned the pre-defined norms and models (Chilvers and Kearnes, 
2015). In place of these contemporary aspects these approaches seek to reimagine participation as a 
relational series of entangled and interrelated involvement in different participatory spaces, which are 
continuous reflexive and co-productionist (Chilvers and Kearnes, 2015). 
The theme throughout this thesis of assessing and identifying where normative assumptions are going 
un-checked can be aptly extended to the procedural realm. As opposed to talking about specific pieces 
of technology we value, we instead talk about specific values certain technology might support or 
disrupt (Demski et al., 2019, Demski et al., 2015). Capability provides ample language and concepts 
through which to separate our values from technology to enable these relationships to be articulated. 
This relates back to the exercise outlined in chapter one on Aristotle’s ultimate end, whereby we 
continually inquire about the end to which an activity aims to find the ultimate outcome which renders 
something useful in our lives. The important aspect of this was to separate the capability from the object 
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which delivers or impedes it to ensure that the means we rely on do not come to dictate what we 
ultimately value (Also see Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017 who does this using a similar but distinct 
theory of human needs). Where such spaces are applicable the appeal of a capability centred 
participation is three-fold.48  
First, capability can inform on both the abstract and material goods a person may require to 
meaningfully engage in a procedural space. As discussed, in chapters two and four a capability 
conception of well-being can be used to outline and highlight various components of well-being that 
must be attained for a person to engage meaningfully in political and procedural spaces. For example, 
capabilities relating to health and education are essential in enabling meaningful participation in society. 
In this way the integration of the capability into an account of energy justice lends itself to disputing 
the conceptions of people at the centre of many modes of participation, creating a space in which a more 
complex and nuanced understanding of a person can emerge. Work on relational aspects of the 
capability approach also contribute to understanding the necessary requirements to engage 
meaningfully  in procedural spaces and align well with the emerging relational understandings of 
participation (See Smith and Seward, 2009). Connections between relational capabilities and access to 
energy services have already illustrated the approaches’ capacity to capture such dynamics (See 
Middlemiss et al., 2019) and can be drawn on to point towards a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationships between well-being, energy access, and participation, where each is seen as integral to the 
other.  
Second, the concept of capability can be used to help structure and articulate a person or group’s valued 
capability set, as to enable them to articulate their core values, decoupled from the structures or topic 
on which a participatory space focuses. At certain times, a pre-defined list of capabilities can serve as 
useful starting point through which to structure discussions, however that does not imply that this list 
cannot be sensitive to or shaped by the people and communities drawing on it (Nussbaum, 2001, also 
see Sen, 2005). Work using similar (although distinct) eudaimonic conceptions of well-being have been 
used to develop such spaces (Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017, Brand-Correa et al., 2018).  
Third, the idea of capability can create accessible means of understanding how these spaces contribute 
to a person’s own well-being or capability set – in other words the concept can be used to articulate the 
benefits and impacts participation can have on the things a person values doing or being. These benefits 
might be instrumental in that the act of participation results in positive changes to the topic of the 
procedure, or they may be intrinsic in that they contribute to a person’s own well-being directly. For 
example, the very act of meaningfully participating in a procedure be the exercise of a key social or 
participatory capability which forms an intrinsic part of a person’s own well-being.  Although a key 
 
48 I use the term spaces of participation, to escape using terminology that suggests that participation is confined 
to separate instances. Instead spaces can expand in size and temporality. 
125 
 
critique of contemporary forms of participation is the assumption of publics formed of autonomous 
individuals (Chilvers and Kearnes, 2015), this does not have mean autonomy itself is not valuable. It is 
still necessary to recognise and respect the autonomy of people who engage in procedural spaces 
regardless of disputes of its extent. Explicitness regarding the normativity embedded in procedural 
spaces can enhance a person’s autonomy by avoiding structures which may dictate the values and 
structures used to articulate a person’s views. By acknowledging these normative assumptions and 
allowing people to challenge or interrogate them, procedural spaces can produce more meaningful 
understandings of the things a person values before then enabling them to apply these values to the 
subject or issue on which the procedure is centred. Autonomy in this sense may be less problematic if 
it us understood as a person wielding “sovereignty” over certain spaces, in understanding that 
procedural spaces may affect how they express and connect their values to different issues49.   
This latter point speaks directly to the recurring theme within this thesis of identifying and scrutinising 
unchecked normativity. A broader application of moral theory and concepts to existing modes of 
participation can help examine where normative assumptions are embedded in existing procedural 
spaces and how these assumptions might be justified or rejected. A key question moving forward will 
be whether proposals to displace existing conceptions of participation are normatively explicit about 
the assumptions embedded within them. Future intersections between broader energy justice discourse 
and recent reimagining’s of participation presents fertile opportunities to explore what “procedural 
justice” might mean with regards to energy dilemmas.  
5.6 Concluding thoughts: the future of energy justice discourse  
This thesis has found significant scope to develop ideas of energy justice. Existing approaches of energy 
justice were shown to fall short in several ways. One major shortcoming was an inability to connect 
energy systems to things we value as to explicate the relevance of energy dilemmas in our lives. This 
thesis explored the viable uses of moral and political philosophy to help understand and make these 
connections. In turn this helped to illustrate how energy justice approaches often deviated from these 
uses of moral and political philosophy when attempting to understand energy dilemmas in a normative 
way.  
The use of moral and political theory, primarily the capabilities space, has been drawn on to illustrate 
how we can connect and articulate the impacts of substantially different energy dilemmas within the 
same moral framings. I presented a framework through which to explore the abilities of different moral 
and political concepts to capture and reveal the dynamics underpinning energy dilemmas. Further, I 
have proposed that trivalent conceptions of justice, which pre-date energy justice, can be used as a 
foundation for a descriptive account of energy justice, so long as the interdependencies between their 
 
49 Thanks to Michael Cannon for fruitful discussions on this topic. 
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constituent components (distribution, recognition, procedure) are articulated in a meaningful way. I 
have argued that a capabilities centric approach can help explicate these connections and will play a 
key role in differentiating energy justice from other grounded theories, through a specific focus on 
energy access.  
In concluding I have pointed to means of developing and understanding of the intersection of energy 
dilemmas and the things we value through shifting focus to ideas of sufficiency. I have suggested that 
the impact of such account is to be found in the procedural realm in helping people and groups achieve 
the capabilities required to articulate and connect the things they value to energy dilemmas in a 
meaningful way. The future agenda I have proposed does not necessarily lead to a framework which 
can be rapidly applied to produce abundant academic outputs but rather proposes a slower and lower 
impact avenue through which to more meaningfully understand the connections between energy 
systems and the things we value.  
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6 Appendix  
Below are short summaries of McCauley et al. (2016) and Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018), I 
recommend visiting the papers in full however. 
Table 6-1 Summary of McCauley et al. (2016) 






This section begins with a brief description of the spatiality of energy justice and suggests that 
work on maldistributions is framed based on proximity to energy infrastructure. This is 
followed by a summary of on-shore wind developments impact on indigenous Sami people’s 
and local reindeer populations, the growing risks associated with the expansion of oil and gas 
extraction and subsequent risk of oil spills associated with increased shipping routes through 
the Arctic impacting local livelihoods which depend on fishing and reindeer husbandry.   
Recognition 
pp.144 
Sami people’s livelihoods depend on fishing and reindeer herding. A point about the “under-
recognised importance of non-indigenous people” p.144 is raised by an interviewee and that 
both these communities are dependent on local ecosystems and therefore vulnerable to energy 
developments. The disparity between the energy rich area and energy provision for inhabitants 
and resulting health and living standards are noted. It is suggested that these disparities result 
from insufficient participation in wealth generating activities. The impacts of tourism on local 
populations and the need for their involvement to direct tourist flows. This is suggested to 
produce income by offering “authentic” experiences, whilst preserving local ecosystem. A 
discussion follows regarding the roll of extractive industries delivering “freedom from want” 
and a point that regional differences across Arctic communities should be respected and taken 
consideration in decision and making. This section concludes stating “beyond indigenous 
peoples, academic scholars are equally identified as under- or mis-recognised. A call for 
recognition is also clear for greater engagement of northern scholars in the identification of 
research priorities in Arctic areas.” This followed by a call to present research in accessible 




Section begins describing procedural justice as a “call for equitable procedures that engage all 
stakeholders in a non-discriminatory way” p.144. Then Argues more attention should be paid 
to knowledge creation in “procedural based decisions” in part because  “Indigenous and non-
indigenous peoples are central, for example, to monitoring the increase in tourism in the high 
north, but equally the intentions of business to develop there. Cultural pluralism is a place for 
creative industry” p.144. A need for earlier engagement in the sitting of infrastructure projects 
and some more positive examples of this are summarised. It is suggested that “procedural 
justice is therefore more than simply inclusion. It involves also the mobilization of local 
knowledge” p.145.    
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Discussion and Conclusions pp.145-146 
- Justice on a procedural level “must be an imperative to not just respect, or include but rather mobilize local 
communities within the decision making for governmental and business processes” p.145 
- “… the influence of local communities on corporations and lower level institutions within the exploitation 
processes of oil and gas, transport and processing are questionable. This self-reflection and acceptance to 
adapt must be reciprocated by energy companies, which would allow for economic growth in the region 
while minimizing the risk of local habitat and ecosystem disruption.” p.145 
-  Argument that it is important to hold energy companies to account. p.145 
- Must ensure all stakeholders are involved in future decision making. “Indeed, stakeholder engagement is 
primarily designed to ensure the inclusiveness of the decision-making process by empowering all the 
stakeholders to participate in it and have their claims taken into account” p.145 
- “However, stakeholder engagement and social accounting currently fail to achieve the goals they were 
established for. Hence a new approach to ensuring sustainability of Arctic resource extraction is needed.” 
- “We propose a justice-rather than simply a stakeholder centred perspective” p.145 
- “energy justice scholars must continue to make the case for a fair re-distribution of burdens and benefits, 
and not just make the case for due process in decision-making. The Finnmark controversy in the first 
results section underlines the extent to which indigenous peoples are subject to distributional injustices—
from a due process perspective of course, but also a proximity one as an energy infrastructure that benefits 
all, and burdens only some.” p.145 
 
 
Table 6-2 Summary of  Jenkins and Martiskainen (2018) 






Section begins arguing that current and historic definitions do not capture the complexities of 
fuel poverty and cites Bouzarovski and Petrova (2015) definition of “attain[ing] a socially and 
materially necessitated level of domestic energy services” p.38. Subsequently argues that what 
is being discussed is “what energy resources we do or do not have access to” that 
“distributional justice can reveal and help us understand” this. Claims distributional justice is 
concerned with the distribution of goods and services across society. Suggests that fuel poverty 
is a clear example of maldistribution. Notes that experience of fuel poverty differ by 
household/people/communities. Offers an early sub-conclusion we should therefore 
“anticipate and mitigate the potential impacts of our choices with a view to reducing unequal 
burdens across a wide range of contexts, including attention to the potential externalisation of 
UK energy policy ‘ills” (Jenkins and Martiskainen, 2018) p.39. Concludes access cannot 
always be evenly distributed.  
Recognition 
pp.40-42 
States “Justice as recognition is taken to be a means of engaging with the questions of ‘who’ 
is energy justice for, and, importantly, who is responsible for its provision” p.40 (Jenkins and 
130 
 
Martiskainen, 2018). Initially discusses living in cold homes, only being able to heat certain 
rooms, which limits use of home. Being able to cool a home will also be a concern; For those 
living in fuel poverty their home can become a place of discomfort, ill health, mortalities 
associated with cold homes. Notes NHS spending of £1.36 billion/year and mental health 
issues, respiratory problems, circulatory illnesses such as heart disease associated with fuel 
poverty. Notes the impact on children’s education, making homework hard to complete. Cites 
Sovacool (2015) on fuel poverty and how people become visible by experiencing the impacts 
of fuel poverty above. Quotes Walker and Day (2012) regarding fuel poverty being seen as a 
lack of recognition of the needs of certain groups – “a lack of equal respect accorded to their 
well-being”. Notes that fuel poverty is both visible and invisible and one of the largest 
challenges is establishing who is being affected. Sub-concludes “identifying those who face 
fuel poverty is key towards recognising the problem and addressing it, it is not always easy to 
identify those who are suffering” (Jenkins and Martiskainen, 2018) p.41. Stigma attached to 
being fuel-poor, “households avoid seeking help for fear of being seen not being able to cope 
with certain aspects of life” (Jenkins and Martiskainen, 2018). Suggests people may not realise 
they are living in fuel poverty and cites several national energy agencies which identify fuel 
poverty can become an issue for any group. Notes that children and the elderly and people 
with disabilities or long-term health conditions can be particularly vulnerable. Cites Sovacool 
(2015), households have neither the time nor the means to participate in energy decision-
making that might ameliorate issues. Suggests need to recognise links between policy for 
reducing fuel poverty and reducing energy demand and to develop more nuanced recognition 
of energy needs linked to vulnerability of particular groups (Gillard et al., 2017). Makes point 
about need for reflexivity regarding who is being impacted by policy and who is responsible 
for these outcomes. 
Procedure 
pp.42-43 
Describes procedural as a call for “equitable procedures that engage all stakeholders in a non-
discriminatory way” p.42. Outlines requirements of just procedures based on Walker and Day 
(2012); Access to information, what type and who it is provided by; Access to and meaningful 
participation in decision making; Minimal bias from decision makers; Access to legal 
processes to achieve redress. How and who community renewable projects are developed for 
“Fuel poverty is not an easy problem to solve. As fuel poverty has causes and implications that 
go beyond energy, addressing it will also require considering issues beyond energy policy 
*e.g. housing, social and health policy). Notes households and fuel poverty are still invisible 
in the realm of decision making. Restates point that households in fuel poverty are likely 
unable to engage in processes which might redress their situation. Discusses charitable 
organisations which provide local advice, often “stop-start” and limited in scope and funding. 
Lack of government effort to resolve these issues indicate people living in fuel poverty are still 
relatively invisible “yet accepted, losers in the UK’s energy system”. P.43 
Findings and Conclusions pp.43-55 
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- Argues that “it is within the overarching process of sociotechnical change that issues of energy justice 
emerge, where inattention to social justice issues can cause injustice, or via their inclusion can provide 
means to solve them” p.43 
- Argues for “greater engagement with the energy justice approach in both academia and in practice, where 
it can be used as a means to guide ethically sound decision making.   
- Government and business must identify vulnerable and then “ascertain and make provision for vulnerable 
customers through targeted subsidies, exemptions and efficiency measures”. p.44 
- “justice principles can provide guidelines for policy interventions by ensuring that energy efficiency 
schemes reach households in a way that meets their specific needs (Gillard et al., 2017)” p.44 
- Need policies to upgrade existing social housing stock combined with “consumer engagement programmes 
to enable participatory justice throughout this process.” p.44 
- Notes that “in terms of achieving procedural justice, funded energy cafes can act as a triage services, 
bringing together local authorities, health workers, community organisations and individuals in trusted 
settings.” And that “similar ventures require grant funding in order to provide a continued services, train 
fuel poverty advisors and transfer learning to others.” p.44 
- Argues there is a need to be aware of the impact of energy pricing and subsidies on low income, vulnerable 
consumers.  
- Final remark that “through these measures and others in the domain of energy demand, we have the 




Bouzarovski, S. & Petrova, S. 2015. A global perspective on domestic energy deprivation: 
Overcoming the energy poverty–fuel poverty binary. Energy Research & Social Science, 10, 
31-40. 
Gillard, R., Snell, C. & Bevan, M. 2017. Advancing an energy justice perspective of fuel poverty: 
Household vulnerability and domestic retrofit policy in the United Kingdom. Energy 
Research & Social Science, 29, 53-61. 
Jenkins, K. E. & Martiskainen, M. 2018. A normative approach to transitions in energy demand: an 
energy justice and fuel poverty case study. 
Mccauley, D., Heffron, R., Pavlenko, M., Rehner, R. & Holmes, R. 2016. Energy justice in the Arctic: 
Implications for energy infrastructural development in the Arctic. Energy Research & Social 
Science, 16, 141-146. 
Sovacool, B. K. 2015. Fuel poverty, affordability, and energy justice in England: Policy insights from 
the Warm Front Program. Energy, 93, 361-371. 
Walker, G. & Day, R. 2012. Fuel poverty as injustice: Integrating distribution, recognition and 
procedure in the struggle for affordable warmth. Energy Policy, 49, 69-75. 
 
